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INTRODUCTION
( OPYRIGHT is dead.! The Digital Millennium Copyright Act
("DMCA")2 has killed it. This does not mean that copyright
has or will become irrelevant to the protection of creative works in
this country. To the contrary, the exclusive rights set forth in Title
17 of the United States Code3 will continue to provide an important
source of protection for works of authorship. The term "copy-
right," however, means more than a system of protecting creative
works against unauthorized copying. Copyright signifies a system
of protection designed and intended primarily to serve the public
interest in the creation and dissemination of creative works, rather
than the private interest of enriching those who create and dis-
seminate such works.4 Where the first is copyright, the second is
mere guild monopoly. With the enactment of the DMCA, there is a
very real danger that our system of protecting creative works will
'The title is an allusion to Grant Gilmore's book The Death of Contract (1974). For
a listing of other articles and essays that have used variations on Professor Gilmore's
title, see Robert C. Denicola, Mostly Dead? Copyright Law in the New Millennium,
47 J. Copyright Soc'y 193,193-94 nn.1-12 (2000).
2Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998)
(codified in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., & 35 U.S.C.).
317 U.S.C.A. §§ 101-1332 (West 1996 & Supp. 2000).
4 United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948) ("The copyright law,
like the patent statutes, makes reward to the owner a secondary consideration."); see
also Feist Publ'ns v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991) ("The primary
objective of copyright is not to reward the labor of authors, but '[tlo promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts."') (quoting U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8);
Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) ("The immediate
effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair return for an 'author's' creative labor.
But the ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the general
public good."); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) ("The economic philosophy
behind the clause empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the
conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to
advance public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in 'Science and
useful Arts."') (quoting U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8).
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serve primarily private interests. If so, then the protection of crea-
tive works will have come full circle, from the guild monopoly of
the Stationers' Company to the guild monopoly of the DMCA, and
copyright, in the sense of protection intended primarily to serve the
public interest, will surely have died.
During the Anglo-American legal system's last experience with
guild monopoly, the Stationers' Company of London controlled
almost exclusively the publication of written works in England
from 1556 to 1694.'- As one might expect, and as courts from time
to time remind us, the Stationers' Company did not always, or even
usually, exercise its control over printing in a benign manner de-
signed to advance the public welfare as a whole.' To the contrary,
securing the profits of a favored few within the guild seemed to be
the Stationers' Company's guiding principle In the end, the Eng-
lish Parliament was persuaded by the Company's excesses to refuse
to renew the last of the Licensing Acts through which the Com-
pany had maintained its power.' A decade and a half later, those
same excesses led the English Parliament to replace guild control
with the first copyright statute, found in the 1709 Statute of Anne
The move from guild control to copyright was not merely a shift
from one means of protecting written works to another. Rather, it
was a more fundamental transformation. Where guild control
sought protection to secure the private welfare of the guild mem-
bers, copyright sought protection to secure the public welfare more
generally. To be sure, there is some overlap in these two purposes.
'J.B. Richardson, The Law of Copyright 5-14 (1913).
See Lasercomb Am. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 974 (4th Cir. 1990) (recognizing the
role of the Stationers' Company in enabling "censorship of Protestant materials");
Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, 191 F.2d 99, 100 n.3 (2d Cir. 1951)
(contrasting the commercial monopoly of the Stationers' Company with copyrights
"granted to encourage learning or for the benefit of authors") (quoting 1 Stephen P.
Ladas, The International Protection of Literary and Artistic Property 15 (1938)).
'See Harry Ransom, The First Copyright Statute 41-43, 55-57 (1956); Richardson,
supra note 5, at 6 ("During the reign of Queen Elizabeth the granting of patents to
print books was greatly abused, often extending to the sole right to print all books of a
particular class .... These patents pressed so hard on the poorer printers that
obtaining no redress by petitions to the Queen, they began to print in defiance both of
the Queen's patents, and also of the laws of the Company.").
See Richardson, supra note 5, at 13-14; Mark Rose, Authors and Owners: The
Invention of Copyright 33 (1993).
8 Ann., c. 19 (1709) (Eng.).
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A protection scheme designed to secure the public's access to a
wide variety of creative works will almost certainly lead to an inci-
dental increase in revenue for those who produce such works.
Similarly, a protection scheme designed to maximize producer
revenue will almost certainly lead to an incidental increase in the
variety of works available to the public. In the end, however, one
of these purposes must predominate, and the choice between them
creates a fundamental divide between guild monopoly and copy-
right.
At every level, a comparison of the protection available under
the Stationers' Company and the protection offered by the Statute
of Anne reflects this divide. Where the Stationers' Company ex-
tended protection to every work, even those created in the distant
past,0 the Statute of Anne extended protection only to newly cre-
ated works." Where the Stationers' Company extended protection
indefinitely,' the Statute of Anne granted protection only for a
limited time.' Where the Stationers' Company established its own
rules defining the scope of protection accorded any given work, 4
"0 Mark Rose, for example, has reprinted a letter from John Locke to Edward Clark
in which Locke asserted:
[t]hat any person or company should have patents for the sole printing of
ancient authors is very unreasonable and injurious to learning; and for those
who purchase copies from authors that now live and write, it may be reasonable
to limit their property to a certain number of years after the death of the
author, or the first printing of the book, as, suppose, fifty or seventy years. This
I am sure, it is very absurd and ridiculous that any one now living should
pretend to have a propriety in... any copy or writings of authors who lived
before printing was known or used in Europe.
Rose, supra note 8, at 33; see also Paul Goldstein, Copyright's Highway: From
Gutenberg to the Celestial Jukebox 41 (1994) ("The Stationers' rights were perpetual,
passing from one generation of printers to the next.").
"1 Actually, the Statute of Anne contained a grandfathering provision that extended
protection for twenty-one years to books already printed. 8 Ann., c. 19, § 1 (1709)
(Eng.).
12E.g., L. Ray Patterson, Understanding the Copyright Clause, 47 J. Copyright
Soe'y 365, 378 (2000).
138 Ann., c. 19, §§ 1, 11 (1709) (Eng.) (providing for fourteen-year term with a
renewal term of fourteen years).
"4Augustine Birrell, The Law and History of Copyright in Books 77-81 (photo.
reprint 1971) (1899) (noting the Company's use of its by-laws to control the effective
scope of protection for particular works); Richardson, supra note 5, at 6 ("By their
charter [the Stationers' Company] were empowered to make bye-laws binding on
their members, and the art or mystery of printing in England was strictly confined to
their body."); Patterson, supra note 12, at 378 & n.33 (noting "the Stationers'
816
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the Statute of Anne entrusted the right to define the scope of pro-
tection to a largely impartial judiciary." In its Preamble to the
Statute of Anne, the English Parliament summarized these changes
by boldly proclaiming a new purpose for protecting creative works:
"the encouragement of learning."'6 No longer would the protection
of creative works serve primarily the printing guild's private inter-
ests. Instead, protection would serve primarily to advance general
social welfare.
Seventy-eight years later, James Madison enshrined this public
purpose in Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the United States Con-
stitution, empowering Congress to enact copyright and patent
statutes "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts."17
As the Supreme Court has recognized on a number of occasions,
this Clause contains both a grant and a limitation on congressional
power."8 Congress may enact a copyright statute, but only if, and to
the extent that, it serves the public, and not merely a private, inter-
est. Following the lead England set in the Statute of Anne, the first
United States copyright statute, enacted in 1790, extended protec-
tion only to newly created works, and provided that protection for
only a limited time." It also made the judiciary, and not the pub-
lishers, the ultimate arbiters of copyright's proper scope.'0 In its
title, the first United States copyright statute proclaimed its public
purpose: "An act for the encouragement of learning."
2
'
Company had the power of self-governance and the authority to enact ordinances"
"to serve their ends").
"8 Ann., c. 19, § 1 (1709) (Eng.).
Id. at pmbl.
"U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see also Robert Patrick Merges & Glenn Harlan
Reynolds, The Proper Scope of the Copyright and Patent Power, 37 Harv. J. on Legis.
45, 56-57 (2000) (discussing the Framers' general distaste for monopolies that do not
advance the public interest).
"s See, e.g., Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5 (1966); see also Feist Publ'ns v.
Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 346-47 (1991) (discussing Congress's power to
enact copyright laws under the Constitution); Yochai Benkler, Constitutional Bounds
of Database Protection: The Role of Judicial Review in the Creation and Definition
of Private Rights in Information, 15 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 535, 539-52 (2000) (surveying
the Court's decisions on this point).
'Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124, 124.
Id. § 6 (authorizing any copyright proprietor injured by unauthorized printing or
publication of her work to recover damages "by a special action on the case founded
upon this act, in any court having cognizance thereof').
2 Id. at tit.
Virginia Law Review
For nearly three hundred years, the Statute of Anne and its suc-
cessors have retained this public interest focus. Although the
constant clamoring of copyright's propertied class has weakened
the link between copyright and its original public purpose, several
aspects of copyright law, including the originality requirement, the
idea-expression dichotomy, and the fair use doctrine, have limited
the scope and availability of copyright protection. These doctrines
have helped ensure that copyright, while protecting works of au-
thorship against infringement, has left room for future authorship
and has limited the monopoly consequences that would follow
from overbroad protection. These limitations on the availability
and extent of copyright's protection have thereby helped ensure
that copyright serves the public interest. Unfortunately, although
these limitations have been prominent features of copyright since
its birth in 1709, the DMCA may overturn these guardians of the
public interest.
Driven by the widespread dispersion of the ability to make near-
perfect and inexpensive copies, the DMCA aims to replace copy-
right's traditional approach of direct legal action against each
individual infringer with a technological lock effective against all
would-be infringers. The DMCA clearly reflects congressional
concern that, left unconstrained, digital technology would soon
place the power to make near-perfect and inexpensive copies into
every home and office.' This dispersion of copying technology cre-
ates the potential for widespread private copying, enabling
ordinary consumers to copy a work for themselves rather than pay
for an authorized copy. Although individually trivial, widespread
private copying in the aggregate could radically reduce the incen-
tive to create any given work of authorship. Moreover, in the face
of widespread private copying, copyright's traditional approach of
direct legal action against each individual infringer would likely
2 H.R. Rep. No. 105-551, pt. 2, at 25 (1998) ("[T]he Committee also recognizes that
the digital environment poses a unique threat to the rights of copyright owners, and as
such, necessitates protection against devices that undermine copyright interests. In
contrast to the analog experience, digital technology enables pirates to reproduce and
distribute perfect copies of works-at virtually no cost at all to the pirate."); S. Rep.
No. 105-190, at 8 (1998) ("Due to the ease with which digital works can be copied and
distributed worldwide virtually instantaneously, copyright owners will hesitate to
make their works readily available on the Internet without reasonable assurance that
they will be protected against massive piracy.").
[Vol. 87:813818
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prove ineffective. Lawsuits against each individual private copier
would become prohibitively expensive and politically unwise. Digi-
tal technology therefore presents a potentially serious, and
otherwise unchecked, threat to the incentives thought necessary to
ensure a continuing supply of creative works.
Nevertheless, the DMCA goes too far in its efforts to eliminate
the threat digital technology poses. In order to ensure that encryp-
tion and the other technological locks that copyright owners adopt
are effective, the DMCA prohibits others from making, distribut-
ing, or importing the decryption technology that could serve to
unlock encrypted works. The DMCA thereby restores to today's
copyright owners the same combination of technological and legal
control over the publication and dissemination of works enjoyed by
the Stationers' Company more than three hundred years ago. Dur-
ing its reign, the Stationers' Company controlled unauthorized
duplication of published works through the exclusive possession of
printing presses backed by an English law that prohibited anyone
other than a member of the Stationers' Company from operating a
printing press.' Proving that history can repeat itself, the anti-
circumvention provisions of the DMCA re-create almost precisely
this same combination of technological control backed by legal
prohibition. The only difference is a slight change in form: The le-
gally controlled technology necessary to make unauthorized copies
during the reign of the Stationers' Company was the printing press;
today, the legally controlled tool needed to make unauthorized
copies is the technology of decryption.
By prohibiting others from possessing the decryption tools nec-
essary to break the technological locks that the copyright industry
places on its digital works, the DMCA empowers those who pro-
duce digital works of authorship to set the terms of public access.
The DMCA thereby creates a grave risk that today's publishers,
like the Stationers' Company before them, may not exercise this
power to advance the public welfare generally.
Recognizing this risk, Congress has incorporated language into
the DMCA that might be read to permit fair or otherwise non-
73 Richardson, supra note 5, at 5-6 (noting that under Charter of May 4, 1556, "the
art or mystery of printing in England was strictly confined to" the Stationers'
Company, which was "authorised to search for and destroy all prohibited books, and
to imprison anyone exercising the art of printing contrary to their direction").
2001] 819
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infringing uses of decryption technology. Courts, however, have so
far shown little inclination to incorporate the fair use doctrine or
other limitations on copyright protection into the seemingly abso-
lute prohibitions of the DMCA. Even if they did, problems would
remain. Dealing with decryption technology is difficult because the
same decryption technology that enables the making of a non-
infringing copy of a creative work also enables the making of an in-
fringing copy. A decryption tool that enables a teacher to prepare a
few spur-of-the-moment copies for the classroom is the same de-
cryption tool that enables a pernicious pirate to duplicate the work
for resale. Moreover, unless lawful access to decryption technology
is severely restricted, the widespread dissemination of decryption
technology is almost inevitable. Because decryption technology is
usually readily portable and easily duplicated, it will likely prove
impossible to contain. If every librarian, teacher, or researcher with
a potential fair use claim is allowed to possess decryption technol-
ogy, it will be all but impossible to keep the technology out of the
hands of those who intend unlawful uses.
As a result, decryption presents something close to an all-or-
nothing choice. We can limit the lawful possession of the necessary
decryption tools to a tiny few and thereby have a realistic chance of
limiting the general availability of such tools. Such an approach,
however, risks denying the necessary decryption technology to in-
dividuals intending an otherwise noninfringing use. Alternatively,
we can permit easier access to decryption technology by allowing
essentially anyone with a plausible claim to fair or lawful use of
such technology to possess it. Yet this approach would risk allow-
ing the decryption technology to spread and become a source of
unauthorized copying more generally.
To address the risks of widespread private copying that digital
technology creates, the DMCA prohibits essentially any lawful
manufacture or distribution of the decryption tools necessary to
break copyright owners' technological controls.24 The Librarian of
Congress has recently reinforced this choice by limiting the class of
works exempted from the DMCA's coverage to two: "1. Compila-
tions consisting of lists of websites blocked by filtering software
applications; and 2. Literary works.., protected by access control
See infra text accompanying notes 49-99.
820 [Vol. 87:813
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mechanisms that fail to permit access because of malfunction,
damage or obsoleteness."' Although certain to restrict some fair or
otherwise noninfringing uses, the DMCA's choice to limit almost
altogether access to decryption technology may nevertheless prove
the lesser evil given the dilemma that decryption technology pre-
sents.
Yet, there are two aspects of private copying that suggest a dif-
ferent solution. First, from an economic perspective, private
copying may not threaten copyright's public purpose at all. If pri-
vate copying increases as a work's popularity increases, then
private copying will reduce revenue, assuming it does so at all,
most substantially for the most popular works. Because such popu-
lar works typically receive an economic return far in excess of that
necessary to ensure their creation, they may remain profitable even
in the face of considerable private copying. At the same time, and
again, to the extent that private copying increases with the popular-
ity of a work, private copying may have little effect on the
incentives for the less popular works at the margins of copyright's
production frontier. If so, then private copying, unlike traditional
infringement, will not lead to a sub-optimal supply of creative
works, but will only enable consumers to recapture a portion of the
"4excess" incentive otherwise available for the most popular works.
As a result, Congress should not prohibit such private copying. In-
deed, given the Constitution's public interest mandate, Congress
could not constitutionally prohibit such private copying.
Second, private copying, again unlike traditional infringement,
represents a critical form of democratic self-governance: civil dis-
obedience. Copyright laws have become increasingly unjust, and in
the face of unjust laws, individual citizens have no choice but to
disobey and thereby force society to enforce the law in a way that
makes its injustice palpable. So long as copyright owners can iso-
late and brand as dangerous those involved in unauthorized
copying, their transaction cost advantage in organizing to lobby for
overbroad copyright protection gives them a distinct edge in the
political process. But if they must seek enforcement directly
-1 Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems for
Access Control Technologies, 65 Fed. Reg. 64,556, 64,574 (Oct. 27, 2000) (to be
codified at 37 C.F.R. § 201.40(b)) [hereinafter Copyright Office, Final Rulemaking].
2001]
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against a broad range of ordinary citizens, copyright owners' col-
lective action advantage may prove insufficient to sustain
overbroad protection. Copyright owners may be able to persuade
authorities to imprison one MIT student in order to protect their
economic wealth, 6 but when they start labeling all college stu-
dents.n and the Girl Scouts too,' as dangerous subversives, they
may have more trouble persuading authorities to their point of
view. Private copying, as a form of civil disobedience, can play a
central role in reaching that point.
To explore these issues, Part I of this Article will begin with a
brief history of copyright protection, exploring the historical path
which led to the DMCA and examining the DMCA's anti-
circumvention provisions to see how they effectively eliminate
some key limitations copyright has traditionally imposed on the
protection of creative works. Part II will then examine alternatives
to the DMCA to determine whether there is some other way to
address the threat to incentives that the increased dispersion of
copying technology creates, while still preserving a vital role for the
overriding public interest copyright is supposed to serve. Given the
potential all-or-nothing choice decryption technology presents,
2In the end, the student, David LaMacchia, was able to avoid prison time for his
interference with the monopoly profits of copyright owners. United States v.
LaMacchia, 871 F. Supp. 535, 545 (D. Mass. 1994). Although the requirement that he
pay his attorneys' fees might be seen as sufficient punishment for Mr. LaMacchia's
behavior, Congress amended the Copyright Act to ensure that anyone who repeats
Mr. LaMacchia's conduct can be imprisoned. No Electronic Theft Act, Pub. L. No.
105-147, § 2(b), 111 Stat. 2678 (1997) (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 506, 507 (1994 &
Supp. V 2000) and 18 U.S.C. §§ 2319, 2319A, 2320 (Supp. V 2000)).
21 See, e.g., Lori Enos, RIAA Cracks Down on Net Pirates, E-Commerce Times
(Sept. 20, 2000), at http://www.newsfactor.comlperl/printer/4339.html (noting that
"[o]ne group that the RIAA has in its crosshairs is college students who have easy
access to computers and high-speed Internet connections through their schools").
28In the summer of 1996, the American Society of Composers, Authors &
Publishers ("ASCAP") notified a number of Girl Scout camps that they could no
longer sing copyrighted musical works around their summer campfires unless they
paid a licensing fee. E.g., Lisa Bannon, Birds Sing, But Campers Can't-Unless They
Pay Up, Star Tribune (Minneapolis), Aug. 24,1996, at lOE, available at LEXIS, News
Library, STRIB File. Although ASCAP quickly retracted its licensing demand after it
received unfavorable publicity, e.g., Michael Davis, ASCAP Changes Tune on Camp
Sing-Alongs, The Tennessean (Nashville), Aug. 28, 1996, at 1E, available at LEXIS,
News Library, TENNES File, bills that would grant an exception for public
performances at summer camps were introduced in the next legislative session.
Fairness in Musical Licensing Act of 1997, H.R. 789,105th Cong. § 2(d) (1997).
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Part III of this Article will consider some of the reasons why copy-
right protection that prohibits all unauthorized private copying is
both unnecessary and undesirable. In the end, there may be no per-
fect solution to the problem of widely dispersed copying
technology and the consequential risk of widespread private copy-
ing. Part IV will nevertheless take a hard look at the issues with the
goal of identifying steps that courts and Congress can take to en-
sure that the DMCA's technological control approach is harnessed
for the public, not a private, interest. Otherwise, while protection
of creative work may continue, copyright will be gone.
I. THE DMCA's TECHNOLOGICAL FIX
A. The Road to the DMCA: Copyright as Anachronism
To understand how we have reached the point where the
DMCA seemed necessary, we must start with copyright's origins in
the early eighteenth century. At that time, printing presses were
large, expensive, and consequently few. As a result, printers could
be found and policed with relative ease, and the principle of con-
trolling unauthorized reproduction by direct action against
individual infringing printers was both practical and sensible.
Given this technological background, copyright statutes adopted
an approach to protecting creative works that relied principally on
direct action against individual infringers. So firmly rooted was this
approach that neither the Statute of Anne nor the Copyright Act
of 1790 expressly incorporated liability for any action other than
direct infringement."9 Indeed, the current United States copyright
statute, more than two hundred years later, has yet to incorporate
express liability for anything other than direct infringement.'
-Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 6, 1 Stat. 124, 125 ("[A]ny person or persons who
shall print or publish any manuscript, without the consent and approbation of the
author or proprietor thereof,... shall be liable .... "); 8 Ann., c. 19, § 1 (1709) (Eng.)
(imposing liability on any bookseller who "shall print, reprint, or import, or cause to
be printed, reprinted, or imported" any protected material).
, See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 434 (1984) ("The
Copyright Act does not expressly render anyone liable for infringement committed by
another."); see also 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (Supp. V 2000) ("Anyone who violates any of
the exclusive rights of the copyright owner as provided by Sections 106 through 121,
2001]
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Unfortunately, the advent of digital technology and the Internet
has rendered this traditional approach of targeting individual in-
fringers increasingly unworkable. The development of these
technologies places the power of creating near-perfect digital cop-
ies in almost every home and on every desk. By dispersing the
power to create copies, these technologies confound traditional
copyright and stretch, if not break, the ability of copyright's tradi-
tional approach to protect creative works. As much for political
reasons as for more practical concerns, copyright owners cannot
search the hard drives of each potential infringer (given that eve-
ryone with a computer qualifies) and bring suit against those
discovered in possession of infringing copies." Moreover, in the
eighteenth century, for infringement to prove attractive, a printer
eventually had to sell the potentially infringing copies, allowing the
illegal activity to come to light on its own. In contrast, with digital
technology and the Internet, many infringements will remain pri-
vate. By using a computer to make an unauthorized copy, an
individual can obtain her own copy of the work without paying the
customary price. For that reason, private infringement can prove
attractive without any need to resell the unauthorized copies, re-
ducing the chance that private copying will come to light without
intrusive searches.
To surmount the difficulties that the increasing dispersion of
copying technology creates for copyright, copyright owners have
resorted to a variety of stopgap measures to maintain copyright's
effectiveness. For example, copyright owners have sought to estab-
lish the contributory or vicarious liability of a single party, such as
Sony or Napster, who has made the individual infringements possi-
ble.' This approach creates a single liable party who can, in a
or of the .author as provided in Section 106A(a), or who imports copies or
phonorecords into the United States in violation of Section 602, is an infringer....").
The DMCA creates safe harbors for Internet Service Providers limiting their liability
for vicarious or contributory infringement, but the DMCA does not itself create such
liability. Id. § 512(a)-(e), (j).
31 See; e.g., James Lardner, Fast Forward: Hollywood, the Japanese, and the
Onslaught of the VCR 203-04 (1987) (recounting critical political commentary
including depictions of "Video Police" invading private residences to search for
infringing private copies following the Ninth Circuit's decision in the Sony Corp.
case).
',Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 419-20; A&M Records v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004,
1010-11 (9th Cir. 2001).
[Vol. 87:813824
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sense, stand in the shoes of the individually infringing printer tradi-
tionally targeted. Similarly, copyright owners have persuaded
Congress to expand the availability of criminal penalties for copy-
right infringement.3' The increased availability of criminal penalties
can help maintain copyright's effective level of deterrence by coun-
terbalancing the substantially reduced risk of being caught that
arises from the increased portability and dispersion of copying
technology.' Increased use of criminal penalties can also shift some
of the costs of enforcing copyright away from copyright owners and
onto taxpayers.
There is a limit, however, to the ability of these measures to en-
sure the effectiveness of copyright's traditional approach in the
face of the ongoing dispersion of copying technology. Current
technology often uses a central registry, such as the ones found on
Napster and MP3.com, to facilitate the ability of individuals to lo-
cate the files available for copying. Such a central registry provides
a convenient excuse for attempting to bring Napster and MP3.com
within the reach of copyright's traditional direct action approach.35
Yet the next generation of copying technology, with programs such
as Gnutella and FreeNet, enables peer-to-peer file sharing without
the convenient target offered by a central registry. 6 Moreover, as
"No Electronic Theft Act, Pub. L. No. 105-147, 111 Stat. 2678 (1997) (codified at 17
U.S.C. §§ 101, 506, 507 (1994 & Supp. V 2000) and 18 U.S.C. §§ 2319, 2319A, 2320
(Supp. V 2000)) (removing the requirement that infringement be "for profit" before
criminal penalties apply); see also Digital Theft Deterrence and Copyright Damages
Improvement Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-160, § 2, 113 Stat. 1774, 1774 (1999)
(codified at 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (Supp. V 2000)) (increasing statutory damages
available for infringement by fifty percent).
I Enos, supra note 27 ("Although [RIAA senior vice president and director of anti-
piracy Frank] Creighton said it would be 'unfortunate' if the OSU student [targeted
by RIAA for criminal copyright infringement charges] ends up with a felony record
for the rest of his life, he did say that such high-profile actions act as a deterrent to
other would-be pirates.").
"See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1019-24 (affirming grant of preliminary injunction on the
grounds that Napster was likely liable, both contributorily and vicariously, for acts of
copyright infringement by its users); UMG Recordings v. MP3.com, 92 F. Supp. 2d
349, 351-53 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (granting partial summary judgment for plaintiffs and
rejecting the fair use defense asserted by defendant supplier of technology designed
to allow owners of sound recordings to access them via the Internet from any
location).
When a user requests a file through a decentralized peer-to-peer file sharing
program, her computer will search for a title on, and then download the title from, the
other users' computers directly. Although Gnutella and FreeNet have received the
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these dispersed file-sharing programs come online, many of the
remaining technical limitations on unauthorized copying, such as
bandwidth restrictions, memory limitations, and the high cost of
CD burners, will also fade. As a result, unauthorized sharing be-
tween private individuals through the Internet, which today is a
relatively minor problem reaching only musical works, sound re-
cordings, and certain computer programs, threatens to become a
serious problem for digital works of authorship more generally.
At some point, the continuing dispersion of copying technology
will render the traditional enforcement approach of suing each in-
dividual infringer impractical. If there are thousands of infringers,
it will simply cost too much to police their conduct effectively
through individual judicial proceedings brought against each one.
For copyright owners, the continuing dispersion of copying tech-
nology and the ineffectiveness of copyright's traditional approach
in containing widespread private infringements give rise to a
nightmare scenario in which only the first person who desires ac-
cess to a work pays for it, and the rest obtain a perfect digital copy
for free through some sort of file sharing technology. Some copy-
right owners have cautioned that, if left uncontrolled, digital
technology may destroy their creative industry altogether. 7 Al-
though this doomsday scenario resides more in rhetoric than
reality, the increasing number of private copies has the potential to
erode, perhaps substantially, the earnings associated with any given
work.
Concerned with how far their earnings might drop, copyright
owners have sought alternative forms of protection. Producers of
mass-market software for the personal computer have relied on
both encryption and contractual use restrictions, misleadingly
most press, a variety of decentralized peer-to-peer file sharing programs are available
for free from websites such as www.zeropaid.com and CNET's www.downloads.com.
Most of these programs have names that are, as yet, unfamiliar, including Rapigator,
KaZaA, iMesh, and BearShare. Siona LaFrance, Bum, Baby, Bum: No Napster? No
Problem, New Orleans Times-Picayune, Mar. 22,2001, at El.
3E.g., National Information Infrastructure Copyright Protection Act of 1995:
Hearing on S.1284 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 11 (1996)
(prepared statement of Kenneth R. Kay, Executive Director, Creative Incentive
Coalition) ("In the [piracy-related Internet] sites we will tour today, one can read the
blueprints for a massive structure of cyber-piracy that could blight the future of
America's creators.").
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called licenses, to supplement copyright protection.' Both strate-
gies have undoubtedly helped, but neither is likely to solve the
more general problem of digital copying on its own. Contractual
use restrictions, absent widespread adoption of the Uniform Com-
puter Information Transactions Act, remain of questionable legal
enforceability. 9 Even if legally enforceable, they are largely inef-
fective in controlling private copying. Like copyright law, contract
law requires lawsuits against each individual breaching party. Us-
ing contract law to control private copying will therefore become
prohibitively expensive as private copying becomes increasingly
widespread.
In contrast, technological controls, such as encryption, can
eliminate private copying without the need for individual lawsuits.
Instead of the prohibitive transaction costs of identifying, suing,
and then enforcing a judgment or settlement against each alleged
infringer, the copyright owner can use encryption to incorporate a
technological lock on the distributed copies of her work and
thereby effectively preclude virtually all private copying. In a
sense, technological controls reverse the dispersion of copying
technology by eliminating the copying technology's ability to re-
produce a work unless properly authorized.
When software companies first introduced technological con-
trols in the mid-1980s, however, there were two problems. First,
third parties quickly developed technological keys that would de-
feat the controls. These unauthorized keys were both inexpensive
and widely available, and they reopened the door to private copy-
ing.' Second, when software producers responded with more
complicated encryption schemes or turned to encryption that relied
on a physical key that could not be easily duplicated, third parties
developed more advanced decryption keys and other means for de-
E.g., Step-Saver Data Sys. v. Wyse Tech., 939 F.2d 91, 96 n.7 (3d Cir. 1991)
(noting the computer software industry's development of licenses to avoid copyright's
first sale doctrine); Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 261 n.13 (5th
Cir. 1988) (noting the computer software industry's use of encryption to supplement
copyright protection).
Compare Step-Saver, 939 F.2d at 105-06 (finding a lack of effective consent to
license terms and therefore refusing to enforce box-top license), with ProCD, Inc. v.
Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1449, 1452-53 (7th Cir. 1996) (finding effective consent to
license terms and therefore enforcing software license).
- Lardner, supra note 31, at 278.
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feating the protection. This development led to an escalating fight
between encryption and decryption technologies that soon reached
a point where the sort of encryption required to protect against
available decryption technology rendered use of the protected pro-
gram unwieldy and precluded many unobjectionable uses as well.41
Still looking for a solution, and having learned the futility of a
purely private solution from watching the encryption-decryption
battles over computer software, copyright owners turned to Con-
gress. To ensure the effectiveness of technological controls on
copying, copyright owners demanded that Congress prohibit third-
party creation of the necessary decryption keys. Responding to
their concerns, Congress first adopted such an approach in the Au-
dio Home Recording Act of 1992 ("AHRA").42 The AHRA
represented a limited adoption of technological controls as it ap-
plied only to a single technology, "digital audio recording
devices."' 3 Even with such a limited agenda, the AHRA was not
entirely successful, given that, after the inclusion of the required
technological controls, digital audiotape never achieved the com-
mercial success originally expected.' Despite this failure, Congress
again embraced technological controls on unauthorized copying in
the DMCA. This time, however, Congress did not limit technologi-
cal controls to a particular technological development, but rather
41 See generally Richard P. Adelstein & Steven I. Peretz, The Competition of
Technologies in Markets for Ideas: Copyright and Fair Use in Evolutionary
Perspective, 5 Int'l Rev. L. & Econ. 209, 213-14 (1985) ("The seller's attempt to
discriminate between buyers and 'free riders' in this way provides the setting for an
unceasing 'competition of technologies' between sellers and free riders. Just as sellers
must call upon various physical and organizational technologies both to ease the free
flow of information and goods between themselves and willing buyers and to maintain
effective exclusionary barriers to free riding, potential free riders are themselves
induced to search out the technical means by which the exclusive relationship
between buyer and seller can be penetrated for their own benefit.").
42Audio Home Recording Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-563, 106 Stat. 4237 (1992)
(codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1010 (1994 & Supp. V 2000)).
,317 U.S.C. § 1002 (a), (c) (1994).
4E.g., Paul Veravanich, Rio Grande: The MP3 Showdown at Highnoon in
Cyberspace, 10 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 433, 451 (2000) ("Ironically,
the DAT never became the success that most music industry observers assumed that
it would."); A. Dustin Mets, Note, Did Congress Protect the Recording Industry into
Competition? The Irony of the Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act,
22 U. Dayton L. Rev. 371, 375 n.30 (1997) (noting that digital audio taping never
gained widespread consumer acceptance).
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radically expanded coverage in an attempt to safeguard virtually all
digitally-stored information.45
The DMCA employs an overlapping approach to control both
the use of and access to decryption technology in order to ensure
the effectiveness of technological controls on unauthorized copy-
ing. First, in Section 1201(a)(1), the DMCA prohibits any person
from circumventing "a technological measure that effectively con-
trols access to a work protected under this title."' Second, to avoid
the need for a lawsuit against each individual using decryption to
break a copyrighted work's technological lock, Sections 1201(a)(2)
and 1201(b)(1) of the DMCA prohibit any person from manufac-
turing, importing, offering to the public, providing, or otherwise
trafficking in decryption technology that is primarily designed to
circumvent technological locks; has only a limited commercially-
significant purpose other than to circumvent such a technological
lock; or is marketed for use in circumventing such a technological
lock." Third, in addition to these general provisions, the DMCA
requires analog videocassette recorders manufactured or imported
eighteen months after the enactment of the DMCA to incorporate
a specified form of copy control technology.
On its own, the DMCA's resort to technological controls as a
means of protecting creative works does not necessarily betray
copyright's public purpose. The defining characteristic of copyright
is not its traditional approach of targeting individual infringers.
The direct action approach was merely a convenient form given the
technology available when copyright was first developed. Rather,
the defining characteristic of copyright-that which distinguishes it
from guild monopoly-is that it protects creative works primarily
to advance the public, rather than a private, interest. Copyright can
evolve and yet remain true to its original public spirit. Unfortu-
nately, the DMCA surrenders this broader public interest to the
dictates of a private interest-the welfare of copyright owners. By
"See S. Rep. No. 105-190, at 2 (1998) ("With this constant evolution in technology,
the law must adapt in order to make digital networks safe places to disseminate and
exploit copyrighted materials. The legislation implementing the treaties, Title I of this
bill, provides this protection and creates the legal platform for launching the global
digital on-line marketplace for copyrighted works.").
17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A) (Supp. V 2000).
Id. § 1201(a)(2)(A)-(C), (b)(1)(A)-(C).
Id. § 1201(k).
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prohibiting the production and distribution of decryption technol-
ogy, the DMCA enables copyright owners to use encryption as
they see fit to protect their works. Although the DMCA contains
some language aimed at preserving copyright's public interest per-
spective, the DMCA's general prohibitions may leave too little
room for otherwise lawful and fair uses of decryption technology.
The next Section therefore examines the DMCA's anti-
circumvention provisions to determine whether they contain ade-
quate safeguards of the public interest.
B. Interpreting the DMCA's Anti-Circumvention Provisions A
Search for the Public Interest
At the heart of the DMCA lies Section 1201(a). It contains two
subsections designed to enable copyright owners to use encryption
or other technological measures to control access to their works. In
Section 1201(a)(1), the DMCA prohibits individuals from circum-
venting "a technological measure that effectively controls access to
a work protected under this title."49 In Section 1201(a)(2), the
DMCA prohibits the manufacture, importation, and distribution of
any technology or device that would serve to circumvent such a
technological measure.' Although Section 1201(a)(1)'s prohibition
on the use of decryption technology to circumvent a technological
lock is important, enforcing the use prohibition will require law-
suits against each individual user. For that reason, Section
1201(a)(1)'s use prohibition will prove largely impractical to con-
trol widespread private copying. In contrast, Section 1201(a)(2)
aims to bar access to decryption technology at the outset. By pro-
hibiting the manufacture and importation of decryption
technology, Section 1201(a)(2) seeks to eliminate the risk of wide-
spread private copying without any need for lawsuits against the
individual copiers. Instead, Section 1201(a)(2) authorizes copyright
owners to control private copying through lawsuits against the rela-
tive handful of parties who would otherwise provide the decryption
tools necessary to unlock encrypted works. If Section 1201(a)(2) is
effective, decryption technology will never become available to or-
49 Id. § 1201(a)(1)(A).
m Id. § 1201(a)(2); see also id. § 1201(b)(1).
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dinary consumers, and widespread private copying will never oc-
cur.
In order to contain decryption technology at its source, Section
1201(a)(2) significantly rewrites the rules pertaining to liability un-
der Title 17 for individuals who market or distribute products that
enable others to engage in unauthorized copying. Through three
subsections offering slight variations on a theme, Section
1201(a)(2) bars the manufacture, importation, or distribution of
any technology that can circumvent a copyright owner's techno-
logical lock. Section 1201(a)(2)(A) prohibits distribution of
technology "primarily designed or produced for the purpose of cir-
cumventing" a technological lock.5 Section 1201(a)(2)(B) prohibits
distribution of technology that "has only limited commercially sig-
nificant purpose or use other than" circumventing a technological
lock' 2 And Section 1201(a)(2)(C) prohibits distribution of technol-
ogy that "is marketed.., for use in circumventing" a technological
lock?
Before the DMCA, the vicarious liability standard that the
Court established in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Stu-
dios' governed the liability of an individual who made available
technology that enabled others to engage in unauthorized copying
of a copyrighted work. Under the Sony Corp. standard, an individ-
ual was liable for the copyright infringement her device made
possible only if her device was incapable of any substantial non-
infringing use." Although liability was not impossible to establish
under the Sony Corp. standard, the standard proved a difficult
hurdle for copyright owners. For example, when computer soft-
ware publishers attempted to control third-party distribution of
decryption keys to their encrypted computer programs in the
1980s, courts applying the Sony Corp. standard could usually find a
"Id. § 1201(a)(2)(A).
Id. § 1201(a)(2)(B).
Id. § 1201(a)(2)(C).
464 U.S. 417 (1984).
Id. at 442 (The sale of a product that enables copyright infringement "does not
constitute contributory infringement if the product is widely used for legitimate,
unobjectionable purposes" and that "it need merely be capable of substantial
noninfringing uses.").
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substantial non-infringing use.' So long as a decryption key could
be used for copying that was either a fair use under Section 107,' 7 a
proper archival copy under Section 117,' or an otherwise non-
infringing use, production and distribution of the key did not con-
stitute copyright infringement.
Under Section 1201(a)(2), however, manufacturing or distribut-
ing a decryption key may violate the DMCA,59 even if the key is
capable of substantial non-infringing use. Such a result follows
from two modifications that Sections 1201(a)(2)(A) and
1201(a)(2)(B) make to the Sony Corp. standard. First, these sec-
tions reduce the degree of involvement required to establish
liability. Second, they tie liability to the act of circumvention itself,
rather than to some eventual act of copyright infringement.
In terms of the DMCA's first modification to the Sony Corp.
standard, we can think of technological devices as falling along a
continuum ranging from those devices that have only infringing
uses to those devices that have only legitimate uses. As we move
from the "only legitimate use" end of this spectrum to the "only il-
legitimate use" end, it is fair to think of the party distributing the
technology at issue as becoming progressively more involved in the
infringement. Indeed, once we reach the "only illegitimate use"
end of the spectrum, we can justifiably treat the person providing
the device as if she herself is committing the resulting infringe-
ments given that there is no lawful use for her device. Most
technological devices that enable the unauthorized copying of
copyrighted works will fall somewhere in the middle, having some
-1 See, e.g., Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software, 847 F.2d 255,265-66 (5th Cir. 1988). But
see Atari, Inc. v. JS & A Group, 597 F. Supp. 5, 9-10 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (finding that
distribution of a device that enabled copying of programs stored in ROM chips
constituted contributory copyright infringement after concluding that § 117 did not
authorize archival copying of such programs).
17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994).
17 U.S.C. § 117 (Supp. V 2000).
5 Rather than rely on copyright's general remedy provisions, the DMCA included
its own remedies provisions that parallel those found in §§ 501-06. 17 U.S.C. §§ 1203-
04 (Supp. V 2000). The DMCA also refers to engaging in prohibited conduct as a
"violation," rather than as an "infringement." Id. Although these differences at first
appear merely curious, this seemingly trivial change in wording plays a significant role
in interpreting the DMCA's anti-circumvention provisions. See infra text
accompanying notes 89-94.
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legitimate and some illegitimate uses, and the key legal question
becomes where along the continuum liability will attach.
In Sony Corp., the Court defined the point where liability will at-
tach in terms of whether the device at issue was capable of
substantial noninfringing use.' Under this standard, the fact that
the technology was, in fact, used almost exclusively for infringe-
ment was not sufficient to establish liability. A plaintiff would have
to further show that the technology was incapable of any substan-
tial noninfringing use. In practice, the Sony Corp. standard limited
liability to those devices very near the "only illegitimate use" end
of our continuum. Only at this point did the Court feel justified in
treating an individual distributing technology that made infringe-
ment possible as if she herself had committed the infringement. In
his dissent in Sony Corp., Justice Harry Blackmun urged the Court
to adopt a standard that focused more on the product's actual use,
rather than its potential uses, insisting that "[o]nly the most uni-
maginative manufacturer would be unable" to satisfy a potential
use or capability standard.6' Yet even Justice Blackmun acknowl-
edged "that if a significant portion of the product's use is
noninfringing, the manufacturers and sellers cannot be held con-
tributorily liable for the product's infringing uses."62
As compared to the Sony Corp. standard, the DMCA radically
reduces the level of involvement required to establish liability for
distributing technology that enables others to engage in unauthor-
ized copying."3 Section 1201(a)(2)(B) defines liability in terms of
whether the device "has only limited commercially significant pur-
pose or use other than to circumvent" a technological control.6'
Although the language is not perfecly clear, the "has ... purpose or
SonY Corp., 464 U.S. at 442.
Id. at 498 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
,- Id. at 491 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
11 Universal City Studios v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 323-24 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)
("By prohibiting the provision of circumvention technology, the DMCA
fundamentally altered the landscape. A given device or piece of technology might
have a 'substantial noninfringing use, and hence be immune from attack under Sony's
construction of the Copyright Act-but nonetheless still be subject to suppression
under Section 1201."') (quoting RealNetworks, Inc. v. Streambox, Inc., No. C99-
2070P, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1889 at *23 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 18, 2000)). But see H.R.
Rep. No. 105-551, pt. 2, at 38 (1998) ("This provision [§ 1201(a)(2)] is not aimed at
products that are capable of commercially significant noninfringing uses...
- 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2)(B) (Supp. V 2000).
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use" phrase seems to focus more on actual, rather than potential,
uses, apparently jettisoning Sony Corp.'s capability standard.' Sec-
tion 1201(a)(2)(A) goes even further. Under Section
1201(a)(2)(A), a person distributing technology violates the
DMCA if the technology is "primarily designed or produced for
the purpose of circumventing a technological measure that effec-
tively controls access to a work protected under this title."'
Following the presumption that "people usually intend the natural
consequences of their actions,"'67 courts will likely determine liabil-
ity under this section by assessing the predominant use of the
technology at issue.' If a device is used fifty-one percent of the
time for circumvention and forty-nine percent for perfectly legiti-
mate purposes, its primary use appears to be circumvention and
distributing the device would likely therefore constitute a violation
of Section 1201(a)(2)(A). As compared either to the majority or to
the dissenting positions in Sony Corp., this represents a radical ex-
pansion of liability for the distribution of technology that enables
others to engage in unauthorized copying.
Second, in addition to reducing the level of involvement re-
quired to establish liability, Section 1201(a)(2) modifies the nature
of the culpable conduct. Under Sony Corp., liability turned on the
technology's capacity for noninfringing use.' If the copying that re-
sulted was noninfringing, even if unauthorized, then the distributor
of the technology could not be held liable. In contrast, the stan-
dards set forth in all three subsections of 1201(a)(2) tie liability to a
technology's ability to circumvent "a technological measure that
6Id.
-Id. § 1201(a)(2)(A).
67 Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 520 U.S. 471,487 (1997).
Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 319. In discussing the defendants' liability under the
DMCA for posting an encryption-breaking computer program to the Internet, the
district court wrote:
Whether defendants [offered the program] in order to infringe, or to permit or
encourage others to infringe, copyrighted works in violation of other provisions
of the Copyright Act simply does not matter for purposes of Section 1201(a)(2).
The offering or provision of the program is the prohibited conduct-and it is
prohibited irrespective of why the program was written, except to whatever
extent motive may be germane to determining whether their conduct falls
within one of the statutory exceptions.
Id.69 See supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text.
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effectively controls access to a work protected under this title."'7
This language imposes liability for distributing technology that cir-
cumvents a technological lock, even if the resulting access is fair or
otherwise noninfringing 1 Because culpability under Section
1201(a)(2) turns on circumvention alone, sale or distribution of de-
cryption keys constitutes a violation of Section 1201(a)(2), even if
every single person who used the keys to circumvent a technologi-
cal control did so to undertake a fair or otherwise non-infringing
use of the protected work.
The expanded liability regime that Section 1201(a)(2) has
wrought may be illustrated by comparing application of the Sony
Corp. standard in one of the computer software encryption cases
from the 1980s to how the Section 1201(a)(2) standard would be
applied to the same case today. In Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software,'
the plaintiff had developed a technological measure designed to
prevent unauthorized use or copying of computer programs. The
plaintiff embedded this measure onto its PROLOK disks and sold
the disks to computer software publishers. The publishers in turn
would store their programs on the PROLOK disks and market
them to the public. Within a few months, the defendant had devel-
oped and begun marketing a computer program that defeated the
plaintiff's technological control. The plaintiff sued, alleging that the
defendant was guilty of contributory or vicarious copyright in-
fringement. " Applying the Sony Corp. standard, the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals rejected this argument, observing that the defen-
dant's program allowed its users to make proper archival copies
under Section 117 of the Copyright Act.' On that basis, without
any consideration of how people were actually using the defen-
dant's program, the Fifth Circuit held that the defendant's program
was "capable of substantial noninfringing uses."'75 The defendant
"1 7 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2)(A)-(C).
71 Universal City Studios v. Reimnerdes, 82 F. Supp. 2d 211, 219 (S.D.N.Y. 2000),
permanent injunction issued, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294 (2000); RealNetworks, Inc. v.
Streambox, Inc., No. C99-2070P, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1889, at *22-23 (W.D. Wash.
Jan. 18, 2000).
847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988).
Id. at 256-57.
Id. at 266.
7, Id. at 267.
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was therefore not liable for contributory or vicarious copyright in-
fringement.
In contrast, if the DMCA were applied to those same facts, the
defendant would almost certainly have violated Section 1201 (a) (2).
The defendant's program enabled its users to circumvent the plain-
tiff's copy protection program. The plaintiff's copy protection
program controlled access to the computer programs stored on the
PROLOK disks by limiting their unauthorized use or copying. And
the computer programs stored on the PROLOK disks were works
protected by copyright. Given these facts, manufacturing and dis-
tributing the defendant's program would constitute a violation
under Section 1201 (a) (2) without regard to whether the circumven-
tion that resulted was otherwise infringing.76
Sections 1201(a)(2)(A) and 1201(a)(2)(B) thus radically expand
the liability of an individual for distributing technology that cir-
cumvents a copyright owner's technological lock. Section
1201(a)(2)(C) achieves a similar result, although it appears to be
directed at the parallel but slightly different issue of contributory
infringement. Under the contributory infringement standard, "one
who, with knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, causes or
materially contributes to the infringing conduct of another, may be
held liable."' Although courts initially treated contributory in-
fringement as subsumed within the Sony Corp. standard, at least in
cases involving the distribution of copying technology, later deci-
sions have treated contributory infringement as an alternate basis
for liability.' Nevertheless, ensuring consistency with the reasoning
and results in Sony Corp. has placed limits on the potential reach
of the contributory infringement doctrine. Given the Sony Corp.
standard, the sale or distribution of a device that enables others to
engage in copyright infringement should not, on its own, constitute
a "material contribution" to that infringement as long as the device
is capable of substantial noninfringing use. Similarly, because Sony
76See Rehnerdes, 82 F. Supp. 2d at 219; RealNetworks, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1889,
at *22-23.
7Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir.
1971) (footnote omitted).
7
8 Compare Vault Corp., 847 F.2d at 262 (treating "vicarious" and "contributory" as
interchangeable terms for a single theory of third-party liability), with A&M Records
v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1027 (9th Cir. 2001) (treating vicarious and
contributory liability as distinct theories of third-party liability).
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extensively advertised the ability of the Betamax to make unau-
thorized copies, Sony Corp. would also seem to preclude a finding
of contributory infringement based upon advertising alone. 9 Under
Sony Corp., something more, some active inducement, is necessary
before the contributory infringement doctrine would apply."0
Section 1201(a)(2)(C) rejects this need for something more. Sec-
tion 1201(a)(2)(C) imposes liability for manufacturing or
distributing a circumventing device if the device "is mar-
keted ... for [a circumventing] use."'" Although the full breadth of
the "is marketed for" standard is not clear, advertising alone ap-
pears sufficient to establish liability, reversing the result in Sony
Corp. itself. Advertising a device's capacity to make unauthorized
copies, as Sony did, would presumably constitute marketing and
would establish the manufacturer's liability under Section
1201(a)(2)(C). More generally, Section 1201(a)(2)(C) may extend
liability to cases where the circumvention capacity of a technology
is advertised, even if the technology is in fact used predominantly
for legitimate, non-circumvention purposes.' Perhaps courts will
interpret the "is marketed for" standard to require something more
than a mere incidental acknowledgement of a technology's capac-
ity to circumvent encryption protecting copyrighted works.
Nevertheless, compared to copyright's traditional contributory in-
fringement doctrine, the literal language of Section 1201(a)(2)(C)
substantially expands the circumstances under which an individual
19 Sony Corp. involved a suit against Sony regarding its potentially copyright-
infringing Betamax VCR. Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 459. There was undisputed
evidence in the case that Sony extensively advertised the Betamax's ability to copy
television programs. Id. at 459, 489 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
" For example, in Sega Enterprises v. Maphia, 948 F. Supp. 923, 929 (N.D. Cal.
1996), the defendants offered for sale a device for decoding programs stored in game
cartridges for particular video game systems. As part of the sales pitch for the device,
the defendants offered buyers free access to their bulletin board, so that any given
buyer could upload the files she had decoded from her own video game cartridges and
download the files other buyers had decoded from their video game cartridges. Id. at
927. Finding that this promotional offer actively induced copyright infringement by
the purchasers of their device, a district court found the defendants liable for
contributory copyright infringement. Id. at 933.
"1 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2)(C) (Supp. V 2000).
'S. Rep. No. 105-190, at 11 n.19 (1998) ("Note that even if a device does not have
circumvention as its primary purpose or design, that is, that it does not fall within the
prohibition of Section 1201(a)(2)(A), the device would still be illegal if it fell within
the prohibitions of either 1201(a)(2)(B) and [sic] (C).").
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can be held liable for distributing technology capable of making
unauthorized copies of a protected work.
On its face, therefore, the DMCA substantially expands liability
for the manufacture, importation, and distribution of technology
that could unlock the technological protection that copyright own-
ers attach to their works. Concerned that unconstrained encryption
might allow copyright owners to go too far in protecting their
works (or perhaps merely to placate opposition to the DMCA),
Congress included three provisions in the DMCA to limit the risk
that encryption would serve primarily the private interest of copy-
right owners, rather than the public interest more generally. First,
Section 1201(a)(1)(B) exempts certain classes of copyrighted works
from Section 1201(a)(1)(A)'s anti-circumvention provision.' For
these classes of works, circumvention of a technological lock does
not violate the DMCA. Section 1201(a)(1)(B) defines the exempt
classes generally as those classes of works whose users "are, or are
likely to be" adversely affected "in their ability to make nonin-
fringing uses" as a result of encryption.' Applying this general
standard, the DMCA authorizes the Librarian of Congress to de-
termine the precise classes. of works exempt from Section
1201(a)(1)(A)'s anti-circumvention provision through a tri-annual
rulemaking proceeding.' Although some legislators and scholars
had hoped that the Librarian would use Section 1201(a)(1)(B) to
issue a broad exemption for research, criticism, and teaching, par-
alleling the fair use doctrine,' the Librarian's initial rulemaking
- 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(B); see also H. R. Rep. No. 105-551, pt. 2, at 26 (1998)
("The Committee has struck a balance that is now embodied in Section [1201(a)(1)]
of the bill .... The Committee has endeavored to specify, with as much clarity as
possible, how the right against anti-circumvention would be qualified to maintain
balance between the interests of content creators and information users. The
Committee considers it particularly important to ensure that the concept of fair use
remains firmly established in the law.").
17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(B).
81 Id. § 1201(a)(1)(C).
See 144 Cong. Rec. H7093 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1998) (statement of Rep. Bliley)
(describing § 1201(a)(1)(B) as a "strong fair use provision [intended] to ensure that
consumers as well as libraries and institutions of higher learning will be able to
continue to exercise their historical fair use rights"); see also Copyright Office, Final
Rulemaking, 65 Fed. Reg. 64,555, 64,572-73 (Oct. 27, 2000) (to be codified at 37
C.F.R. 201.40(b)) (noting and rejecting Professor Peter Jaszi's proposed exemption
under § 1201(a)(1)(B) for a class of works consisting of "works embodied in copies
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exempted only two classes of works from Section 1201(a)(1)(A)'s
protection: "1. Compilations consisting of lists of websites blocked
by filtering software applications; and 2. Literary
works... protected by access control mechanisms that fail to per-
mit access because of malfunction, damage or obsoleteness."'
As a second limit on the DMCA's potential for advancing the
private interests of copyright holders at the expense of the public
interest, Congress specifically stated in Section 1201(c) that the
DMCA does not limit the fair use defense or expand the scope of
contributory or vicarious liability.' Section 1201(c)(1) states that
"[n]othing in this section shall affect... limitations, or defenses to
copyright infringement, including fair use."'  Section 1201(c)(2)
states that "[n]othing in this section shall enlarge or diminish vi-
carious or contributory liability for copyright infringement."'
Although these provisions appear to incorporate these important
public interest safeguards directly into the DMCA, closer inspec-
tion reveals that the apparently firm guaranties in Section 1201(c)
prove deceptively empty. Both subsections state that the DMCA
shall not affect these doctrines for purposes of "copyright in-
fringement." But there is a catch. The DMCA has its own civil and
criminal remedies provisions." Liability arises under these sections
not for "copyright infringement," but for violations of Sections
1201 or 1202.2 The DMCA thus creates a distinction between
which have been lawfully acquired by users who subsequently seek to make non-
infringing uses thereof").
Copyright Office, Final Rulemaking, 65 Fed. Reg. at 64,574. Moreover, even if the
Librarian in some future rulemaking should expand the classes of exempt works, the
exemption in § 1201(a)(1)(B) applies only to § 1201(a)(1)(A)'s prohibition on the
circumvention of a technological lock. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(B). The § 1201(a)(1)(B)
exemption does not apply to § 1201(a)(2). Id. As a result, while use of decryption
technology to obtain access to the exempt class of works would not violate the
DMCA. manufacturing or distributing the decryption technology'necessary to obtain
such access would still apparently violate § 1201(a)(2). Cf Universal City Studios v.
Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 324 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) ("The fact that Congress elected
to leave technologically unsophisticated persons who wish to make fair use of
encrypted copyrighted works without the technical means of doing so is a matter for
Congress....").
- 17 U.S.C. § 1201(c).
' Id. § 1201(c)(1).
Id. § 1201(c)(2).
Id. §§ 1203-04.
Id. §§ 1203(a), 1204(a).
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copyright infringement and violations of the DMCA.' As a result,
the public interest guaranties offered in Sections 1201(c)(1) and
1201(c)(2) are meaningless. These sections may help ensure that
the fair use and contributory or vicarious liability doctrines con-
tinue to apply in determining whether "copyright infringement"
has occurred, but they do not incorporate these doctrines into the
determination of whether a "violation" of the DMCA has oc-
curred.'
Third, a few other sections offer limited exemptions to the
DMCA's restrictions on the use of and access to decryption tech-
nology. But these exemptions are unlikely to provide any real
constraint on the ability of copyright owners to use encryption
technology to advance their own welfare at the expense of the pub-
lic's. For example, Section 1201(d)(1) grants nonprofit libraries the
ability to use decryption to gain unauthorized access to an en-
crypted work.95 The library, however, may gain access "solely in
order to make a good faith determination whether to acquire a
copy of that work," and any resulting copy "may not be retained
longer that necessary to make such good faith determination."
'9 6
There are similarly limited exemptions in Section 1201(f), authoriz-
ing the use of decryption to obtain access to a computer program
solely to identify and analyze those elements necessary to achieve
9 The legislative history supports this distinction:
H.R. 2281, as reported by the Committee on the Judiciary, would regulate-in
the name of copyright law-the manufacture and sale of devices that can be
used to improperly circumvent technological protection measures. The
Committee on Commerce adopted an amendment that moves the anti-
circumvention provisions out of Title 17 and establishes them as free-standing
provisions of law .... The anti-circumvention provisions (and the accompanying
penalty provisions for violations of them) would be separate from, and
cumulative to, the existing claims available to copyright owners.
H.R. Rep. No. 105-551, pt. 2, at 23-24 (1998).
See Universal City Studios v. Reimerdes, 82 F. Supp. 2d 211,219 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)
("Defendants, however, are not here sued for copyright infringement. They are sued
for offering to the public and providing technology primarily designed to circumvent
technological measures that control access to copyrighted works and otherwise
violating Section 1201(a)(2) of the Act. If Congress had meant the fair use defense to
apply to such actions, it would have said so.").
9517 U.S.C. § 1201(d)(1).
9Id.
[Vol. 87:813840
The Death of Copyright
interoperability, 7 and in Section 1201(g), authorizing encryption
research.'
Having freed copyright owners from the specter of third-party
decryption keys, the DMCA places no real limits on the ability of
copyright owners to use encryption to maximize their own revenue.
Instead, the DMCA replicates the system of legally backed techno-
logical controls that enabled the Stationers' Company to
monopolize the publication of printed works in England more than
three hundred years ago. Given the difficulties encountered in the
last Anglo-American experience with a guild monopoly, Con-
gress's decision to return to a guild monopoly as the model for
protection in the "Digital Millennium" is surprising, indeed star-
tling. Such an approach places at risk essentially all of the public
interest protections found both in the Statute of Anne and in copy-
right law more generally.
Consider, for example, the three changes that from the outset
distinguished the Statute of Anne from the guild monopoly of the
Stationers' Company: (1) adoption of the originality requirement;
(2) imposition of a limited duration for protection; and (3) delega-
tion of the task of defining protection's proper scope to an
independent judiciary. On all three of these issues, the DMCA
embraces the approach followed under the guild monopoly of the
Stationers' Company. By generally prohibiting the distribution of
decryption technology, the DMCA extends protection to unorigi-
nal works potentially indefinitely. The DMCA also returns
responsibility for determining protection's proper scope to the
copyright industry itself.
On the issues of originality and the duration of protection, the
DMCA generally prohibits the distribution of decryption technol-
ogy and thereby enables individuals to rely on encryption to
effectively bar unauthorized access and copying. Encryption tech-
nology does not, however, distinguish between works that
copyright protects and those left unprotected. It can bar unauthor-
ized access to any file, whether or not the work contained within is
protected by copyright.' If decryption technology is generally un-
' Id. § 1201(f).
Id. § 1201(g).
See Kenneth W. Dam, Self-Help in the Digital Jungle, 28 J. Legal Stud. 393, 394,
396-97 (1999) (recognizing that result by arguing that use of encryption to protect
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available, individuals can use encryption to protect digital files that
copyright leaves unprotected.
Congress attempted to avoid this result by limiting application of
the anti-circumvention prohibitions in Sections 1201(a)(1) and
1201(a)(2) to cases where the technological measure controls ac-
cess to a work "protected under this title."'" The dual use nature of
decryption technology, however, will likely defeat Congress's at-
tempt to limit the use of encryption to copyrighted works. Almost
invariably, the same decryption technology that enables individuals
to decrypt works not protected by copyright will also enable indi-
viduals to decrypt works protected by copyright. For example, in
one of the first cases brought under the DMCA, Universal City
Studios v. Reimerdes, °' eight motion picture studios sued to enjoin
the distribution of a computer program known as DeCSS.' This
program defeated the encryption system the motion pictures stu-
dios were using to protect their copyrighted works. Finding a
violation of the DMCA, the district court enjoined distribution of
DeCSS.1 " This result not only enables the motion picture studios to
use their Contents Scramble System (or CSS) to protect works
covered by copyright, but it also allows them to use CSS to protect
works that fall outside of copyright. If a motion picture studio used
CSS to encrypt both recent films still within copyright's term and
older films no longer protected by copyright, then under the pre-
cise language of the DMCA, the use of DeCSS to decrypt the older
films unprotected by copyright would not violate Section
1201(a)(1). The manufacture and distribution of DeCSS, however,
would likely remain a violation of Section 1201(a)(2) because
DeCSS could be used to decrypt the more recent films as well.
Given decryption technology's potential for both legitimate and il-
legitimate use, the question would become whether the technology
was primarily designed to decrypt copyrighted works or to decrypt
uncopyrighted works. Because the decryption technology is neces-
sarily designed for both tasks, a court would likely resolve this
uncopyrightable and public domain materials "should not be viewed as conflicting
with the intellectual property law of copyright").
1- 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A), (a)(2)(A)-(C).
111 F. Supp. 2d 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
112 Id. at 303.
13 Id. at 317-19, 345.
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issue by looking at the technology's actual use."°' To the extent that
the decryption technology could break the lock on more, or more
valuable, works still within copyright, a court could reasonably find
the technology "primarily designed" to decrypt works "protected
under this title." Distribution of the technology would therefore
violate Section 1201(a)(2), even if the technology were also neces-
sary to break encryption locks on digital works unprotected by
copyright.
As a result, despite Congress's attempt to limit the anti-
circumvention provisions to works "protected under this title," the
practical consequences of the DMCA's general ban on decryption
technology are broader than the formal language. Under the pre-
cise language of the DMCA, an individual remains formally free to
decrypt a non-copyrighted work and copy it. Yet, because of its in-
evitable dual use nature, distribution of the necessary decryption
technology would likely be a violation of Section 1201(a)(2). As a
practical matter, then, it is unclear how or where ordinary consum-
ers would obtain the decryption technology necessary to break the
encryption lock on digital information unprotected by copyright.
For that reason, although the DMCA does not formally repudiate
the originality or limited times limitations on protection first found
in the Statute of Anne, the DMCA's general prohibition on the
distribution of decryption technology achieves that result nonethe-
less.'
The DMCA also largely eliminates the judiciary as the central
arbiter of copyright protection's proper scope. Through its reliance
on encryption-based protection, the DMCA empowers copyright
owners themselves to balance the public and private interests at
stake. With encryption, copyright owners will be in a position to try
and protect their works as they see fit. This is not to say that copy-
right owners will necessarily exercise their newfound authority to
eliminate all limitations on protection, or that they could even do
so if they tried. Encryption technology has its limits, and even
where protection is technically feasible, some limitations on the
scope of protection may coincide with the interests of copyright
See id. at 319.
See David Nimmer, A Riff on Fair Use in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act,
148 U. Pa. L. Rev. 673,729 (2000).
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owners."° Nevertheless, any number of copyright doctrines are
unlikely to survive in an encryption-based world, such as the first
sale doctrine in Section 1 0 9 ,"c the authorization for archival copies
in Section 108'0° and Section 117(a),"° the authorization for repair
copies in Section 117(c),"' and the authorization for nonprofit re-
search and teaching copies under Section 107."' Yet, the major
concern here is not with whether particular limitations will survive,
but with the more general bias copyright owners will bring to defin-
ing the proper scope of protection. While courts may not always
have seen the public interest clearly in copyright cases, they at least
did not have their own money at stake. Copyright owners will. That
self-interest will undoubtedly cloud copyright owners' perception
of the balance between public and private interest and will tilt pro-
tection in favor of copyright owners.
By replacing the judiciary with copyright owners as the central
arbiter of protection's proper scope, the DMCA replaces the pub-
lic interest in the creation and dissemination of works of
authorship with the private interest of maximizing the revenue of
copyright owners. Given this fact, the only plausible argument that
might justify the DMCA in the light of the Constitution's public in-
terest mandate is that Congress had no choice. Facing the risk of
widespread private copying that digital technology creates, propo-
nents of the DMCA will undoubtedly argue that the DMCA's
reliance on technology-based control represents the only viable
means to ensure an adequate supply of creative works. Otherwise,
those proponents might argue, the risk of widespread private copy-
ing will undermine completely the incentive to produce such
works. To determine whether Congress had no choice, Part II turns
to a consideration of the available alternatives. Examining these al-
ternatives may reveal whether another approach might better
redress whatever threat private copying poses for creative work
while still preserving copyright's public interest focus.
106 William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright
Law, 18 J. Legal Stud. 325,332-33 (1989).
10717 U.S.C. § 109 (1994 & Supp. V 2000).
108 Id. § 108.
1- 17 U.S.C. § 117(a) (Supp. V 2000).
110 Id. § 117(c).
1117 U.S.C. § 107 (1994).
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II. ADDRESSING THE RISK OF WIDESPREAD PRIVATE COPYING
WITHOUT BETRAYING THE PUBLIC INTEREST
Other than the DMCA, there are three general approaches that
copyright law might take in the face of private copying. First, it
could retain an encryption-based approach, but modify or interpret
the DMCA to include limitations on encryption-based protection
to ensure that it serves primarily the public interest. Second, it
could abandon an encryption-based approach altogether and sub-
stitute some alternative approach in its stead. Third, it could
abandon encryption and trust American consumers to regulate
themselves. The following Sections discuss each of these three gen-
eral approaches in turn.
A. A Modified Encryption-Based Approach
If the problem with encryption-based protection is that it per-
mits copyright owners (and others) to over-protect their works, the
obvious solution is to impose limits on the permissible bounds of
encryption. For contractual restrictions on use and copying
("CRUCs"), a number of commentators have discussed the use of
preemption to bar excessive restrictions -an approach that has
received a decidedly mixed judicial reception."' CRUCs, however,
are a matter of state law and therefore subject to preemption
where they "stand[] as an obstacle to the accomplishment and exe-
112 E.g., David A. Rice, Public Goods, Private Contract and Public Policy: Federal
Preemption of Software License Prohibitions Against Reverse Engineering, 53 U.
Pitt. L. Rev. 543 (1992); see generally Julie E. Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace: The
New Economic Orthodoxy of "Rights Management," 97 Mich. L. Rev. 462, 485-86
(1998) (discussing the conditions in which copyright law might preempt contract
terms); Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property and Shrinkwrap Licenses, 68 S. Cal. L.
Rev. 1239. 1271 (1995) (noting that "[flederal intellectual property law ... does not
"preempt the field' entirely"); Michael J. Madison, Legal-Ware: Contract and
Copyright in the Digital Age, 67 Fordham L. Rev. 1025, 1127-32 (1998) (noting
limited scope of preemption of contract law by copyright law); J.H. Reichman &
Jonathan A. Franklin, Privately Legislated Intellectual Property Rights: Reconciling
Freedom of Contract with Public Good Uses of Information, 147 U. Pa. L. Rev. 875,
920-22 (1999) (discussing shortfalls of preemption doctrine as a tool for
understanding copyright issues).
III Compare Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software, 847 F.2d 255, 269-70 (5th Cir. 1988)
(applying preemption to prohibit enforcement of CRUCs under state law), with
ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1453-55 (7th Cir. 1996) (refusing to preempt
CRUCs that prohibit commercial use of factual data).
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cution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.' '14 In con-
trast, Congress has expressly authorized encryption-based
protection in the DMCA. As the DMCA is itself federal law, pre-
emption, whether of the express statutory variety or the implied
constitutional variety, is not an option for controlling overbroad
encryption-based protection. 5 Courts could, however, attempt to
limit overbroad encryption-based protection by incorporating the
fair use doctrine and other limitations on copyright protection into
the DMCA's anti-circumvention provisions."6 This would soften
the terms of the DMCA and allow a defendant to avoid liability by
showing that, even though she circumvented a technological con-
trol, the resulting use or access was fair or otherwise noninfringing.
Incorporating the fair use doctrine and other limitations on
copyright protection seems to contradict the plain language distinc-
tion that the DMCA draws between "violations" of the DMCA
and "copyright infringement... 7 Nevertheless, a court has several
plausible bases for incorporating the fair use doctrine (and perhaps
other limitations on copyright protection) directly into the
DMCA's anti-circumvention provisions. First, interpreting Section
1201(c) as a type of savings clause that merely preserves fair use in
cases involving traditional copyright infringement claims would
render Section 1201(c) almost entirely superfluous. Nothing in the
DMCA suggests that the DMCA intended to overturn the fair use
doctrine for copyright infringement generally; as a result, a savings
clause appears unnecessary. A narrow interpretation of Section
1201(c), restricting its application to copyright infringement, would
therefore violate a cardinal tenet of statutory interpretation:
Courts must give effect, if possible, to every word in a statute. For
Section 1201(c) to have any substantive meaning at all, courts pre-
sumably should interpret the section as something other than a
simple restatement of the obvious."' Yet, the relevant legislative
history seems to relegate Section 1201(c) to such a trivial role."9
114 Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
"' Denicola, supra note 1, at 197-99.
"6 In theory, we could also implement this approach by enacting a federal law that
affirmatively prohibits, and provides appropriate sanctions for, the use of encryption
likely to bar fair or otherwise noninfringing uses.
11 See supra text accompanying notes 88-94.
18 Another argument for incorporating the fair use doctrine and other limitations on
copyright protection into the DMCA's anti-circumvention provisions relies on
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As an alternative approach to incorporating the fair use doctrine
into the DMCA, a court might rely on the belief that courts origi-
nally crafted the fair use doctrine without express statutory
authorization as justification for applying the doctrine to the
DMCA. Although this belief does not rest on an entirely firm
foundation,' 2' the serious constitutional questions that would oth-
erwise arise from a plain language interpretation of the DMCA
might justify such incorporation. Given that fair use and copy-
right's other limitations are intended to ensure that copyright
serves "the Progress of Science," removing them may prove be-
yond Congress's constitutional authority under the Patent and
Copyright Clause."' Although the Eleventh Circuit has allowed
Congress to avoid a limitation inherent in the Patent and Copy-
right Clause by resorting to its Commerce Clause authority,"
§ 1201(b)(1). 17 U.S.C. § 1201(b)(1) (Supp. V 2000). Section 1201(b)(1) closely
parallels § 1201(a)(2), prohibiting the manufacture and distribution of technology that
"is primarily designed" for, "has only limited commercially significant purpose or use
other than." or "is marketed" for circumvention. Id. § 1201(b)(1)(A)-(C). Section
1201(b)(1), however, prohibits such actions as to "a technological measure that
effectively protects a right of a copyright owner under this title," id. (emphasis added),
rather than prohibiting such actions as to "a technological measure that effectively
controls access to a work protected under this title," id. § 1201(a)(2)(A)-(C). Because
a copyright owner's exclusive rights under § 106 are expressly "[slubject to sections
107 through 121," 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994 & Supp. V 2000), the phrase "right of a
copyright owner under this title" found in § 1201(b)(1) may implicitly incorporate the
limitations on copyright protection set forth in §§ 107 through 121, including the fair
use doctrine.
"9See WIPO Copyright Treaties Implementation Act; and Online Copyright
Liability Limitation Act: Hearing on H.R. 2281 and H.R. 2280 Before the Subcomm.
on Courts and Intellectual Prop. of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong.
49-50 (1997) (prepared statement of Marybeth Peters, register of copyrights,
Copyright Office of the United States, Library of Congress) (recognizing the potential
threat strong encryption-based protection presents to fair use but recognizing that
"'a]s drafted, however, the [savings] clause does not establish fair use as a defense to
the violation of section 1201 in itself"); see also S. Rep. No. 105-190, at 30 (1998)
("Together these provisions are intended to ensure that none of the provisions in
section 1201 affect the existing legal regime established in the Copyright Act and case
law interpreting that statute.").
1-, See Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Reexamining Copyright's Incentives-Access Paradigm,
49 Vand. L. Rev. 483, 502 n.70 (1996) (noting that historically the limitation of fair use
was seen as implicit in the meaning of the word "copy").
12, U.S. Const. art. I., § 8, cl. 8.
122 United States v. Moghadam, 175 F.3d 1269,1280 (11th Cir. 1999), cert. denied 529
U.S. 1036 (2000) (concluding "that the Copyright Clause does not envision that
Congress is positively forbidden from extending copyright-like protection under other
constitutional clauses, such as the Commerce Clause, to works of authorship that may
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courts have also emphasized fair use's central role in ensuring that
the protection Congress extends to copyrighted works does not
violate the First Amendment's guaranty of free speech.l" If courts
follow through on this reasoning, the DMCA may prove constitu-
tionally infirm if interpreted to exclude the fair use doctrine
whether the DMCA is treated as an exercise of Congressional
power under the Patent and Copyright Clause or under the Com-
merce Clause."4 To avoid finding the DMCA unconstitutional, or
not meet the fixation requirement inherent in the term 'Writings"'); see also Authors
League of Am. v. Oman, 790 F.2d 220,224 (2d Cir. 1986) (upholding the now-expired
manufacturing clause of the Copyright Act); U.S. Copyright Office, Report on Legal
Protection for Databases 108-110 (1997) (reaching the conclusion that Congress
likely had authority to protect unoriginal databases under the Commerce Clause).
But see Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, A Wiseguy's Approach to Information Products:
Muscling Copyright and Patent into a Unitary Theory of Intellectual Property, 1992
Sup. Ct. Rev. 195, 230 ("Restrictions on constitutional grants of legislative power,
such as the Copyright Clause, would be meaningless if Congress could evade them
simply by announcing that it was acting under some broader authority."); John J.
Flynn, The Orphan Drug Act: An Unconstitutional Exercise of the Patent Power,
1992 Utah L. Rev. 389, 414 n.81 ("[Tjhe Commerce Clause and the Patent Clause
should be read together as establishing an implicit policy of precluding the federal
government from granting private parties unregulated and exclusive monopolies over
economic activity other than that authorized by the Patent Clause."). Moghadam does
not directly apply to the DMCA, given that the works protected under the DMCA
are also works protected under copyright. See Brief Amicus Curiae of Intellectual
Property Law Professors at 21-23, Universal City Studios v. Corley (2d Cir. submitted Jan.
26,2001) (No. 00-9185), http.//www.law.georgetown.edu/faculty/jec/2600ipprofsamicus.pdf.
1 E.g., Harper & Row Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 559-60 (1985). Of
course, scholars have long recognized these recitations as mere form rather than
substance. Lyman Ray Patterson, Copyright in Historical Perspective 225 (1968)
("The contradiction of protecting ideas as private property in a society devoted to
freedom of expression has been rationalized away with assurances that copyright does
not protect ideas, but only the expression of ideas. The rationalization, however, will
not stand up in light of the concept of copyright as it exists today.").
See Benkler, supra note 18, at 548-52 (arguing that both the Patent and
Copyright Clause and the First Amendment place constitutional limits on
congressional authority to create property rights in information); Yochai Benkler,
Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on Enclosure of the
Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 354, 414-29 (1999) (arguing that the DMCA, by
authorizing private enclosure through encryption, may violate the First Amendment);
Julie E. Cohen, Copyright and the Jurisprudence of Self-Help, 13 Berkeley Tech. L.J.
1089, 1131-34 (1998) (same); William Patry, The Enumerated Powers Doctrine and
Intellectual Property: An Imminent Constitutional Collision, 67 Geo. Wash. L. Rev.
359, 361 (1999) ("When a specific clause of the Constitution, such as Clause 8 of
Article I, Section 8, has been construed as containing general limitations on
Congress's power, Congress may not avoid those limitations by legislating under
another clause."); Patterson, supra note 12, at 374 ("For Congress to use the copyright
clause to delegate to copyright holders powers that the First Amendment denies to
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to avoid confronting the serious questions as to constitutionality
that would otherwise arise, a court could plausibly adopt a broader
reading of Section 1201(c) that would incorporate fair use directly
as a limitation on the DMCA's anti-circumvention provisions.
Nevertheless, even if a court could be persuaded to incorporate
fair use and other limitations on copyright protection into the
DMCA, such a step would not necessarily solve the problem that
digital technology presents, nor restore the balance copyright has
sought to establish over the last two hundred years. Digital tech-
nology has fundamentally altered copyright doctrine by making
widespread private copying possible. Although the fair use doc-
trine has played a central role historically in defining copyright's
limits, it presupposes: (1) that the copyright owner will be able to
identify the alleged infringement in order to bring it before the'
court; and (2) that a judicial proceeding represents a viable means
for resolving the dispute. Private copying challenges both of these
necessary preconditions. Because it is private, this sort of copying
is more difficult to identify and bring before the court. And even if
identified in some cases, the costs of resolving the question of in-
fringement through a judicial proceeding are prohibitive. As a
result, unless otherwise effectively controlled, private copying
would continue, not because a court had balanced the public and
private interests at stake and found the private copying to be fair,
but because anonymity and the safety of numbers would insulate
the private copier's actions from judicial scrutiny.
Given that digital technology has fundamentally altered the bal-
ance copyright seeks to achieve, leaving the fair use and Sony
Corp. doctrines in place would have rendered any attempt to con-
trol private copying impotent. If Congress had prohibited
circumvention of a technological control only where it led to in-
fringement, such a prohibition would prove superfluous. It would
require the copyright owner to prove both circumvention and in-
fringement, whereas traditional copyright requires a showing of
infringement alone.
Similarly, if Congress had retained the Sony Corp. standard, de-
cryption technology and the resulting ability to engage in private
copying would likely have become commonplace. Although de-
Congress to control access to published works that have been purchased in the open
market-makes little sense and worse policy.").
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cryption technology once commonly came as a physical device-
the infamous "black box"'--decryption technology increasingly
comes in the form of computer programs. Consider, for example,
the decryption technology at issue in the cases brought to date un-
der the DMCA. Several involve physical devices analogous to the
black box.126 Others, however, involve computer programs that de-
feat a copyright owner's technological controls."i
Where the decryption technology at issue is a computer pro-
gram, the difficulties of circumscribing its availability once the
program has been published are obvious. In Universal City Studios
v. Reimerdes,2 for example, once the DeCSS program was posted,
it became instantly available to anyone with access to the Inter-
25 During the floor debate over the DMCA, at least some senators expressed the
view that the anti-circumvention provisions reached only such black boxes. For
example, then-Senator John Ashcroft stated:
In discussing the anti-circumvention portion of the legislation, I think it is worth
emphasizing that I could agree to support the bill's approach of outlawing
certain devices because I was repeatedly assured that the device prohibitions in
1201(a)(2) and 1201(b) are aimed at so-called "black boxes" and not at
legitimate consumer electronics and computer products that have substantial
non-infringing uses. I specifically worked for and achieved changes to the bill to
make sure that no court would misinterpret this bill as outlawing legitimate
consumer electronics devices or computer hardware. As a result, neither section
1201(a)(2) nor section 1201(b) should be read as outlawing any device with
substantial non-infringing uses....
144 Cong. Rec. S4890 (daily ed. May 14, 1998) (statement of Sen. Ashcroft); see also
144 Cong. Rec. H7094 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1998) (statement of Rep. Bliley) (stating that
"In our report, the Committee stressed that section 1201(a)(2) is aimed
fundamentally at outlaying [sic) so-called 'black boxes' that are expressly intended to
facilitate circumvention of protection measures for purposes of gaining access to a
work. This provision is not aimed at products that are capable of commercially
significant noninfringing uses .... ").
'2 CSC Holdings v. Greenleaf Elecs., No. 99-C7249, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7675, at
*24 (N.D. Ill. June 1, 2000) (finding a likely violation of DMCA as a result of sales of
a cable descrambler and decoder); RealNetworks, Inc. v. Streambox, Inc., No. C99-
2070P, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1889, at *2-3 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 18, 2000) (finding a
likely violation of DMCA as a result of sales of a "Streambox VCR" that decoded the
plaintiff's encrypted works); Sony Computer Entm't Am. v. Gamemasters, 87
F. Supp. 2d 976, 987 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (finding that the sale of a piece of game
equipment, the "Game Enhancer," that altered certain codes in the plaintiff's
encrypted games likely violated the DMCA).
1, Universal City Studios v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294,317-19 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)
(finding that defendant's posting of the DeCSS computer program on his website
violated the DMCA); RealNetworks, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1889, at *33 (finding that
defendant's distribution of its Ferret computer program likely violated the DMCA).
"s 111 F. Supp. 2d 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
The Death of Copyright
net. > Although knowledge of it undoubtedly took longer than an
instant to filter out, its portability and ease of duplication once
available as a digital posting on the Internet are readily apparent."3
Because it was capable of noninfringing uses, the DeCSS program
would have avoided liability under the Sony Corp. standard. Yet,
the program was equally capable of infringing uses. If its distribu-
tion were lawful, the program would undoubtedly reopen the door
to widespread private copying of copyrighted works.
For these reasons, neither incorporating the fair use defense nor
restoring the Sony Corp. standard would reestablish copyright's
traditional balance in today's digital age. A modified DMCA
would simply tilt the balance in favor of private copiers by allowing
them to remain beyond the law's reach. As a result, if private copy-
ing poses the threat to the creation of works of authorship that the
copyright industry fears, then a modified DMCA is unlikely to ad-
dress that threat adequately.
B. Alternatives to Encryption
Another alternative to the DMCA would be to extend the stop-
gap measures that copyright has already employed. For example,
Congress could increase even further the penalties associated with
copyright infringement. With increased penalties, even a few pri-
vate copying prosecutions could serve as examples that would
deter private copying more generally. This approach is problem-
atic, however. Given the transaction costs involved, legal action
against individual private copiers would likely be brought against
only a relative handful of those involved in the activity. For those
few prosecutions to deter private copying generally, courts would
need to punish the few infringers chosen for prosecution to an ex-
tent radically disproportionate to the wrong they committed. At
some point, a point copyright law may have already reached, the
Id. at 303.
'The lawsuit was filed in January 2000, and the district court granted a preliminary
injunction against the defendants' posting in the same month. Id. at 312 & n.92. While
this is fast work for a district court, the preliminary injunction still came far too late to
prevent widespread distribution of the DeCSS program. See id. at 312 (noting that the
defendants "continued to support links to other web sites purporting to offer DeCSS
for download, a list which had grown to nearly five hundred by July 2000").
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level of punishment required to deter private copying generally will
simply become unjust. Alternatively, Congress might attempt to re-
tain copyright's traditional approach of legal action against each
individual infringer, but improve its effectiveness by radically re-
ducing the transaction costs and expenses associated with
individual copyright infringement cases. The Uniform Domain
Name Dispute Resolution Policy ("UDNDRP") that the Internet
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers ("ICANN") has
adopted for resolving domain name disputes on the Internet sug-
gests one such model.131 A similar approach, if applied to private
copying, could sharply reduce the transaction costs of individual in-
fringement actions and bring more private copiers within the law's
reach. Even if suing every private copier remained impractical, an
increase in the number of enforcement actions would increase the
risk of a lawsuit for each private copier. With enough of an in-
crease, the enforcement activity might deter private copying
generally without any need to resort to unjust punishments. Yet,
the danger remains that in order to reduce the transaction costs to
an acceptable level, Congress might have to: (1) simplify copyright
doctrine to such an extent that the public interest limitations are
effectively removed; or (2) turn decisionmaking over to arbitrators
who may ignore even a carefully crafted set of rules in favor of
more simplistic, pro-plaintiff resolutions.3
Moving beyond stopgap extensions of copyright's traditional ap-
proach, another possibility is to authorize private copying while
attempting to compensate copyright owners by collecting levies on
sales of the equipment and blank storage media that enable such
M Internet Corp. for Assigned Names & Numbers, Uniform Domain Name Dispute
Resolution Policy, at http:lwww.icann.orgludrpludrp-policy-24oct99.htm (last updated
June 4,2000).
132 Milton Mueller, Rough Justice: An Analysis of ICANN's Uniform Dispute
Resolution Policy V2.1, at http://dcc.syr.edu/roughjustice.htm (last visited Mar. 23,
2001). In his Executive Summary, Dr. Mueller notes this disjunction between the
carefully drafted rules and their application by the arbitrators in particular cases:
On the whole, the UDRP criteria for resolving domain name disputes have
proven to be robust and fair. If applied properly, the policy serves as an
effective remedy against abusive registrations while preventing overreaching by
trademark holders. Although a significant number of bad decisions have come
out of the process, the worst of them clearly violate or ignore one or more of
the UDRP's decision criteria.
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copying.131 Such an approach for videocassette recorders was pro-
posed in the United States following the Sony Corp. decision. 4
Although rejected in the United States at that time, a levy-based
approach has proven popular in Europe. 5 Beginning with Ger-
many in 1955 with the Grundig decision of the Federal Supreme
Court,"' twelve of the fifteen European Union ("EU") members
have imposed, or authorized a collective rights organization to ne-
gotiate, a fee (variously defined as a royalty, a tax, or a levy) on the
sale of copying equipment and its associated blank storage media.'"
-In the AHRA, the United States adopted such an approach for digital audio
recording devices and associated blank storage media. 17 U.S.C. §§ 1003-07 (1994 &
Supp. V 2000). Because the relevant technology has largely failed in the marketplace,
however, the royalty provisions have proven to be of little significance.
I' H.R. 1030, 98th Cong. (1983); see also Lardner, supra note 31, at 251 (discussing
background negotiations behind introduction of H.R. 1030).
"See Deloitte & Touche, Report on the Collective Management of Copyright in
the European Union, at 10 (2000) (on file with the Virginia Law Review Association).
I'- BGHZ 18, 44 (F.R.G.); see also Reinhold Kreile, Collection and Distribution of
the Statutory Remuneration for Private Copying with Respect to Recorders and
Blank Cassettes in Germany, 23 Int'l Rev. Indus. Prop. & Copyright L. 449, 459-60
(1992) (discussing the effects of the Grundig decision); Juergen Weimann, Private
Home Taping Under Sec. 53(5) of the German Copyright Act of 1965,30 J. Copyright
Soc'y 153, 154-56 (1982) (explaining the background of the Grundig decision).
I Federal Act on Copyright in Works of Literature and Art and on Related Rights
(Aus.) § 42(5)-(7); Law on Copyright and Neighboring Rights art. 55 (June 30, 1994)
(BeIg.), http://clea.wipo.int (CLEA ID BE003) (last visited Mar. 23, 2001); Act on
Copyright 1995 § 39 (June 14, 1995) (Den.), http://clea.wipo.int (CLEA ID DKO01)
(last visited Mar. 23, 2001); Copyright Act art. 26a (Dec. 22, 1965) (Fin.),
http://clea.wipo.int (CLEA ID FI001) (last visited Mar. 23, 2001); Law on the
Intellectual Property Code art. L. 311-1 (Jan. 3, 1995) (Fr.), http://clea.wipo.int
(CLEA ID FR003) (last visited Mar. 23, 2001); Law Dealing with Copyright and
Related Rights art. 54(1) (June 23, 1995) (F.R.G.), http://clea.wipo.int (CLEA ID
DE007) (last visited Mar. 23, 2001); Copyright, Related Rights and Cultural Matters
art. 18(3) (Aug. 2, 1996) (Greece), http://clea.wipo.int (CLEA ID GR212) (last visited
Mar. 23. 2001); Law No. 93 of Feb. 5, 1992: Provisions for the Benefit of
Phonographic Companies and Remuneration for Private Non Profit-Making
Reproduction (no date) (Italy), http://clea.wipo.int (CLEA ID IT002) (French
language only) (last visited Mar. 23, 2001); Act Amending the 1912 Copyright Act
Concerning a Levy on the Reproduction of Recorded Images or Sound Recordings
for Personal Use, Study, or Practice §16(c) (May 30, 1990) (Neth.),
http://clea.wipo.int (CLEA ID NLO04) (last visited Mar. 23,2001); Code of Copyright
and Related Rights art. 82 (Sept. 3, 1991) (Port.), http://clea.wipo.int (CLEA ID
PT002) (last visited Mar. 23, 2001); Consolidated Text of the Law on Intellectual
Property art. 25(1) (Mar. 6, 1998) (Spain), http://clea.wipo.int (CLEA ID ES070) (last
visited Mar. 23, 2001); Act on Copyright in Literary and Artistic Works art. 26k
(Swed.) (on file with Virginia Law Review Association); see also Deloitte & Touche,
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In its May 22, 2001 directive on copyright, the EU approved this
approach. In Article 5.b.2, the EU authorized member states to al-
low private, non-commercial reproduction "on condition that the
rightholders receive fair compensation," presumably through levies
on equipment used for such private copying." In the twelve mem-
ber states that already have levies for private copying, the levies
apply to a wide variety of products, including blank audio and VHS
cassettes, audio and VHS recorders, photocopiers, digital storage
media, and scanners, and have recently been extended to CD
burners in Germany.'39 The funds from the levies are typically col-
lected by one or more collective rights organizations in each
member state and are disbursed following a sampling procedure
similar to the one the American Society of Composers, Authors,
and Publishers ("ASCAP") and Broadcast Music, Inc. ("BMI")
use to determine how often a musical work is performed publicly.'40
Based upon surveys or samples, the collective rights organizations
attempt to estimate the likely level of private copying for each in-
dividual work and distribute the available funds accordingly.14'
supra note 135, at 13 (summarizing these fees); Kristi Essick, Computer Tax Plan
Sparks French Fury, The Standard Europe, at http:leurope.thestandard.comlarticle/
display/0,1151,14198,00.html (Jan. 24, 2001) (discussing controversy in France over
extending copyright levy to include non-removable digital recording media, such as
computers).
I' European Union Copyright Directive 2001/29/EC, art. 5.b.2 (May 22, 2001); see
also id., pmbl., 35.250 final at 21-22. The Directive allows member states to grant an
exception to the copyright owner's reproduction right for "natural person[s]" to copy
for "private use and for ends that are neither directly nor indirectly commercial." Id.
The Directive attempts to split the difference between a levy-based approach and an
encryption-based approach to the private copying issue by stating that the
rightholders must receive "fair compensation which takes account of the application
or non-application of technological measures" to control access. Id., art. 5.b.2.
"'9Essick, supra note 137 (following hyperlink to a "country-by-country guide"
identifies differing availability and levels for levies on various digital and analogue
recording and copyright equipment and storage media); Hewlett-Packard to Pay
Royalties on CD Writers, 36 GEMA Newsletter (Dec. 2000), http:llwww.gema.de/
englpublic/brief36/page4.html (discussing levies on German CD burners).
1,0 Compare Deloitte & Touche, supra note 135, at 57-60 (describing the methods
used by European collective rights organizations to allocate revenue among
rightholders), with M. William Krasilovsky & Sidney Shemel, This Business of Music
197-99 (rev. 7th ed. 1995) (describing similar methods used by ASCAP and BMI to
distribute their revenues).
-
4 Deloitte & Touche, supra note 135, at 57-59; see also Kreile, supra note 136, at
463-66 (discussing royalty distribution in Germany); Weimann, supra note 136, at
166-67 (same).
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To date, these private copying levies have remained a near-
trivial component of the total revenue available for copyrighted
works in Europe. Even in Germany, the country with the most ex-
tensive system of levies,42 the levies collected were only DM 124
million and DM 125 million in 1998 and 1999, respectively (or
roughly $65 to 75 million each year).143 By way of contrast, the total
licensing revenue for just one of Germany's collective rights or-
ganizations, the Society for Musical Performing Rights and
Mechanical Reproduction Rights ("GEMA"), amounted to DM
1.465 billion and DM 1.515 billion in 1998 and 1999, respectively."
If we consider the private copying levies as a component of
GEMA's total revenues, GEMA's share' 5 of the private copying
levies amounted to roughly 2.6% of its total revenues both in 1998
and 1999."6
Any attempt to expand the levy-based approach to redress pri-
vate copying must confront three principal difficulties. First,
imposing a levy raises both efficiency and fairness concerns. These
concerns arise because copying technology has uses other than pri-
142 See Kreile, supra note 136, at 449 ("The following article concentrates on the
German view, as the remuneration system in Germany is not only the oldest statutory
regulation (since 1965), but since 1985 is also the most comprehensive."); Boris
Grondahl. Taxing Question, The Standard Europe (Jan. 24, 2001), at
http://europe.thestandard.com/article/display/0,1151,14146,00.html ("In Germany, the
country with the most complete set of such levies .... ").
1' See e-mail from Michael Sandt, Society for Musical Performing Rights and
Mechanical Reproduction Rights (Germany) ("GEMA"), to Glynn Lunney (Feb. 22,
2001) (on file with the Virginia Law Review Association) (setting forth the levies
collected in Germany for the years 1988 through 1999); see also Kreile, supra note
136, at 456-57 (setting forth levies collected in Germany for the years 1988 through
1990 in identical amounts to those set forth in the e-mail); Grtndahl, supra note 142
(noting that German levies amounted to 90 million euros in 1998). The conversion
rate between Deutsch marks and U.S. dollars averaged 1.7597 DM per U.S. dollar in
1998 and ranged from 1.6543 to 1.9522 DM per U.S. dollar in 1999. World Almanac
and Book of Facts 2001, at 221; Wall St. J., Jan. 3,2000, at C1.
- Reinhold Kreile, Foreword, 162 GEMA News (Dec. 2000), http://www.gema.de/
eng/publicn 162/vorwwort.html.
- As one of the principal collective rights organizations in Germany, GEMA
receives 42% of the levies from audio recording equipment and almost 21% of the
levies from video recording equipment. See Kreile, supra note 136, at 464-65
(breaking down the distribution of the levies between the various German collective
rights organizations as of 1992). I have assumed that GEMA's share of the levies has
remained constant since 1992.
- For those keeping score at home, the actual numbers work out to be 2.6139% in
1998 and 2.6109%in 1999.
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vate copying, yet a levy imposes its price uniformly. The individual
who uses a tape recorder to make fifteen copies of another's copy-
righted musical works must pay the same levy as the individual
who uses the recorder to make a demo tape of her own work. A
levy thereby discourages legitimate use of the copying technology
(the efficiency concern) and forces individuals who undertake le-
gitimate uses to pay tribute to copyright owners as if they were
engaged in private copying (the fairness concern).' These consid-
erations become increasingly significant as the levy increases. If,
for example, we were to adopt a levy-based approach as the central
means for addressing potential lost revenues in a world where pri-
vate copying had become a routine means for avoiding the
purchase of a work, a levy-based approach might need to impose a
levy sufficient to equalize, for example, the costs of privately copy-
ing a popular CD and purchasing the CD at the market price.
Rather than pay only a few dollars for ten blank CDs, a consumer
might have to pay ten dollars for one CD in order to provide the
funds necessary to compensate the copyright owner for the lost
sales revenue. At such a high level, a levy could prove both fair and
efficient only so long as nearly everyone is using the blank CDs for
the same purpose. If substantial legitimate uses remain, the ineffi-
ciency and unfairness of such a large levy become palpable.
Second, such a levy discourages the creation and dissemination
of new distribution technologies. With the introduction of innova-
tive copying technology, a manufacturer is likely to enjoy some
market power with the new technology, whether as a result of a
patent or simple lead-time advantage. This market power offers
the manufacturer the opportunity to earn rents on the new tech-
nology that serve in turn as the incentive for developing and
producing the new technology. If a levy is imposed on such tech-
nology, the levy will increase the price of the technology to
consumers, creating an artificial price increase and its resulting in-
47In Germany, proponents of the levy-based approach have countered this
argument by suggesting that "it is unlikely that the machine during its whole lifetime
will never be used in infringing ways...." Weimann, supra note 136, at 167. Of
course, this still leaves open the very real possibility that individuals will use their
respective machines to quite different extents for private copying.
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efficiencies, as it would for existing technologies.' The levy will
also reduce the rents available to the manufacturer for introducing
the new technology. With a levy, part of the rents otherwise avail-
able to the manufacturer will be collected through the levy and
turned over to copyright owners."9 Reducing the rents available
reduces, in turn, the manufacturer's incentive to innovate. Reduced
incentives, together with an increased price to consumers for the
new technology, are likely to slow the creation and introduction of
new copying and distribution technologies.
While consumer groups and electronics manufacturers have ad-
vanced these first two considerations as reasons to oppose a levy-
based approach, copyright owners have advanced a third. Their
concern is that a levy-based approach expressly authorizes private
copying.1" Such an express authorization could move private copy-
ing from the margins into the mainstream, converting private
copying from a minor annoyance into a major threat to copyright
revenues. At the same time, a levy-based approach would also limit
the ability of copyright owners to price discriminate and otherwise
1'1 In contrast to the perfectly competitive market, the price increase resulting from
a levy in a monopoly market may yield a price increase to consumers somewhat lower
or higher than the amount of the levy. Hal. R. Varian, Intermediate Microeconomics:
A Modem Approach 419 (5th ed. 1999) (noting that when a quantity tax is imposed
on a monopolist it "may increase the price by more or less than the amount of the
tax").
, Before the levy, the manufacturer had presumably set a price that maximized its
available profit. If the levy takes the form of a pure profits tax, the levy will not
change the manufacturer's optimal market price or output. Id. at 420. As a result,
such a levy would come dollar-for-dollar out of the manufacturer's pocket. In
contrast, a per unit levy would increase the price the manufacturer should charge to
maximize profits. Id. at 418-20. The rents available at this new price will be lower
than the pre-levy rents, and moreover the manufacturer will have to turn over a share
of the reduced rents as its part of the levy.
'1, See Deloitte & Touche, supra note 135, at 13 (noting that along with levies, "[a]ll
Member States provide for a form of involuntary license for reproductions at home of
sound and audiovisual recordings for private purposes"); Mark Ward, A Tax on
Music Tracks, BBC News Online, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/englishlsci/tech/
newsid_ 120000/1120199.stm (Jan. 17, 2001) ("'We decided against it in the UK,' she
said, 'because a levy on blank tapes would seem to legalise taping, and the money
raised from any levy would have been a drop in the ocean of lost royalties."') (quoting
a spokeswoman for the British Phonographic Institute). Copyright owners are also
concerned that a lack of competition, supervision, and transparency in the operation
of collective rights organizations raises doubts as to any system that forces them to
rely more heavily on such organizations for their revenues. Deloitte & Touche, supra
note 135, at 28-34,44-55.
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price their works as they see fit. With a levy-based approach, re-
sponsibility for setting prices would no longer reside with copyright
owners alone, subject only to the market; the government and
equipment manufacturers would also play a central role. Whether
set by statute or by negotiation with the manufacturers, copyright
owners worry that the resulting levies will prove inadequate to
compensate them for lost sales should private copying become
widespread.
Although not fatal,'51 these difficulties with a levy-based ap-
proach are serious and suggest the need to consider one final
alternative: the Honor System.
C. The Honor System
In his Philosophy of Right,'52 Hegel articulated an honor-based
approach for controlling plagiarism: "Hence plagiarism would have
to be a matter of honour and be held in check by honour."'53 Yet, in
the rush to shut down Napster and MP3.com, very little serious at-
tention has been paid to the possibility that American consumers
might be trusted to regulate themselves. Far too much attention
has been paid to the assumption that if consumers can obtain cop-
ies for free, the vast majority of them will do so."5
I See infra text accompanying notes 312-28.
12 Hegel's Philosophy of Right (T.M. Knox trans., Oxford Press. 1967) (1952).
'5 Id. 69, at 56. To place the statement in context, the entire passage reads:
Moreover, the purpose of a product of mind is that people other than its author
should understand it and make it the possession of their ideas, memory,
thinking, &c.... The result is that they may regard as their own property the
capital asset accruing from their learning and may claim for themselves the right
to reproduce their learning in books of their own.... Now to what extent does
the new form which turns up when something is expressed again and again
transform the available stock of knowledge, and in particular the thoughts of
others who still retain external property in those intellectual productions of
theirs, into a private mental property of the individual reproducer and thereby
give him or fail to give him the right to make them his external property as well?
To what extent is such repetition of another's material in one's book a
plagiarism? There is no precise principle of determination available to answer
these questions, and therefore they cannot be finally settled either in principle
or by positive legislation. Hence plagiarism would have to be a matter of
honour and be held in check by honour.
Id. 69, at 55-56.
'm When a group of motion picture studios sued a sixteen-year-old Norwegian for
distributing the DeCSS program, Jack Valenti of the Motion Picture Association of
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As part of the development of the free rider concept, economists
often begin with the assumption that each consumer makes deci-
sions to maximize her 55 utility based upon a narrow view of
rational self-interest. Under this narrow view, a consumer will typi-
cally choose to free ride.' 6 Free riding enables her to obtain access
to the public good without paying her pro rata share of the public
good's cost and leaves her free to devote those resources else-
where. Also, as part of this initial development of the free rider
concept, economists often assume that cooperation is unlikely, es-
pecially as the number of participants (and hence potential free
riders) increases. Through these assumptions, economists created a
theoretical framework in which to examine and develop the con-
cept and potential consequences of free riding largely free of real
world complications. Although these assumptions were therefore
convenient in the initial theoretical development of the free rider
concept, economists have also recognized that these assumptions
are unlikely to prove generally accurate. "7 Self-sacrifice, coopera-
America insisted that "[n]obody is going to make very expensive movies if they can't
protect them." Sixteen-Year-Old Boy in Norway Unlocks Computer Code That Lets
Anyone Make Illegal Copies of Movies, ABC World News This Morning, Mar. 10,
2000, LEXIS, News Library, ABC News File. Valenti's statement implicitly equates
the availability of DeCSS with widespread free copying.
-I am using the female pronoun in the text as the universal pronoun, not to
identify the sex of the actor at issue. In using the female pronoun, I do not mean to
invoke those experimental studies that have shown a difference in free riding
behavior between men and women. See, e.g., Kelly M. Brown & Laura 0. Taylor, Do
as You Say, Say as You Do: Evidence on Gender Differences in Actual and Stated
Contributions to Public Goods, 43 J. Econ. Behav. & Org. 127 (2000); Jamie Brown-
Kruse and David Hummels, Gender Effects in Laboratory Public Goods
Contribution: Do Individuals Put Their Money Where Their Mouth Is?, 22 J. Econ.
Behav. & Org. 255 (1993); Clifford Nowell & Sarah Tinkler, The Influence of Gender
on the Provision of a Public Good, 25 J. Econ. Behav. & Org. 25 (1994).
'6William H. Oakland, Theory of Public Goods, in 2 Handbook of Public
Economics 485, 514 (Alan J. Auerbach & Martin Feldstein eds., 1987) ("In markets
for private goods, when the number of participants is large, individual actors become
price-takers. In public good markets, on the other hand, people become quantity-
takers. Consequently, no agent feels that he/she can influence the amount of public
good which is made available. The rational agent, therefore, will attempt to 'free ride'
on the public good supplies of others.").
' Amartya K. Sen, Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of
Economic Theory, in Beyond Self-Interest 25, 37 (Jane Mansbridge ed., 1990) ("The'
purely economic man is indeed close to being a social moron. Economic theory has
been much preoccupied with this rational fool decked in the glory of his one all-
purpose preference ordering. To make room for the different concepts related to his
behavior we need a more elaborate structure."); see also Howard Margolis,
2001] 859
Virginia Law Review [Vol. 87:813
tion, and charitable contribution, just to name a few examples, are
all extremely common and tend to refute, at least to some extent,
the free rider theory.158
Looking at free riding as an empirical, real world phenomenon,
it is far less clear that free riding will prove both substantial and in-
evitable."9 Over the last twenty years, economists and sociologists
have conducted extensive empirical research into the question of
free riding and the private provision of public goods." Through
Selfishness, Altruism, and Rationality 11 (1982) ("Almost no economist would deny
the possibility of altruism in rational choice.").
Im E.g., Dipak K. Gupta et al., Group Utility in the Micro Motivation of Collective
Action: The Case of Membership in the AARP, 32 J. Econ. Behav. & Org. 301, 302
(1997):
However, the fact of life is that people, across time, space, and culture take part
in collective actions of all sorts, often at extreme costs, risking economic well-
being, reputation, and even personal safety. It is, therefore, well accepted after
two decades of intense analyses that the solution to this logical quagmire lies,
not with the rationality of the actor taking part in a collective action, but with
the definition of rationality.
159 See John 0. Ledyard, Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research, in The
Handbook of Experimental Economics 111, 121 (John H. Kagel & Alvin E. Roth
eds., 1995) ("Economists and game-theorists argue that the hypothesis of selfish
behavior is the only viable one as an organizing principle, yet they also contribute to
public television and vote in elections.").
16, For a survey of the literature, see generally Douglas D. Davis & Charles A. Holt,
Experimental Economics 317-43 (1993); Ledyard, supra note 159. To sample some of
the work in the field, see Simon P. Anderson et al., A Theoretical Analysis of
Altruism and Decision Error in Public Goods Games, 70 J. Pub. Econ. 297 (1998);
James Andreoni, Cooperation in Public-Goods Experiments: Kindness or
Confusion?, 85 Am. Econ. Rev. 891 (1995) [hereinafter Andreoni, Cooperation in
Public-Goods Experiments]; James Andreoni, Why Free Ride? Strategies and
Learning in Public Goods Experiments, 37 J. Pub. Econ. 291 (1988); James Andreoni
& John H. Miller, Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoner's
Dilemma: Experimental Evidence, 103 Econ. J. 570 (1993); Jordi Brandts & Arthur
Schram, Cooperation and Noise in Public Goods Experiments: Applying the
Contribution Function Approach, 79 J. Pub. Econ. 399 (2001); C. Brain Cadsby &
Elizabeth Maynes, Gender and Free Riding in a Threshold Public Goods Game:
Experimental Evidence, 34 J. Econ. Behav. & Org. 603 (1998); Charles Brain Cadsby
& Elizabeth Maynes, Voluntary Provision of Threshold Public Goods with
Continuous Contributions: Experimental Evidence, 71 J. Pub. Econ. 53 (1999)
[hereinafter Cadsby & Maynes, Voluntary Provision]; R. Mark Isaac et al., Public
Goods Provision in an Experimental Environment, 26 J. Pub. Econ. 51 (1985); R.
Mark Isaac et al., Divergent Evidence on Free Riding: An Experimental Examination
of Possible Explanations, 43 Pub. Choice 113 (1984) [hereinafter Isaac et al.,
Divergent Evidence]; Susan K. Laury et al., Anonymity and the Voluntary Provision
of Public Goods, 27 J. Econ. Behav. & Org. 365 (1995); Gerald Manvell & Ruth E.
Ames, Economists Free Ride, Does Anyone Else? Experiments on the Provision of
Public Goods, IV, 15 J. Pub. Econ. 295 (1981); Gerald Marwell & Ruth E. Ames,
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this research, they have identified at least five considerations that
may lead individuals to contribute voluntarily to a public good:
(1) Altruism: Some individuals contribute to the production of a
public good because they derive satisfaction from the satisfaction
others experience from the good's creation;"'
(2) The "Warm Glow" Effect: Some individuals contribute to
the production of a public good because they derive satisfaction di-
rectly from contributing; 
62
(3) Long-Term Self Interest: Some individuals contribute to the
production of a public good because they recognize that their con-
tributions help ensure the work's creation, from which they derive
satisfaction;1
63
(4) Reputation: Some individuals contribute to the production
of a public good because they derive satisfaction from their result-
ing reputation;TM and
(5) Informal Cooperation: Some individuals contribute to the
production of a public good because groups develop informal
mechanisms to encourage such contributions, and the individual
derives satisfaction from being a member of the group."
Experiments on the Provision of Public Goods, I: Resources, Interest, Group Size,
and the Free-Rider Problem, 84 Am. J. Soc. 1335 (1979); Gerald Marwell & Ruth E.
Ames, Experiments on the Provision of Public Goods, II: Provision Points, Stakes,
Experience and the Free-Rider Problem, 85 Am. J. Soc. 926 (1980); Thomas R.
Palfrey & Jeffrey E. Prisbrey, Anomalous Behavior in Public Goods Experiments:
How Much and Why?, 87 Am. Econ. Rev. 829 (1997); Paul Pecorino, The Effect of
Group Size on Public Good Provision in a Repeated Game Setting, 72 J. Pub. Econ.
121 (1999); Daniel Rondeau et al., Voluntary Revelation of the Demand for Public
Goods Using a Provision Point Mechanism, 72 J. Pub. Econ. 455 (1999).
61 Andreoni & Miller, supra note 160, at 578-82 (finding evidence that altruism
exists in experiment of finitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma). But see Palfrey &
Prisbrey, supra note 160, at 830 (defining an altruistic effect where "a subject's utility
is increasing, not only in his or her own payoff, but also in the total group payoff," but
failing to find such an effect in their experiments).
1,2 Palfrey & Prisbrey, supra note 160, at 830 ("Warm-glow preferences mean that
the act of contributing, independent of how much it increases group payoffs, increases
a subject's utility by a fixed amount.").
16, Cadsby & Maynes, Voluntary Provision, supra note 160, at 54 (noting that the use
of a threshold total contribution level "may act as a focal point for cooperation").
I" Andreoni & Miller, supra note 160, at 582 (finding evidence that "subjects appear
very willing to build reputations for altruisms" within context of a finitely repeated
Prisoner's Dilemma game).
"I E.g., Robyn M. Dawes, Social Dilemmas, 31 Ann. Rev. Psychol. 169, 185 (1980)
(discussing an experimental result finding that only thirty-one percent contributed
without communication among the subjects, while seventy-two percent contributed
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Although researchers have used a variety of approaches to ex-
plore consumer behavior on the free rider/public good issue, one
standard approach is known as the threshold public goods game."
In a threshold public goods game, individuals in a group must de-
cide whether to contribute voluntarily to the provision of a public
good. If enough contributions are made, the public good is pro-
vided. If not, the public good is not provided and individuals lose
any contributions they have made. All individuals are better off if
the public good is provided, but individuals who do not contribute
are better off than those who do contribute whether the public
good is provided or not.
Even where the payoffs are structured to generate a dominant
strategy for all players not to contribute, "[m]ost players in this
game violate their one-shot dominant strategy, with many contrib-
uting upwards of half their endowment."'67 The near-uniform
conclusion from repeated studies is that voluntary contribution
rates to the production of public goods are significantly different
from zero."6 Moreover, voluntary contributions occurred in these
experiments despite the tendency of the artificial and controlled
laboratory setting to "eliminat[e] a large amount of subjects' natu-
with communication among the subjects); Gupta et al., supra note 158, at 318 (finding
that "group-based utilities in the preference for public goods appear to offer a
significant explanation for AARP membership").
,66 This description comes from Cadsby & Maynes, Voluntary Provision, supra note
160, at 53-54.
"17Palfrey & Prisbrey, supra note 160, at 830; see also Andreoni, Cooperation in
Public-Goods Experiments, supra note 160, at 892 ("In a ten-period iterated game,
subjects generally begin by contributing about half of their endowments to the public
good. As the game is iterated, the contributions 'decay' toward the dominant strategy
level and stand at about 15-25% of the endowment by the tenth iteration.") (citation
omitted).
,6sAndreoni, Cooperation in Public-Goods Experiments, supra note 160, at 892
("These experiments typically find that subjects are sensitive to free-riding incentives
and are generally closer to the free-riding outcome than the Pareto-efficient
outcome."); Ledyard, supra note 159, at 112-13 (summarizing research results
suggesting voluntary contribution rate in the range of forty to sixty percent).
"Nonetheless, cooperation is still above that which would validate the theory [of free
riding]." Andreoni, Cooperation in Public Goods Experiments, supra note 160, at 892.
Andreoni also notes that some players, who may have been mistaken as to the
dominant stategy, contributed by mistake in the initial rounds of a repeated game and
then reduced their mistake-based contributions in later rounds. Id. at 897. Yet he
found that the reductions in mistaken contributions as a result of learning were
"replaced by a growth in kindness, leaving total cooperation fairly stable." Id. at 900.
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ral tendency to be cooperative."'69 Although the studies do not sug-
gest that free riders can never pose a problem,70 they have shown
that voluntary contribution rates can reach the level necessary to
ensure efficient production of a public good.17'
Evidence from the real world tends to confirm these studies'7
and suggests that the honor system is a practical alternative to
more formal legal control in this area. For example, when Stephen
King offered his serial novel, The Plant, on the Internet, he relied
on voluntary contributions to fund the endeavor and stated that he
would provide future installments only if the voluntary contribu-
tion rate remained above a certain threshold level." The
contribution rate hovered at over seventy percent for the first few
installments, as consumers voluntarily contributed in order to en-
sure the availability of future installments." The contribution rate
fell below King's threshold only when he announced the series' end
Andreoni, Cooperation in Public-Goods Experiments, supra note 160, at 900.
,',Robyn M. Dawes & Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: Cooperation, 2 J. Econ.
Persp. 187, 196 (1988) ("It is certainly true that there is a 'free rider problem.'... On
the other hand, the strong free rider prediction is clearly wrong-not everyone free
rides all of the time."); Isaac et al., Divergent Evidence, supra note 160, at 140
("[F]ree riding is neither absolutely all pervasive nor always nonexistent .... The
extremes of strong free riding and near-Lindahl optimal behavior can and do occur.").
- Cadsby & Maynes, Voluntary Provision, supra note 160, at 68-69 ("[O]ur
experiments provide many examples where groups move toward cooperation rather
than free-riding over time. Indeed, our results indicate that a deterioration in the level
of contributions is a special case, occurring only when the incentives to reach an
efficient equilibrium are relatively low. The more general result is that contributions
move toward a Nash equilibrium over repeated rounds of a public goods game.");
Ledyard, supra note 159, at 156-57 (summarizing studies showing that with
communication permitted between group members, contribution rates increased to
between seventy and ninety percent, even over repeated periods); Rondeau et al.,
supra note 160, at 468 ("Using large groups in an induced value framework, we have
shown that the provision point mechanism with money-back guarantee and
proportional rebate of excess contributions can closely approximate demand
revelation.").
,12 One particularly interesting real-world study is James C. Murdoch & Todd
Sandier, The Voluntary Provision of a Pure Public Good: The Case of Reduced CFC
Emissions and the Montreal Protocol, 63 J. Pub. Econ. 331 (1997) (finding that the
Montreal Protocol merely formalized voluntary reductions in CFC emissions that
countries had previously and voluntarily undertaken).
-Jerry Harkavy, King-Sized Experiment in Publishing Inconclusive, Commercial
Appeal (Memphis), Dec. 11, 2000, at B3, available at LEXIS, News Library, The
Commercial Appeal File.
- Id. (noting that "[alt the outset, about 75 percent of readers obeyed the honor
system").
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and removed the incentive for consumers to contribute."' King's
experiment also suggests the viability of informal cooperation in
this context. When the contribution rate threatened to fall below
the threshold King had identified as necessary for additional in-
stallments, consumers who placed a higher value on the series'
continuation stepped in and offered additional contributions. 
1 6
Although King's fame makes The Plant something of a special
case, evidence from the field of computer software provides more
general support for the notion that consumers can regulate them-
selves. For computer programs, private copying is already an
option for obtaining unauthorized copies. Yet, a report sponsored
by the Business Software Alliance estimated that more than sev-
enty percent of the copies in circulation from 1995 to 1999 in the
United States were obtained legitimately."7
Although a seventy percent contribution rate might seem too
low to encourage the production of copyrighted works, contribu-
tion rates as low as fifty percent may be sufficient to ensure an
optimal supply. Assume that a copyright owner contemplating
production faces a downward-sloping, linear demand curve with
constant marginal costs.'78 If the author holds a monopoly position
by virtue of a copyright (as reflected in the assumption of a down-
ward-sloping demand curve),'79 she maximizes profit by producing
-75 Jonathan Lambeth, King's Plant wilts as readers fail to pay, Daily Telegraph
(London), Dec. 7, 2000, at 3. After noting that contribution rates fell from seventy-six
percent for the first three installments to below fifty percent for installments four and
five, Stephen King stated, "It may be that people are stealing this particular
installment simply because they know the story is going to stop anyway." Id.
176 Dave Cosgrave, King's New E-Publishing Model, eBusiness Journal, Oct. 1, 2000;
Don O'Briant, 'Plant' Fans Pay Their Way, Times Union (Albany, NY), Aug. 27,
2000, at J4 ("Amazon.com, which is processing payments for King, reports that some
readers have been sending in extra money for the $1 installments-from $2 to $20-to
make up for deadbeat downloaders."), available at LEXIS, News Library, The Times
Union File.
7 Int'l Planning & Research Corp., 1999 Global Software Piracy Report 6 (2000), at
http://www.bsa.orglusalgloballib/piracy/l1999PiracyStats.pdf (May 2000).
18 These assumptions are entirely typical. See, e.g., Varian, supra note 148, at 416-
417 (assuming a downward-sloping linear demand curve); Landes & Posner, supra
note 106, at 327 & n.4 (assuming a downward-sloping demand curve); id. at 333
(assuming constant marginal costs).
' Commentators have debated whether, and if so to what extent, copyright creates
market power. Compare Lunney, supra note 120, at 519 (recognizing that copyright
creates market power generally for all authors; the extent of market power for any
given author is a mere question of degree), and William R. Johnson, The Economics
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additional copies of her work up to the point where marginal reve-
nue equals marginal cost. She will then set her price at the
corresponding market-clearing levels.1" In contrast, if the market
for copies of the copyright owner's work had been perfectly com-
petitive, the owner would continue to produce additional copies
until marginal cost equalled demand. Figure 1 illustrates these rela-
tionships, where Qc and Pc represent the author's output and
pricing decisions under perfect competition, and Qm and Pm rep-
resent her output and pricing decisions under monopoly.
of Copying, 93 J. Pol. Econ. 158, 161 (1985) ("There are many sellers of originals,
each with the monopoly power that stems from the fact that his work is not a perfect
substitute for the others."), with Paul Goldstein, Copyright, 55 Law & Contemp.
Probs. 79, 84 (1992) (suggesting that copyright does not generally create market
power), and Tom W. Bell, Fair Use v. Fared Use: The Impact of Automated Rights
Management on Copyright's Fair Use Doctrine, 76 N.C. L. Rev. 557, 588 n.142 (1998)
(arguing that "copyright owners do not necessarily enjoy monopoly power"). Most
commentators readily admit that popular authors enjoy some considerable degree of
market power, reflected in the variety of price discrimination practices that copyright
owners employ. E.g., Aaron Xavier Fellment, Copyright Misuse and the Limits of the
Intellectual Property Monopoly, 6 J. Intell. Prop. L. 1, 13 (1998); William W. Fisher
III, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1659, 1702-03 (1988).
But see Donald S. Chisum & Michael A. Jacobs, Understanding Intellectual Property
Law § 1C, at 1-7 (1992) ("Giving exclusive rights to an author or inventor is no more
a monopoly or anticompetitive than other species of real or personal property.").
Commentators question whether such market power extends to less popular authors,
however. E.g., Fisher, supra, at 1702. While reduced popularity likely coincides with
reduced market power, the fundamental purpose of copyright is to enable all authors
to price their works somewhat above marginal cost so that they have some
opportunity to recover their authorship investment. See generally Yochai Benkler,
An Unhurried View of Private Ordering in Information Transactions, 53 Vand. L.
Rev. 2063. 2068 (2000) ("But remember that information goods, if they are sold at a
positive price at all, are being sold at a price above their marginal cost. To the extent
that we observe a transaction for an information good at a positive price, we are
observing a situation where the seller has 'market power' to engage at least to some
extent in above marginal cost pricing."). The ability of less popular authors to price in
excess of marginal cost may derive more from following the prices that popular
authors set than the result of any inherent market power of their own. Nevertheless,
to the extent even less popular authors can and do price in excess of their marginal
costs, they will follow the monopolist's profit-maximizing rule in setting that price. As
a result, so long as their demand curve is linear and their marginal costs constant, they
too will sell only half the number of copies that would be sold in a competitive
market.
I" E.g., Varian, supra note 148, at 414-16.
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Figure 1. Comparison of monopoly and competitive output and
pricing.
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The result under these assumptions is that the copyright owner
will maximize her profit by selling exactly half the number of cop-
ies that she would have sold in a perfectly competitive market.'81
This pricing strategy means that for every consumer who willingly
pays the copyright owner's price, there is another who would have
paid the work's competitive price, but who is unwilling to pay the
supra-competitive price the copyright owner is charging. Because
these consumers are unwilling to pay the copyright owner's price in
",Professor Varian provides the mathematical background for the proof of this
statement:
Suppose that the monopolist faces a linear demand curve p(y) = a - by. Then
the revenue function is r(y) = p(y)y = ay - by2, and the marginal revenue
function is M R (y) = a - 2by.
iNote that the marginal revenue function has the same vertical intercept, a, as
the demand curve, but it is twice as steep.
Id. at 416-18. Recall that marginal costs are constant. Suppose that they are equal to
k. Then the intersection of the demand curve and marginal cost occurs when a - by =
k, i.e. when y, = (a - k)/b. Similarly, the intersection of the marginal revenue curve
with marginal cost occurs when a - 2by = k, i.e., when y. = (a - k)/2b. But y. is just
half of y. So Qm is half of Qc.
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any event, the copyright owner would see no reduction in her
revenue, ceteris paribus, even if every one of them obtained an un-
authorized copy of the work through private copying." Nor would
allowing unpaid access for these consumers increase the price of
copies for those consumers willing to pay for the work. Because the
copyright owner's optimal price is a function solely of her marginal
cost, she cannot increase the profit associated with her work by at-
tempting to redistribute any part of a free rider's pro rata share of
the work's fixed costs to her paying customers."
As a result, so long as the free riding is concentrated among
those unwilling to pay in any event,"M contribution rates as low as
fifty percent are fully consistent with the efficient private market
production of creative works.'" In that light, the more than seventy
'I have suggested elsewhere that free riding may present a competitive challenge
to the copyright owner and force her to reduce her price generally. See Glynn S.
Lunney. Jr., Trademark Monopolies, 48 Emory L.J. 367, 448-52 (1999); see also infra
text accompanying notes 323-28 (discussing free riding's competition-inducing effects
under a levy system).
18 This sharply differentiates unauthorized copying from theft. With theft, the thief
deprives the owner of the tangible article itself, including the item's marginal cost
(and market price in a perfectly competitive market). In contrast, with unauthorized
copying, the copier, not the copyright owner, bears the marginal cost of the
unauthorized copy. As a result, if a producer experienced a fifty percent theft rate,
where for every two units produced, one was stolen, the marginal cost of the stolen
unit would have to be added to the price of the sold unit. In contrast, if a copyright
owner experiences a fifty percent unauthorized copying rate, where for every copy
sold, a second is privately copied, the copyright owner incurs no marginal cost for the
second copy and so would not change the price of the sold copy. But see Information
Infrastructure Task Force, Working Group on Intellectual Property Rights,
Intellectual Property Rights and the National Information Infrastructure 230 (Sept.
1995) (asserting that "[c]onsumers of copyrighted works pay for the acts of infringers;
copyright owners have suggested that the price of legitimate copies may be higher due
to infringement losses suffered by copyright owners").
I" Given that unauthorized copies may be of lower quality and often lack some of
the features associated with an authorized copy, such as liner notes, free updates, and
warranty service, we should expect free riding to be concentrated among those
unwilling to pay for an authorized copy.
'll If the private copying entails a marginal cost for additional copies less than the
marginal cost associated with authorized distribution of additional copies, then
voluntary contribution rates below fifty percent could be consistent with the optimal
supply of creative works. Similarly, if we vary the assumptions of a straight-line
demand curve or a flat marginal cost curve, the minimum contribution rate necessary
to ensure that efficient activity levels are reached may vary. Moreover, economists
have developed a variety of models as alternatives to the perfect competition and
monopoly cases. If one of these other models more accurately reflects the sort of
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percent contribution rates that both King and the software industry
have achieved indicate that an effective external control against
private copying may prove unnecessary. Consumers can regulate
themselves.'" All the public needs is some general statement, such
as that found in copyright law, reflecting and reinforcing the prin-
ciple that excessive unauthorized copying is improper.
"competition" found in copyrighted works, the fifty percent free-riding threshold may
be too high. For example, if we analyze the issue as a Stackleberg equilibrium
between a leader and a follower offering identical products and competing on
quantity, production levels in the market under our assumptions would rise to
seventy-five percent of the perfectly competitive output level. See Varian, supra note
148, at 468-75. In such a case, free riding in excess of twenty-five percent might prove
too high to ensure efficient production levels.
1 Moreover, the same free-rider problem that might lead to an underproduction of
copyrighted works may also ensure that private copying proves either self-limiting or
addressable through traditional copyright. For private sharing to occur, someone must
undertake the expense of loading the work on her computer and then open her
computer to others, with consequential risks to security and her bandwidth usage.
With small group sharing, peer pressure within the group may be sufficient to ensure
that each person contributes to the works uploaded and available for copying. For
small groups, the security risks and costs associated with offering the work to others
for copying are minimal. Of course, in such small groups, that same peer pressure is
also likely to increase the group's paying demand for works as well. As a result,
private copying within small groups will likely be harmless or perhaps even beneficial
to copyright revenues. For very large groups, the bandwidth and security costs
entailed in making a work available for others to copy are significantly higher. For
that reason, individuals within the group will likely attempt to free ride and wait for
others to make materials available for copying. As a result, private copying within
large groups is itself subject to potential free-rider problems that will limit its practical
extent. Eytan Adar & Bemardo A. Huberman, Free Riding on Gnutella, First
Monday (Oct. 2000), at http:/www.firstmonday.dklissues/issue5_lO/adar/index.html
(last visited August 7, 2001). For such large groups, a central registry may prove
essential for widespread private copying to occur. Jordan Ritter, Why Gnutella Can't
Scale. No, Really, at http://www.darkridge.com/-jpr5/doc/gnutella.htm (last visited
Mar. 23, 2001) (describing how Gnutella imposes excessive bandwidth demands on its
users because, in the absence of a central file list, Gnutella must search each system
for a file to determine whether the file is present and typically searches numerous
systems for a file before finding it). Yet, such a central registry would arguably bring
large group private copying within the reach of traditional copyright through the
vicarious or contributory infringement doctrines. As between large group and small
group private copying, the question is whether there is a group size sufficiently small
to avoid the free-rider problem that arises with private copying, yet sufficiently large
that the private copying reduces the group's paying demand for copyrighted works as
a whole. To the extent that the incentive to free ride and the peer pressure not to free
ride represent two sides of the same coin, there is every reason to expect, as a general
rule, that if the group is small enough to encourage any significant degree of sharing,
it is also small enough for the sharing to increase the group's paying demand for
works.
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III. PRIVATE COPYING AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST
To determine whether some of these alternatives, either indi-
vidually or in combination, might better reflect copyright's public
spirit, this Part returns to the key short-term legal question: Should
courts read the DMCA's anti-circumvention provisions liberally or
strictly? On the one hand, a liberal reading allows more extensive
access to decryption technology for those likely to have a fair use
for such technology, but puts such technology into the hands of
those intending unlawful uses as well. A strict reading, on the other
hand, restricts access to decryption technology and ensures near-
complete protection against private infringement, but bars other-
wise fair or lawful uses of an encrypted work.
A balancing of these two concerns, weighing the potential lost
access from strong encryption against the potential lost incentive
from weak encryption in line with copyright's traditional incen-
tives-access paradigm, would plausibly weigh in favor of restricting
access to decryption technology. Even if restricting access led to
over-protection and increased prices for creative works generally,
society would presumably still prefer to have the works, albeit at a
higher price, than risk not having them at all.
As discussed at the outset, however, two considerations suggest
a need to rethink this initial conclusion. First, this conclusion relies
on an unspoken and largely unexamined assumption that more
revenue for any given copyrighted work will yield more works gen-
erally. In the case of widespread private copying, this assumption
will likely prove untrue. So long as the level of private copying in-
creases with the popularity of a work, private copying is unlikely to
reduce creative output at the margins. Instead, it will simply enable
consumers to recapture a portion of the excess incentives otherwise
associated with the production of more popular, non-marginal
works. Moreover, by reducing these excess incentives, private
copying will tend to reduce the corrupting influence that excess in-
centives would otherwise exert on the authorship process. As a
result, attempting to resolve the issue by balancing the relative
costs of over- and under-protection, as the traditional analysis de-
fines them, obscures the true issues. Second, the traditional
analysis ignores the important role that private copying can play as
a form of civil disobedience. Broader copyright protection benefits
a concentrated, well-organized constituency, copyright owners, at
2001]
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the expense of a dispersed group, consumers generally. Therefore
copyright owners will have a decided advantage in the political bat-
tle over copyright's proper scope. This advantage is evident in the
radical expansion in copyright protection that has occurred over
the past two hundred years. Furthermore, although the Constitu-
tion entrusts the judicial branch with the responsibility for policing
copyright's boundaries, courts have largely abdicated that role. As
a result, civil disobedience may offer the only effective means for
ordinary consumers to express their political discontent with copy-
right's excessive scope.
A. Protection, Excess Incentives, and the Margins of Creativity
An examination of the Constitution and its limitation on con-
gressional authority in the field of copyright legislation is necessary
to define the concept of excess incentives more precisely. As Arti-
cle I, Section 8," Clause 8 states, Congress may enact a copyright
statute only to secure "the Progress of Science."1 Although the
exact parameters of this limitation are not clear, one aspect of the
limitation shines through: Copyright may not serve solely or pri-
marily to enrich copyright owners. The public must receive
something in return."n
Copyright proponents insist that copyright serves such a public
purpose by providing a needed incentive for the creation of works
of authorship. Because works of authorship are relatively easy to
copy, proponents insist, too few works will be created in the ab-
sence of protection. Only by protecting these works against
copying, proponents continue, can we ensure the public an ade-
quate supply of creative works.'" The heart of this justification has
changed little since first articulated by the Stationers' Company:
And further if priuileges be revoked no bookes at all shoulde
be prynted, within shorte tyme, for comonlie the first prynter is
at charge for the Authors paynes, and somme other suche like
extraordinarie cost, where an other that will print it after hym,
commeth to the Copie gratis, and so maie he sell better cheaper
187 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
's See sources cited supra note 4.
19 E.g., Paul Goldstein, 1 Copyright § 1.2, at 1:5 (Little, Brown and Co., 2d ed.
1996); Landes & Posner, supra note 106, at 328.
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then the first prynter, and then the first prynter shall never vtter
[sell] his bookes."
With only slight modification to the Stationers' Company's lan-
guage, substituting numerous private individuals for the "other"
competing printer, the underlying public interest justification for
protection remains fundamentally unchanged. If numerous indi-
viduals who would otherwise purchase an authorized copy of the
work are able to make their own unauthorized copy, then the
copyright owner will have little incentive to create and disseminate
her works. As a result, protection against the risk of widespread
private copying is necessary today, as protection against more tra-
ditional infringement was in the past, to ensure the public an
adequate supply of creative works.
Copyright today goes much further than the public interest re-
quires, however. Although unauthorized copying can reduce the
revenue for all creative works, it implicates the public interest only
in those specific cases in which the reduction goes so far as to ren-
der a given work unprofitable. For such marginal works, copyright
protection serves the public interest directly by improving the prof-
itability picture for such marginal works and thereby helping to
ensure their creation. Unlike patent law, however, copyright law
makes no attempt to limit its protection to those works that would
not have been created but for the inducement of a copyright."' To
the contrary, copyright law today goes out of its way to maximize
revenue for the most popular works, while doing very little to en-
courage the production of marginal works.
This misplaced emphasis on maximizing revenue for the non-
marginal work developed over the course of the twentieth century
'' The Arguments of the Patentees in Favour of Privileges for Books (May 4, 1586),
in 2 A Transcript of the Registers of the Company of Stationers of London, 1554-
1640 A.D., at 805 (Edward Arber ed., 1875) (alteration in original) [hereinafter
Arguments of the Patentees]; see also Int'l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S.
215, 241 (1918) ("Indeed, it is one of the most obvious results of defendant's theory
that, by permitting indiscriminate publication by anybody and everybody for purposes
of profit in competition with the news-gatherer, it would render publication profitless,
or so little profitable as in effect to cut off the service by rendering the cost
prohibitive in comparison with the return.").
' For the patent law approach, see Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 11
(1966) (describing the limitation on patents to "those inventions which would not be
disclosed or devised but for the inducement of a patent").
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as the constant clamoring of copyright's propertied class drew
copyright steadily away from its original public interest focus.'
Where copyright initially sought to protect a copyright owner
against the copying competitor in order to provide the owner with
a fair opportunity to recover the costs of her work, today it increas-
ingly seeks to protect a copyright owner against the loss of any
opportunity to license her work in order to permit her to capture
fully the work's associated market value."9 This evolution has led
to a substantial expansion in the length and scope of copyright pro-
tection and has vastly increased the revenue associated with the
most popular works. But it has done very little to encourage di-
rectly the production of marginal works. Almost by definition, a
marginal work is worth only a little more than it costs. The switch
to a value-based protection scheme therefore generates little addi-
tional revenue for the marginal work. In contrast, because non-
marginal works can command a market value considerably more
than their cost, the switch has substantially increased the revenue
for non-marginal works.
Copyright clearly serves the public interest when it protects a
work that would not otherwise have been created. Such protection
may generate additional revenue for the copyright owner, but it
also offers the public a work that it would not otherwise have re-
ceived. For such marginal works, protection primarily serves the
public interest, and the private benefit of increased revenue to the
copyright owner is merely incidental. But when protection provides
112See Jessica Litman, Copyright Legislation and Technological Change, 68 Or. L.
Rev. 275, 278-82 (1989) (tracing the development of copyright law as a response to
interested parties); Stewart E. Sterk, Rhetoric and Reality in Copyright Law, 94 Mich.
L. Rev. 1197,1198 (1996) ("[T]he nation's elite, including its lawmakers, has a stake in
believing and acting on copyright rhetoric. The elite's investment in the status quo
reinforces the power of the interest groups who have fueled copyright expansion.").
113See, e.g., Benny v. Loew's Inc., 239 F.2d 532, 534 (9th Cir. 1956) (discussing
movie studio's proposition that copyright extends "to any lawful use of their property,
whereby they may get a profit out of it"), aff'd sub nom. Columbia Broad. Sys. v.
Loew's Inc., 356 U.S. 43 (1958); see also UMG Recordings v. MP3.com, 92 F. Supp.
2d 349, 352 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) ("Any allegedly positive impact of defendant's activities
on plaintiffs' prior market in no way frees defendant to usurp a further market that
directly derives from reproduction of the plaintiffs' copyrighted works. This would be
so even if the copyrightholder had not yet entered the new market in issue .... )
(citation omitted); Lunney, supra note 120, at 554-71 (tracing the evolution of
copyright from a system intended to offer copyright owners a cost-based return to one
offering a value-based return).
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an incentive far in excess of that necessary to ensure a work's crea-
tion, the public interest justification is far less clear. The public
interest in such protection is not linked to the creation of the work
itself, as it is with marginal works. By definition, such non-marginal
works would have been created even without (or with far nar-
rower) copyright protection. As a result, those aspects of copyright
protection that generate excess incentives merely enrich lucky
copyright owners without concomitant public benefit.
A strict reading of the DMCA which tightly restricts access to
decryption technology will make this problem of excess incentives
even worse. The strong encryption that would result from a strict
reading of the DMCA would enable the copyright industry to price
discriminate between their various customers more precisely than
they are currently able.'94 Strong encryption will therefore increase
the revenue associated with producing any given digital work. This
additional revenue may prove sufficient to ensure the profitability
of a few additional works. Yet because such marginal works have a
market value only slightly in excess of their costs, the predominant
effect from strong encryption is to increase, perhaps substantially,
the revenue associated with the most popular works.
On its face, a copyright statute that provides for excess incen-
tives appears to violate the Constitution's public interest limitation
because excess incentives benefit copyright owners without offer-
ing the public anything in return. Over the years, however, those
who support broad copyright protection have developed two justi-
fications and an excuse for bringing excess incentives within
Congress's constitutional authority. First, proponents of broad pro-
tection have insisted that excess incentives serve the public interest
because they will be reinvested, at least in part, in the creation of
- See Julie E. Cohen, Copyright and the Perfect Curve, 53 Vand. L. Rev. 1799,
1801-08 (2000) (describing a model of copyright price discrimination); William W.
Fisher III, Property and Contract on the Internet, 73 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1203, 1234-40
(1998) (same); Michael J. Meurer, Price Discrimination, Personal Use and Piracy:
Copyright Protection of Digital Works, 45 Buff. L. Rev. 845, 876 (1997) ("Digital
technology will encourage more price discrimination and greater profits to copyright
holders regardless of the direction of copyright law in the digital world."); Glynn S.
Lunney, Jr., Comment, Atari Games v. Nintendo: Does a Closed System Violate the
Antitrust Laws?, 5 High Tech. L.J. 29, 41-46, 73 (1990) (arguing that Nintendo's use
of a lockout chip may result in price discrimination).
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additional works.195 As a result, excess incentives not only enrich
those who have created the most popular works but also lead to
the creation of additional works. Excess incentives, proponents
therefore insist, are consistent with the Constitution's public inter-
est mandate.
This "trickle-down" vision of copyright is flawed. There are two
types of works that might arguably benefit from such trickle-down
reinvestment. The first category consists of those works that are
expected to prove profitable as a result of copyright protection. Al-
though these marginal works lie near the heart of copyright's
public interest justification, they cannot justify excess incentives.
Because copyright has made this class of works profitable, they
should not have to rely on trickle-down reinvestment to obtain the
necessary financial backing. So long as they were expected to prove
profitable at the outset, these works should be able to fend for
themselves in the marketplace even if some prove unprofitable in
the end. They would be created even in the absence of trickle-
down reinvestment. As a result, proponents of broad copyright
cannot plausibly claim that these works are the result of excess in-
centives, even if some copyright owners routinely reinvest a
portion of their excess profits in such works.
A more plausible public interest rationale for excess incentives
exists for a second category of works: those works that are ex-
pected to remain unprofitable even with today's broad copyright
protection. Because these works are expected to lose money, they
cannot be expected to attract the necessary financial backing in the
market on their own. Production of these works may therefore de-
pend on trickle-down reinvestment to go forward, and proponents
of broad copyright can more plausibly assert that these works
195 This argument also originated with the Stationers' Company. In a 1586 petition to
the Star Chamber, the Stationers' Company asserted:
Also priviledges, are occasion, that many bookes are nowe prynted, which are
more beneficial to the common welth, then proffitable to the prynter, for the
Patentee beinge benefeted otherwise by Bookes of profitable sale is content to
bestowe parte of his gayne in other bokes, which are within the compas of his
patent, verie beneficiall for the common welth, and yet suche whereby the
printer shall scarse reape the Tenth parte of his charge: which Bookes wolde
never be prynted if privileges were revoked.
Arguments of the Patentees, supra note 190, at 805.
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would not have been created but for the excess incentives available
to other, more popular works.
Although this second category provides some plausible public
interest justification for excess incentives, the possibility of trickle-
down reinvestment in this second category of works is not suffi-
cient to bring excess incentives within Congress's constitutional
authority. The difficulty with trickle-down reinvestment for this
category of works is the absence of any clear reason why a rational
copyright owner would reinvest her excess incentives in an en-
deavor expected to lose money. A copyright owner may be in the
business of producing copyrighted works and actively look for in-
vestment opportunities in that field first. But as actual behavior
tends to prove, once the apparently profitable opportunities are
gone, copyright owners will devote their resources elsewhere,
whether on lavish lifestyles, restaurant chains, or large aircraft.""
Whatever reinvestment in otherwise unprofitable works may oc-
cur, whether driven by a sense of charitable obligation, ego-
induced blindness, or a simple mistake in estimating popular tastes,
it is likely to prove too trivial to justify the degree of excess incen-
tives that copyright provides today. Recall that even a protection
scheme that focused exclusively on maximizing revenues for the
copyright industry would have some incidental tendency to in-
crease the number of creative works available." Yet, the
Constitution requires something more than an incidental tendency
to advance the public interest. It requires that protection serve the
public interest primarily. By any rational measure, the possibility
that some copyright owners may choose to reinvest a portion of
their excess revenues in additional works does not convert the pri-
'% Among the many copyright-financed extravagances that might be mentioned are
the homes of Shania Twain and Bill Gates. See Matthew Wright, Twain's World:
Shania's Pounds IOM Swiss Retreat, The Mirror (London), Feb. 10, 2000, at 19
("Shania lives a hermit-like existence with producer husband Mutt Lange, in this
spectacular pounds 10 million home on the banks of Lake Geneva."); Chris Solomon,
'Fatigue' in Medina over huge mansions: $500,000 fine tied to length of project, The
Seattle Times. Mar. 17, 2001, at B1 ("This, after all, is the home of Microsoft founder
Bill Gates and his $109 million manse, with its 30-car garage and chattering man-
made salmon stream."). Restaurants have also proven a popular investment for the
wealth copyright can generate. James Aufenast, Five-Star Dining, Actors Used to
Wait Tables Before They Were Famous; Now, When They Make It Big, They Buy the
Restaurants. The Independent (London), Mar. 18,2001, at 8-9.
Ir See supra text accompanying note 191.
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manily private benefit of excess incentives into a primarily public
benefit. Otherwise, the Stationers' Company could have retained
its guild monopoly and proven that it was advancing "the Encour-
agement of learning" by occasionally donating a small fraction of
its monopoly profits to schools.198
The second justification offered for excess incentives is the un-
certainty often associated with the production of creative works.
No one is quite sure which works will prove successful, and propo-
nents of broader protection have suggested that this uncertainty
can justify excess incentives for two reasons. First, proponents in-
sist that absent the availability of excess incentives, the risk and
uncertainty associated with creative works will discourage invest-
ment in such works."9 In evaluating this argument, it is necessary to
ensure that real risk is involved, rather than, for example, Holly-
wood accounting techniques which manage to show a loss even on
the most popular works.2' Similarly, the analysis must discount
those apparent losses that result from over-estimation of expected
monopoly profit. When a film is made or an album cut, the parties
sit down, estimate the likely monopoly profit, and then divide the
expected monopoly profit among those involved, with actors, di-
rectors, artists, and producers all receiving a salary or royalty
advance reflecting their share of the expected monopoly profits.201
"'See Arnold Plant, The New Commerce in Ideas and Intellectual Property 15
(1953) ("A special case for a monopoly for publishers cannot rest on the general
proposition that if business men are enabled to make monopoly profits, some of them
will be devoted to good works.").
199 Goldstein, supra note 179, at 83 (Without broad copyright protection, "[t]he
availability of risk capital would decline, as would the willingness of publishers to try
untried authors in the marketplace."); David Ladd, The Harm of the Concept of
Harm in Copyright: The Thirteenth Donald C. Brace Memorial Lecture, 30 J.
Copyright Soc'y 421, 431 (1983) ("By limiting potential rewards in the copyright
market ... the entrepreneurial calculus which precedes risk-taking in authorship and
publishing is shifted in the direction of not taking a chance, i.e., not writing or
publishing a 'risky' work, whether ideologically or economically risky.").
2OThe legal attack on Hollywood's accounting methods began in Buchwald v.
Paramount Pictures Corp., No. C-706083, 1990 Cal. App. LEXIS 634, at *44 (Cal.
App. Dep't Super. Ct. Jan. 31, 1990); see also Tim Carvell, Lights! Cameral Lawsuitl,
Fortune, Oct. 11, 1999, at 189, 192 (recounting how, following the Buchwald case
"'Hollywood accounting' became a synonym for fraud").
21 See generally Lunney, supra note 120, at 556 n.282 (discussing this phenomenon
in the context 6f book publishing); Ejan Mackaay, Legal Hybrids: Beyond Property
and Monopoly?, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 2630, 2635 (1994) ("[T]he amount an investor
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If the monopoly profits fail to reach the expected level, revenues
from the work may fail to cover the ex ante division of expected
profits and generate the appearance of a loss.' Such cases, how-
ever, do not reflect a true loss or a real risk any more than the
apparent losses generated by artificial accounting techniques. If
copyright expands to increase the revenue for such apparently
marginal works, the expected monopoly profits associated with
these works will increase. Consequently, the ex ante division of
those expected profits will increase, and so the works will prove no
more profitable after the expansion than they did before.
Even actual risk cannot justify an increase in protection without
more. Risk is a real cost and should not be subsidized merely to
encourage risk-taking. If two activities have otherwise identical
costs, revenue, and expected benefit, but one has a higher level of
associated risk, 3 then the less risky activity generates a higher net
social value. Facing a choice between these two activities, most in-
dividuals, being risk-averse, will and should choose the less risky
activity. Moreover, subsidizing risk-taking activity merely because
it is risk-taking leads to a vicious cycle. If only one in three works
are profitable, and assuming that a one-in-three risk level justifies
an increase in protection, increased protection will generate in-
creased revenue for all three works. As a result, a fourth work that
was previously too risky will now become a risk worth taking, and
suddenly the success rate falls to one profitable work in four.' But
if a one-in-three risk level justifies some increase in protection,
surely a one-in-four risk level must justify somewhat more. Ex-
panding protection again, because the activity is now riskier, means
success rates will fall again, perhaps to one profitable work in five.
would be willing to sink into a particular project should depend upon his assessment
of the chances of success and the expected revenues in case of success.").
Indeed, an economic doctrine known as the winner's curse suggests that such
over-payment of expected monopoly profits will prove common. Alvin E. Roth,
Introduction to Experimental Economics, in The Handbook of Experimental
Economics 1, 60-65 (John H. Kagel & Alvin E. Roth eds., 1995); see also E.C. Capen
et al., Competitive Bidding in High-Risk Situations, 23 J. Petroleum Tech. 641 (1971)
(finding evidence of rates of return on offshore oil-and-gas leases that were
systematically below market rates).
,', At the simplest level, greater risk refers to a wider variation in the possible
outcomes for a given mean outcome.
Given that risk-taking is being subsidized, it should not be surprising to see the
risk level increase.
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Such a vicious cycle arises not only in theory, but is reflected in the
steadily falling success rates for the copyright industry over the last
two hundred years.'
Risk and uncertainty, as discouragement, can justify some de-
gree of protection only to the extent that they represent a cost that
a first producer bears, but second-comers avoid, because they fol-
low the path blazed by a proven work. Yet, even this legitimate
risk-based argument has weaknesses. The cost advantage for imita-
tors from incurring less risk will lead to a sub-optimal production
of creative works only to the extent that the risk savings available
from imitating works of authorship is disproportionately large
compared to that available from imitating one of the wide range of
creative products that copyright leaves unprotected.2" Given the
low success rate for new products generally,' there is little reason
to believe that the imitator of a copyrighted work obtains a dispro-
portionate risk savings as compared to imitators generally. In
addition, even at its narrowest, copyright in the United States has
Compare Petition to the High Court of Parliament (April 1643), in 1 Transcript
of the Registers, supra note 190, at 1.587 (asserting, in a 1643 petition on behalf of the
Stationers' Company, that "scarce one book of three sells well, or proves gainfull to
the publisher"), and Arnold Plant, The Economic Aspects of Copyright in Books, 1
Economica (n.s.) 167, 183 (1934) (citing an 1878 article for the proposition that
"[flour books out of five which are published do not pay their expenses"), with Digital
Audio Recording: Hearing on H.R. 4567 Before the Subcomm. on Commerce,
Consumer Prot., and Competitiveness of the House Comm. on Energy and
Commerce, 102d Cong. 88 (1992) (statement of Jason S. Berman, President,
Recording Industry Association of America) ("[O]nly 15 percent of all recordings
released recoup their costs .... "), and Home Recording of Copyrighted Works:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Admin. of Justice
of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 29 (1982) [hereinafter Home
Recording Hearings] ("Six out of ten films never recoup their total investment,
period."), and id. at 547 (statement of Jerry Moss, chairman of A&M Records)
("Eighty-four percent of all [sound recording] industry releases fail to recover their
costs. Six percent of classical records make it into the black.").
2 See Lunney, supra note 182, at 446-48 (noting that free riding leads to
inefficiency only where free riding in one sector of the economy is relatively greater
than free riding in other sectors).
E.g., Mitzi M. Montoya-Weiss and Roger Calantone, Determinants of New
Product Performance: A Review and Meta-Analysis, 11 J. Prod. Innovation Mgmt.
397, 401-02 (1994) (summarizing studies of new product introductions that report
success rates from thirty-eight to sixty-eight percent); Robert Prentice, Vaporware:
Imaginary High-Tech Products and Real Antitrust Liability in a Post-Chicago World,
57 Ohio St. L.J. 1163, 1171 (1996) (noting that eighty percent of new products in the
high-tech field fail).
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always prohibited exact and near-exact duplications. Because exact
copying is forbidden, the question is whether approximate copying
provides any real guarantee of success. The inability of imitators to
duplicate the success of television shows like Who Wants to Be a
Millionaire? and Friends2' suggests that imitating approximately
does not significantly reduce the risk and uncertainty associated
with a follow-on work. In any event, this risk-savings concern im-
plicates the public welfare only at the margins, for those original
works rendered unprofitable by a disproportionate risk savings
available to imitators. To advance copyright's legitimate end, regu-
lators might constitutionally solve this concern by providing
slightly broader protection for marginal works in order to reduce
the risk savings available to imitators. But it is hard to see any ra-
tional relationship between awarding extremely high returns to the
most popular works and solving whatever problem risk savings
may present for marginal works.
Uncertainty combined with extremely high returns for the most
popular works can also serve to encourage the creation of addi-
tional works through a type of lottery effect. Because no one is
quite sure whose work will become the next Gone with the Wind,
offering extremely high returns for the most popular works repre-
sents, in a sense, a lottery.2" All that an individual must do to enter
is author a creative work. Studies have shown that a small chance
for extreme wealth will attract disproportionate resources."' Peo-
- Raymond L. Fischer, Quiz Show Mania: Daja [sic] Vu With a Vengeance, USA
Today, Sept. 1, 2000, at 66, 68 (noting failure of Greed, Twenty-One, and Winning
Lines launched respectively by Fox, NBC, and CBS in an attempt to duplicate
Millionaire's appeal); Diane Holloway, TV's midseason scramble: Networks conjure
up nearly 20 new series after fall debuts yield plenty of duds, Austin-American
Statesman, Jan. 6, 1996, at El ("So, what went wrong? The schedule was too crowded
and too full of clones. Whoever said you can't have too many friends wasn't thinking
of fall's television season, when at least a half-dozen newcomers copied the concept
and attractive, 20-something casting of NBC's 'Friends.' But they forgot to copy the
clever writing style, so viewers turned away.").
-" Goldstein, supra note 179, at 83 ("A robust copyright, by contrast, will mix the
hope of high return on some works with risk of loss on others, giving publishers, if not
quite a lottery, then at least a portfolio that will promote investment and sustain a
wider variety of authorship than could command support under any other legal
system.").
2... D  Michael Risinger et al., Brave New "Post-Daubert" World-A Reply to
Professor Moenssens, 29 Seton Hall L. Rev. 405, 425 (1998) (noting "the well-known
tendency for a majority of people to become risk-preferring in circumstances of
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ple will spend resources for a chance of winning even if their ex-
penditure significantly exceeds their expected return, as shown by
the sales of lottery tickets that offer an expected return of only fifty
to seventy-five cents on the dollar.21 Providing extremely high
profits for the most popular works may generate a similar lottery
effect, attracting resources to works whose cost exceeds their ex-
pected revenue. As a result, the existence of excess incentives for
the most popular works may lead to the production of additional
marginal works, or so proponents of broader protection might
claim.
While this argument may appear valid under the traditional in-
centives-based analysis of copyright, it is flawed as well. As I have
shown elsewhere, the true cost from too much copyright protection
is the same as the cost from too little protection.2 2 As the Station-
ers' Company long ago articulated, the cost to society from too
little protection is that there will be too few works. More precisely,
scarce resources, in the form of creativity, will be devoted else-
where even though society would have preferred they be invested
in additional works of authorship. Although the traditional incen-
tives-based analysis describes the costs of overbroad protection in
potential high rewards and low costs, regardless of rational odds (sometimes referred
to as the lottery effect)"); see also Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect
Theory: Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47 Econometrica 263 (1979) (discussing
phenomena which violate tenets of expected decision-making, including decisions
about gambling with a low probability of success coupled with a high return); Amos
Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Advances in Prospect Theory: Cumulative
Representation of Uncertainty, 5 J. Risk & Uncertainty 297 (1992) (similar).
21 E.g., Charles M. Yablon, A Dangerous Supplement? Longshot Claims and
Private Securities Litigation, 94 Nw. U. L. Rev. 567, 588 n.72 (2000) ("The popularity
of lotteries obviously reflects the fact that this [the general assumption of risk-
aversion] is not true for very small chances of very big gains, where many people seem
to be risk-preferring.").
212See Lunney, supra note 120, at 492, 600; see also Staff of Subcomm. on Patents,
Trademarks, & Copyrights, Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 85th Cong., An
Economic Review of the Patent System 45-46 (Comm. Print 1958) (Study No. 15,
prepared by Fritz Machlup) (making a similar argument about patents); Benjamin
Kaplan, An Unhurried View of Copyright 75 (1967) ("Magnify the headstart and you
may conceivably run the risk of attracting too much of the nation's energy into the
copyright-protected sectors of the economy."); Robert M. Hurt & Robert M.
Schuchman, The Economic Rationale of Copyright, 56 Am. Econ. Rev. 421,425, 430
(1966) (suggesting that the gains provided by additional works of authorship must be
offset by losses in other areas); Plant, supra note 205, at 170 ("The output which
monopoly alone can evoke is not normally regarded as preferable to the alternative
products which free competition would allow to emerge.").
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terms of lost access, the cost from overbroad copyright is the same
type of misallocation. Individuals will devote their creativity to ad-
ditional works of authorship, even though society would have
valued those resources more highly if they were invested else-
where. When there is a lottery effect which attracts additional
resources into the production of additional works whose costs ex-
ceed their expected revenue, the very fact that cost exceeds
expected revenue for these additional works establishes that the
resources required were more highly valued elsewhere. Instead of
remedying the misallocation of creativity from too little copyright
protection, too much protection and the resulting excess incentives
will re-create the same type of misallocation problem that copy-
right was supposed to solve. Rather than "promote the Progress of
Science," excess incentives promote waste by attracting too much
creativity into the production of works of authorship and leaving
too little for other more valuable uses. Such an effect can scarcely
be said to advance the public welfare.
The third argument for excess incentives is more in the nature of
an excuse. Here, the argument is not that excess incentives are af-
firmatively desirable, but that they are inevitable. Both as a
practical matter and to avoid the dangers of political censorship,
the argument goes, copyright will almost necessarily provide a uni-
form level of protection for all works. Given a uniform level of
protection, every work but the truly marginal will earn revenue at
least slightly more than its costs. Excess incentives are therefore an
inevitable byproduct of copyright's attempt to ensure production
of the works that would not have been created but for copyright.
As a result, attempting to eliminate excess incentives altogether is
both futile and unworkable. As David Ladd and others have sug-
gested, nothing could be more dangerous to a vibrant and varied
creative output than to recast copyright into the mold of a rate
regulation statute requiring copyright owners to submit evidence of
their fixed and marginal costs and requiring courts to then tailor
2i, Lunney, supra note 120, at 492, 600. In an interesting early model, Professor
Thompson demonstrated that in a perfect market, with perfect information and
perfect competition, private production would lead to an oversupply of public goods.
Earl A. Thompson, The Perfectly Competitive Production of Collective Goods, 50
Rev. Econ. & Stat. 1 (1968); Earl A. Thompson, The Perfectly Competitive
Production of Collective Goods: Reply, 51 Rev. Econ. & Stat. 479 (1969).
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copyright protection to ensure a fair return on owners' invest-
ment.
2 14
Given the difficulties of more perfectly tailoring copyright's
ends-means fit for each individual work, some degree of excess in-
centives is probably inevitable and must necessarily fall within
Congress's constitutional authority. But to cover the degree of ex-
cess incentives copyright systematically provides today, proponents
must stretch this excuse further than it can constitutionally bear.
Moreover, even assuming that this excuse justifies excess incentives
in the context of traditional infringement, this excuse does not as
readily apply to private copying. As discussed, to the extent that
private copying increases with the popularity of a work, private
copying may reduce the excess incentives associated with the most
popular works, and yet not materially reduce the incentives neces-
sary to ensure the creation of the marginal works. Private copying
would not therefore threaten the public interest that the Constitu-
tion requires copyright to serve. Furthermore, to the extent that
private copying achieves this reduction on its own, it would not re-
quire a judicial or legislative work-by-work determination of
copyright's proper scope. Private copying may therefore improve
copyright's ends-means fit without requiring elaborate and ulti-
mately unworkable government supervision. Given this self-
regulating character, the excuse traditionally used to justify exces-
sive incentives would not apply. With the availability of private
copying, excess incentives are no longer an inevitable side effect of
ensuring adequate incentives for works at the margins, at least not
to the degree they exist today. As a result, prohibiting private
copying serves no purpose but to enrich copyright owners and
therefore falls outside congressional authority under the Patent
and Copyright Clause.
The self-regulating character of private copying stems from two
network effects."5 The first arises when consumers make decisions
24 Ladd, supra note 199, at 431-32 ("Every limitation on copyright is a kind of rate-
setting. And however high-minded, every person who thus sets rates applies a value-
judgment: how much the author or publisher should receive.... This control of idea-
laden copyrighted works is more wisely left with the people than vested in a
government tribunal, a statutory license fee, or even a sincere judge searching a
record for undefined harm.").
215 A network effect refers to a situation where "the utility that a user derives from
consumption of the good increases with the number of other agents consuming the
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as to which works they desire to copy privately. Because of this
first effect, more individuals will seek to privately copy popular
works. The second, complementary network effect arises from the
likely availability of particular works for private copying. Because
of this second effect, more popular works will more likely be avail-
able for private copying.
The first effect arises because the desirability of a work derives
in part from the fact that others have experienced it as well. Al-
though commentators and courts have readily accepted the notion
of such network effects for computer programs,216 the effects are
present for copyrighted works more generally. The established re-
lationship between increased airplay and increased sales for
musical works more generally"" reflects the fact that others' knowl-
edge and expectations of a particular work can shape our desire for
that work, even if there are other works that convey the same ideas
just as well.21' Although the network effects of popularity are not
likely to determine completely a work's market success or failure,
they suggest that an important element in a work's success is
whether the work develops an audience sufficiently large to offer
good." Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition, and
Compatibility, 75 Am. Econ. Rev. 424, 424 (1985); see generally Mark A. Lemley &
David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic Effects, 86 Cal. L. Rev.
479, 488-95 (1998) (distinguishing between actual networks, virtual networks, and
simple positive feedback phenomena).
2 I E.g., Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 818 (1st Cir. 1995)
(refusing to protect the command structure of Lotus 1-2-3, in part, because of the
network or lock-in effect generated once users have learned the command structure),
aff'd by an equally divided Court, 516 U.S. 233 (1996); Sega Enter. v. Accolade, Inc.,
977 F.2d 1510, 1520 (9th Cir. 1992) (copying of another's copyrighted computer
program constitutes fair use where copying is necessary to acquire information that
will ensure compatability); Peter S. Menell, An Analysis of the Scope of Copyright
Protection for Application Programs, 41 Stan. L. Rev. 1045, 1079-82 (1989) (arguing
for narrow protection for computer programs as a result of network externalities
associated with their use).
- Goldstein, supra note 10, at 74 (noting that falling sales of records and sheet
music when radio stations ceased airplay of ASCAP music on January 1, 1941
"establish[ed] the empirical truth of the broadcasters' claim that radio broadcasts in
fact boosted music sales"); Lunney, supra note 120, at 629 n.473 (noting recurrent
payola scandals in radio broadcasting where record labels paid radio stations to play
their albums in order to boost record sales).
21 See Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Lotus v. Borland: Copyright and Computer Programs,
70 Tul. L. Rev. 2397, 2414-17 (1996) (exploring switching costs and network effects
associated with popular entertaining works and comparing them to those involved
with computer programs).
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its members an opportunity to share their enjoyment of the work
with each other. Once a work's audience reaches that size, the re-
sulting shared enjoyment reinforces the work's desirability and
enhances the work's appeal to potential new audience members.
Because of these network effects, we should expect that a work
either becomes sufficiently popular to generate a popularity net-
work and then becomes even more popular, or it does not and thus
never will. The sharp disparity between the revenue and audience
size for popular works and those for less popular works starkly re-
veals this popularity divide. For example, an examination of
domestic box office receipts as reported in Variety's annual sum-
mary of the top 250 films of the past year reveals that the twenty-
fifth most popular film had a domestic box office more than 68.8
and 51.2 times that of the twenty-fifth least popular film in the
years 1999 and 2000, respectively.219 By way of contrast, a similar
examination of income inequality generally in the United States
reveals that for the years 1995 through 1997 the ratio of annual
(individual) income for a man at the ninetieth centile and a man at
the tenth centile ranged from 5.61 to 6.39 and for annual household
income ranged from 2.70 to 2.88.' This comparison suggests that
income disparities for creative works are far more substantial than
income disparities in the market generally. Moreover, the top ten
percent of the films received 48.2% and 43.9% of total domestic
box office receipts in 1999 and 2000, respectively." In contrast, the
bottom ten percent of the films received only 0.32% and 0.36% of
the total domestic box office in 1999 and 2000, respectively.'
219Anthony D'Alessandro, Top 250 of 2000, Variety, Jan. 8-14, 2001, at 20
[hereinafter 2000 Movie Gross]; Anthony D'Alessandro, The Top 250 of 1999,
Variety, Jan. 10-16,2000, at 20 [hereinafter 1999 Movie Gross].
See Finis Welch, In Defense of Inequality, 89 AEA Papers & Proceedings 1, 5
(1999).
2, The top twenty-five films of 1999 grossed $3,565,175,000. See 1999 Movie Gross,
supra note 219. Domestic box office for 1999 was $7.4 billion. Id. The top twenty-five
films of 2000 grossed $3267,392,000. See 2000 Movie Gross, supra note 219. Domestic
box office for 2000 was $7.45 billion. See Dade Hayes, Late Rally Lifts Wilted
Wickets, Variety, Jan. 8-14,2001, at 9 (reporting domestic box office of $7.45 billion);
1999 Movie Gross, supra note 219, at 20 (reporting domestic box office of $7A
billion).
"The bottom twenty-five films of 1999 grossed $23,832,000. See 1999 Movie Gross,
supra note 219. The bottom twenty-five films of 2000 grossed $26,665,000. See 2000
Movie Gross, supra note 219.
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On its own, this sharp disparity in revenue suggests that private
copying would necessarily reduce revenue far more for popular
works than for less popular works even if private copying were di-
rectly proportional to traditional popularity.' Rather than directly
proportional, however, private copying is likely to increase with a
work's popularity. Focusing on private copying between individu-
als in the absence of some central repository, the ability to copy
privately depends entirely on an individual's ability to find another
who is willing to make the file available for copying. This need to
find another from whom to copy generates a second, complemen-
tary network effect. Because of the first, consumption-based
network effect, more people are likely to have copies of a popular
work. As a result, other factors being equal, finding someone who
has and is willing to share is likely to be far easier with a popular
work than with a less popular work. Knowing this, individuals are
far more likely to look for opportunities to copy popular works
privately.
In a recent study of Gnuteila usage, for example, Eytan Adar
and Bernardo A. Huberman found that the vast majority of
Gnutella queries (that is, file requests) are concentrated on a rela-
tively few topics. 4 Based upon a recorded set of 202,509 Gnutella
queries, they report that:
The top 1 percent of those queries accounted for 37% of the to-
tal queries on the Gnutella network. The top 25 percent
account for over 75% of the total queries. In reality these val-
ues are even higher due to the equivalence of queries ("britney
spears" vs. "spears britney").'
In distributing the money collected through private copying levies, many
collecting societies in Europe simply assume that private copying is proportional to
more traditional measures of popularity. See Kreile, supra note 136, at 466 (describing
GEMA's method of distributing private copying levies as an "additional percentage"
to royalty payments for more traditional distribution methods, such as sales of pre-
recorded cassettes and radio airplay); Weimann, supra note 136, at 167 ("Indicators as
to the frequency of home tapings of a work may be in case of musical works the
number of public broadcasts, or in the case of a record, its sales .... "); see also
Deloitte & Touche, supra note 135, at 58-59 (describing use of general surveys to
allocate private copying levies). For an analysis of how this approach would distribute
a levy on VCRs and blank videocassettes, see infra note 322
,,Adar & Huberman, supra note 186.
Id.
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As these data suggest, popularity itself, because of its associated
network effects, leads individuals looking to engage in private
copying both to seek and to find popular works far more often than
less popular works. Thus private copying will affect popular works
disproportionately.
As a result, private copying may reduce revenue significantly for
the more popular works, yet leave largely untouched the incentive
to create less popular, marginal works. Given that result, private
copying is unlikely to reduce creative output. It may simply reduce
the excessive incentive copyright otherwise provides for the most
popular works. Moreover, by enabling consumers to recapture a
portion of the excess incentives associated with more popular
works, private copying leaves consumers with a little extra money
in their pockets, some of which consumers are likely to reinvest in
marginal works. Although exactly how much consumers will
choose to reinvest in additional works of authorship, as compared
to some other use, is unclear,' there is every reason to believe that
consumers will reinvest at least some. Given that awarding these
excessive incentives to copyright owners would lead to additional
works through trickle-down reinvestment only through mistake or
charity," consumers are, almost necessarily, likely to reinvest as
much, if not more, of these recaptured resources in marginal works
as would the owners of the most valuable copyrights. In addition,
allowing consumers to decide how these excess incentives are rein-
vested gives consumers a louder voice in determining which
marginal works are financed and produced.
If private copying does not reduce the incentives for creating
additional works at the margins, but merely reduces the excess in-
centives available for the non-marginal works, then that fact alone
For example, the plaintiffs' own expert in A&M Records v. Napster, Inc, 239 F.3d
1004, 1010-11 (9th Cir. 2001), found that although album sales had decreased around
some college campuses, sales had increased nationally. See Report of Michael Fine 1,
at http://www.riaa.com/pdf/fine.pdf (June 10, 2000). The plaintiffs' expert, perhaps not
surprisingly, concluded from this that high levels of Napster usage on college
campuses was reducing sales at nearby record stores. Id. at 1-2. Yet, the continued
growth in national sales may also suggest that college students are spending on music
the money they saved by downloading at college after they return home. Id. at 2
(noting that "[s]ince the first quarter of 1997, total national album sales have grown
by 18%").
227 See supra text accompanying notes 201-04.
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is sufficient to place private copying beyond Congress's reach un-
der the Patent and Copyright Clause. The argument can go
considerably farther than suggesting that reducing excess incen-
tives is merely unlikely to harm the production of creative works,
however. Reducing excess incentives is likely to prove affirmatively
desirable because excess incentives distort the authorship process
and may perversely discourage the labors of the most popular au-
thors. The fundamental assumption behind the systematic
expansion of copyright over the last two hundred years is that more
incentives mean more and better works.' Yet, this fundamental
assumption has gone largely unexamined and untested. In part, this
assumption goes unexamined because it has some obvious, if su-
perficial, truth. In part, it goes unexamined because any attempt to
examine more deeply the link between money and creativity
quickly becomes mired in uncertainty. Despite these difficulties,
the fundamental nature of this assumption warrants at least some
attempt to evaluate the supposed link between money and creativ-
ity. One way is to ask a simple question: Is it likely that
Shakespeare would have written more works, or works of better
quality, if he were paid unimaginable sums of money following his
first popular success? For this is what the expansive copyright sys-
tem does today. It pays almost unimaginable sums of money to
authors for a popular hit, and then hopes that the payment will
lead to more and better works. 9
Asking this question suggests two concerns that undercut the as-
sumption that more protection and higher returns for the most
popular works will lead to more and better works. At the outset of
this discussion, let me offer a caveat. Every author is different;
every creative effort is different. Generalizations are usually haz-
ardous. In that light, the following two considerations are offered
with some hesitancy and a strong cautionary note. They are offered
nevertheless, with the hope of casting some light onto copyright's
fundamental assumption.
-See, e.g,, 144 Cong. Rec. H7092 (Aug. 4, 1998) (statement of Rep. Frank) ("If we
do not see that authors and composers and singers and musicians and other creative
people are rewarded for their work, not only is that unfair, to many of us, but the
amount of work we get will diminish.").
- In my classes, I sometimes refer to this hope as the "Shakespeare Hypothesis."
2001]
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First, broadening protection and increasing returns for the most
popular works may shift authorship effort away from great works
toward popular works. Broad copyright may give us Madonna in-
stead of Mozart, Sheldon instead of Shakespeare, and the
Backstreet Boys instead of Bach. This is not to suggest that great
works cannot be popular nor is it to impose some elitist distaste for
popular works.' There may well be considerable overlap between
great and popular works. Yet, there is also a considerable differ-
ence between them. Popular works offer currency; great works
endure. Popular works offer superficial enjoyment; great works of-
fer meaning. Most importantly for copyright law, popular works
have large sales; great works may not. This is not to say that popu-
lar works are more valuable than great works, even in an economic
sense. But popular works tend to have large audiences whose indi-
vidual reservation prices are tightly clustered around the typical
market price for such works. That combination maximizes the pri-
vate return available for any given social value and therefore leads
copyright to reward popularity disproportionately.2"
By offering substantial, and in some cases almost unimaginable,
returns for popular works, copyright introduces a certain tension
into the creative process: Should an author strive for a great work
or a popular one? While the obvious ideal would be to author a
work that is both, an author may be capable of only one or the
other at any given time. Given that copyright operates generally on
the principle that monetary rewards can influence behavior, offer-
ing higher returns for popular works may influence these authors
to pursue popularity instead of greatness.
In addition, popular works, almost by definition, must appeal to
a wider audience. Seeking the common denominator among a
wider audience leads almost inevitably to a lower common de-
- Justice Holmes' admonition in Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188
U.S. 239 (1903), bears repeating here: "It would be a dangerous undertaking for
persons trained only to the law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of
pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits." Id. at 251.
23, John Kay, The Economics of Intellectual Property Rights, 13 Int'l Rev. L. &
Econ. 337, 348 (1993) ("[T]he intellectual property that is well protected is not
intellectual property of great value or great creative merit, and the intellectual
property that is of great originality and great creative merit is not at all well protected.
The result is that quite disproportionate resources are attracted to producing these
essentially second-rate, but fortuitously favored, activities.").
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nominator. As a result, striving for popularity may produce not a
wonderful, cacophonous variety, but a dulling, repetitive sameness
as works include over and over the same elements intended to ca-
ter to popular tastes. Rather than free authors to explore their own
inspirations, as some commentators have suggestedz 2 excess incen-
tives may chain authors ever more tightly to the formula that first
brought them popular success. This effect has been quite pro-
nounced in the music industry, where musicians have coined the
term "corporate rock" to identify those works that follow certain
forms to ensure their popularity. 3 Yet, the influence of money is
pervasive in all of the copyright industries and is likely to reshape
creative decisions in order to ensure a work's marketability at the
expense perhaps of something more.'
-1 Goldstein, supra note 179, at 83; Ladd, supra note 199, at 431; Neil Weinstock
Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 Yale L.J. 283, 358-59 (1996).
All three scholars argue that giving authors a little more protection than might strictly
be required can create breathing space for authors to express themselves more freely.
There is an inconsistency in their reasoning. To identify this inconsistency, we must
first unpack what it would mean to give authors "a little more protection." Although
not formally stated, this concept seems to entail broadening protection to ensure
somewhat more revenue for any given work than is strictly necessary to ensure its
creation. In other words, for any given level of popular and market success, we wil
create a system of protection that enables a work to earn somewhat more, rather than
somewhat less. Restated in this way, it becomes clear that these commentators are
suggesting we increase the rewards for popular success in order to free authors to
pursue something other than popular success. The inconsistency arises because these
commentators are necessarily assuming that monetary rewards influence behavior
(thus, the need for a little extra protection to provide authors with a monetary
cushion) and at the same time, assuming that authors will ignore the increased
monetary rewards to pursue something else. This inconsistency does not preclude the
possibility that some authors may find sudden wealth liberating, but given copyright's
general assumption that additional incentives will shape people's efforts, increased
rewards for achieving popularity would seem to promote increased authorship
directed at achieving popularity.
"-, See generally Negativland, Fair Use: The Story of the Letter U and the Numeral
2, at 190 (1995) (arguing that music is now "a trans-national business, run not on
artistic motivations but on the bottom lines drawn by lawyers and accountants").
-" The pervasive importance and likely influence of money is seen most readily in
the uniform use of rankings based upon sales and viewership across the entertainment
industries, including the New York Times' Bestseller's List, Billboard's album and
single lists, gold and platinum albums based upon sales, and Variety's top films list.
See also Negativland, supra note 233, at 154, 189-90 (noting pervasive influence of
money within the music industry). Consider this recent interview in Newsweek:
[NEWSWEEK:] The world's obsessed with box office. It's depressing, isn't it?
ZWICK [Producer of Traffic]: We've all been co-opted by the numbers.
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What is lost as a result of the distorting effect of excessive incen-
tives is impossible to determine. If copyright's underlying
assumption that people respond to money is accurate, however,"
then it seems clear that offering very high returns for the most
popular works almost certainly costs society some of the great
works it desires.' Private copying, by reducing the monetary re-
turns available to the most popular works, can reduce the
difference between the returns available for popularity and the re-
turns available for greatness. Private copying can reduce the
distorting effect that inordinate incentives for the most popular
works can generate and can thereby restore the author's freedom
to pursue her own creative vision.
Second, broadening protection and increasing the returns for the
most popular works will likely decrease the productivity of our
most popular authors. While copyright simplistically assumes that
more incentive means more productivity, this assumption is flawed.
At some point, higher returns for a given author's work will likely
reduce that author's creative output. 7 Economists call this reversal
in output the backward-bending labor supply function, and they
GRAZER [Producer of Dr. Seuss' How the Grinch Stole Christmas]: More than
ever.
ZWICK: This notion of what the opening is, what the gross is... All of us at
this table came to our passion for movies based on a love of movies, none of
which we could sit here and name the grosses of. The whole culture has
ascribed meaning to numbers. It began in the '80s when we didn't know what
baseball players made, we didn't know what CEOs were paid... And now
we're all prey to it. There is a constant reaffirmation of its importance in all our
lives. So much of our days, our talk, becomes consumed by it that we begin to
believe in it.
Jeff Giles & David Ansen, Pass Me an Oscar, Newsweek, Feb. 5, 2001, at 56, 59
(ellipses in original).
13 Certainly, there is good reason to expect that increasing returns can influence
behavior. Richard B. Freeman, Demand for Education, in 1 Handbook of Labor
Economics 357, 370 (Orley Ashenfelter & Richard Layard eds., 1986) ("The
investment model of the decision to pursue education has been studied extensively
with generally favorable results for the key behavioral assumption: that individual
decisions respond significantly to meet incentives."); Welch, supra note 220, at 13
(tracing collective responses in the level of education individuals chose to obtain
given changes in the education-based wage differential).
Cf. Wendy J. Gordon, Norms of Communication and Commodification, 144 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 2321, 2337 (1996) ("If not all goods and values are commensurable with
money, that suggests that increasing the amount of money attached to a given
behavior will not always generate a significant increase in the behavior.").
Varian, supra note 148, at 173.
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typically introduce it to their students by asking the students how
many hours each would work for a given wage. Usually the an-
swers suggest that, when wages are low, an increase in the wage
will lead to additional time working as the offer of a higher wage
makes additional work and the resulting additional income more
attractive. As the wage continues to increase, students begin to re-
alize that they can earn enough income to sustain the lifestyle they
seek with fewer hours and also realize that a little leisure time to
enjoy their earnings would be nice. Once that point is reached, in-
creasing the wage tends to decrease the time worked.'
More formally, this backward-bending labor supply arises from
two effects: a substitution effect and an income effect. 9 Higher
wages make work more attractive relative to leisure, leading an in-
dividual to substitute work for leisure (the "substitution effect").
Yet, higher wages also produce higher incomes that lead an indi-
vidual to increase her demand for various goods including
additional leisure (the "income effect"). Once wages reach the
point where the income effect begins to outweigh the substitution
effect, any further wage increases will reduce the time spent work-
ing.240
The available empirical evidence uniformly indicates that, for
the average individual, labor supply begins to fall with increasing
wages at a wage well below the level that broad copyright protec-
tion offers popular authors today. In terms of comparison, only
lottery winners experience sudden wealth in a way similar to that
of suddenly popular authors today. Studies of lottery winners
demonstrate that such large awards sharply reduce, on average,
time worked.2 ' As Professor Gregory Mankiw has summarized:
- See, e.g., id. at 174.
2-9 Id. at 174-75.
2-1 Id.
21" Guido W. Imbens et al., Estimating the Effects of Unearned Income on Labor
Supply, Earnings, Savings, and Consumption: Evidence from a Survey of Lottery
Players 2 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7001, 1999),
http://dsl.nber.org/papers/w700l.pdf ("We find that winning a modest prize ($15,000
per year for twenty years) does not affect labor supply or earnings
substantially.... Winning a much larger prize ($80,000 rather than $15,000 per year)
reduces labor supply as measured by hours, as well as participation in the labor force
and social security earnings...."); H. Roy Kaplan, Lottery Winners and Work
Commitment: A Behavioral Test of the American Work Ethic, 10 J. Inst. for
Socioecon. Stud. 82, 90 (1985) ("Generally, as the size of the winning increased, so too
2001]
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The results from studies of lottery winners are striking. Of
those winners who win more than $50,000, almost 25 percent
quit working within a year, and another 9 percent reduce the
number of hours they work. Of those winners who win more
than $1 million, almost 40 percent stop working. The income ef-
fect on labor supply of winning such a large prize is
substantial.2 42
Although there are differences between lottery winnings and
copyright royalties that caution against applying these precise
changes in labor supply directly to the production of copyrighted
works, ' 3 these findings strongly suggest that the excess incentives
available to authors today may not only distort the authorship
process by encouraging the production of popular works at the ex-
pense of great works, they may reduce the supply of works from
our most popular authors as well.'" Again, private copying, by re-
ducing the excess incentives available, can help redress the
disincentive that excess incentives would otherwise create.
did the number of changes. Twenty-three percent of million dollar winners quit
working. At the other end of the spectrum, none who won less than $ 50,000 quit.")
(italics omitted); see also Douglas Holtz-Eakin et al., The Carnegie Conjecture: Some
Empirical Evidence, 108 Q.J. Econ. 413, 420 (1993) (examining effects of inheritance
on labor supply and finding that "[a] consistent story appears to emerge: higher
inheritances are associated with a greater propensity to exit the [labor] market").
242 N. Gregory Mankiw, Principles of Microeconomics 483 (2d ed. 2001).
-
3The principal difference between the two is that lottery winnings represent
unearned income that is unrelated to the individual's work. In contrast, authorship
royalties are earned, though perhaps uncertain and sometimes unexpected, and
certainly related to the individual's work as an author.
In the field of invention, corporations usually obtain assignments of patent rights
from their employees in advance. Although the particular employee responsible for a
given invention may receive some increase in salary as a result of her particular
profitable inventions, most of the excess incentive goes to the corporation and is
redistributed among a pool of researchers as a form of risk sharing. Such an approach
would tend to avoid the reduction in labor supply that large awards to the particular
inventor would otherwise create. Such an approach is more difficult to apply in
copyright both because works of authorship are too driven by individual talent (or
name recognition) to sustain such an approach, and because the termination
provisions in §§ 203 and 304 preclude effective assignment of the entire copyright. 17
U.S.C.A. §§ 203, 304 (2000).
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B. Copyright's Capture: The Political Economy of Copyright and
the Need for Civil Disobedience
In addition to securing a better fit between copyright and the
public interest, private copying can also serve as an important ele-
ment of democratic self-governance in two senses. First, it provides
an avenue for civil disobedience that enables otherwise disenfran-
chised consumers to express their dissatisfaction with copyright's
present scope. Second, by allowing individuals to determine the
proper level of protection for themselves, private copying can serve
as a type of direct democracy that avoids the agency-cost pitfalls
present when relying on a representative democratic process to de-
termine copyright's proper scope.
When James Madison drafted the Patent and Copyright Clause
of the Constitution, he was aware of the potential for abuse inher-
ent in authorizing government to grant exclusive rights to
individuals under patent and copyright.245 For that reason, Madison
drafted the Patent and Copyright Clause both as a grant and a limi-
tation of congressional power. Although he did not accept Thomas
Jefferson's suggestion to limit the terms of patent and copyright to
a specified number of years,46 he required patent and copyright to
subsist only "for limited Times,"4 ' and he tied them to a public
purpose-"[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts" 21 -to ensure that copyright and patent continued to serve
the public interest rather than the private interest of favored con-
stituents.
24, See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (July 31, 1788), in 13 The
Papers of Thomas Jefferson 440, 442-43 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1956) (suggesting to
Madison that the Constitution include a provision abolishing all government-
established monopolies); Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17,
1788), in 14 The Papers of Thomas Jefferson 16, 21 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1958)
(responding that while government-established monopolies are "justly classed among
the greatest nusances [sic] in Government," limited monopolies to encourage "literary
works and ingenious discoveries... are ... too valuable to be wholly renounced").
,1 See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Aug. 28, 1789), in 5 The
Writings of Thomas Jefferson 107, 113 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1895) (proposing the
following language: "Art. 9. Monopolies may be allowed to persons for their own
productions in literature & their own inventions in the arts, for a term not exceeding
years but for no longer term & no other purpose").
U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
""Id.
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While Madison clearly foresaw the potential for abuse, his at-
tempt to limit that potential has proven of little avail, particularly
with respect to copyright. Although copyright's term was initially
limited to fourteen years plus a like renewal term, Congress has
repeatedly extended its term so that it now stands at life plus sev-
enty years.2 Although not precisely analogous, the fact that
copyright's term now exceeds the life plus twenty-one years per-
missible under the rule against perpetuities strongly suggests that it
is no longer for a "limited Timeol."'' 0 Copyright once secured to au-
thors the exclusive right to "print, reprint, publish or vend""1 their
work; it now grants authors a substantially broader set of rights, al-
lowing an author to control almost any profitable use of her work
or of other authors' variations on her work. 2 And although copy-
right once limited protection to "maps, charts, and books,"' 3 it now
protects a far wider range of subject matter, and ironically reserves
its narrowest protection for the factual works that once repre-
sented two-thirds of its identified subject matter.
Courts and commentators have pointed to changing technologies
and changing markets as either justification for or explanation of
- 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2000). See generally William Patry, The Failure of the
American Copyright System: Protecting the Idle Rich, 72 Notre Dame L. Rev. 907,
915-33 (1997) (tracing the extension of copyright's term).
25 Of course, the comparison is not precise. Where the rule against perpetuities
formally reaches future interests created by an individual's private act, copyright is a
present vested right created by statute. Nevertheless, both the rule against
perpetuities and the constitutional provision restricting copyright to a "limited time"
address the period over which an individual is given exclusive control over resources.
Where the rule against perpetuities limits that period to a life plus one generation,
copyright proponents are increasingly arguing for copyright extensions in terms of life
plus two generations. E.g., Council Directive 93/98/EEC of 29 October 1993,
Harmonizing the Term of Protection of Copyright and Certain Related Rights, 1993
O.J. (L 290) pmbl., item 5 (justifying a longer copyright term by suggesting that the
"average lifespan in the Community has grown longer, to the point where [the
standard] term [of life-plus-50] is no longer sufficient to cover two generations").
2 Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124,124.
- Compare id. § 6, 1 Stat. at 125 (prohibiting unauthorized "print[ing] or
publish[ing]" of a copyrighted work), with 17 U.S.C. § 106(1)-(6) (1994 & Supp. V
2000) (granting the copyright owner the exclusive rights to reproduce, prepare
derivative works from, distribute, publicly perform, or publicly display the
copyrighted work).
23 Act of May 31,1790, ch. 15, pmbl., 1 Stat. 124,124.
-Compare id. with Feist Publ'ns v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 348-49
(1991) (sharply limiting protection for works presenting factual information).
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this expansion." Certainly some parts of the expansion, such as the
protection of computer programs in the 1980s and of sound re-
cordings in the 1970s, were driven by changing forms of expression.
But historically, very little of copyright's expansion can be tied to
parallel changes in technology or markets. For example, Congress
gave authors the exclusive right to translate their works in 1870 in
response to Stowe v. Thomas.' Yet there was no change in tech-
nology or markets that might have justified this expansion. Just as
someone could have done in 1790, Thomas had translated Stowe's
work Uncle Tom's Cabin by hand and serialized the resulting work
in his newspaper for his German-speaking customers in Pennsyl-
vania. 7 Similarly, Congress extended copyright protection to
musical works in 1831," adding the exclusive right to perform such
works publicly in 1897 ---well before the advent of radio and tele-
vision.2"' Given that the printing and public performance of musical
works in the nineteenth century differed very little from that in the
eighteenth, changing technologies or markets could not have justi-
fied this expansion. In fact, very little of copyright's expansion in
the United States over the last two hundred years can be tied to
some contemporaneous change in technology or markets.26'
Political pressure, not technology, has driven copyright's expan-
sion. While those who produce works of authorship and those who
consume such works share a common interest in ensuring a some-
what greater variety of works than the market would produce in
the absence of copyright, they disagree over how extensive that
protection should be. On the one hand, producers tend to favor
21, E.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 430 (1984)
("From its beginning, the law of copyright has developed in response to significant
changes in technology."); Adelstein & Peretz, supra note 41, at 209.
-" 23 F. Cas. 201 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1853) (No. 13,514), superseded by statute, Act of
July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 86, 16 Stat. 198,212.
2 1Id. at 201.
2, Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, § 1, 4 Stat. 436,436.
21, Act of Jan. 6, 1897, ch. 4, 29 Stat. 481.
2- See Frederick Lewis Allen, Only Yesterday 164-65 (1931) ("[T]here was no such
thing as radio broadcasting to the public until the autumn of 1920, but ... by the
spring of 1922 radio had become a craze . . ").
2I Other expansions that are difficult to trace to any contemporaneous technological
change include: Act of Apr. 29, 1802, ch. 36, § 2,2 Stat. 171, 171 (extending protection
to prints): Act of Aug. 18, 1856, ch. 169, 11 Stat. 138 (extending protection to the
public performance of dramas and plays).
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broader protection, reflected at the extreme by their demands for
protection that would enable them to recover the full value of their
work. 2 Consumers, on the other hand, tend to favor somewhat
narrower protection. While they may be willing to tolerate some
copyright protection and the associated increase in prices, consum-
ers quickly reach a point at which increasing variety is no longer
worth its cost and broader protection becomes a wasteful and un-
deserved windfall for producers.
Although the Constitution seemingly prefers the interests of
consumers over those of producers, copyright owners have enjoyed
a decided advantage in the political contest over copyright's proper
scope.' Because there are fewer copyright producers, each pro-
ducer has a higher individual stake in proposed copyright
legislation than do individual consumers. Producers are therefore
more likely to keep informed of, and seek to influence Congress
on, proposed legislation. As compared to consumers, copyright
producers are also better organized through institutions such as un-
ions and trade associations, and therefore face decidedly lower
transaction costs in organizing their lobbying efforts. Reduced
transaction costs allow producers to present a more unified front to
Congress and to obtain certain economies of scale in their persua-
sion efforts. Third, because of close ties within the industry,
copyright producers can police their group more effectively to en-
sure that everyone contributes a proportionate share to the
lobbying effort, minimizing the number that will free ride. More-
over, because the market shares of copyright producers are well
known within their industries and because the marginal value of
additional protection is closely related to market share, copyright
producers can readily identify when one member of their group is
E.g. Home Recording Hearings, supra note 205 ("The central principle on which
this [royalty on home recording equipment] hinges is this: The right of those who
create television programs and feature films to own what they create.") (statement of
Jack Valenti, Motion Picture Association of America).
SOn the collective action and transaction costs advantages of concentrated interest
groups generally, see Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods
and the Theory of Groups (1965); see also Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., A Critical
Reexamination of the Takings Jurisprudence, 90 Mich. L. Rev. 1892, 1949-52 (1992)
(summarizing the lobbying advantages available to a concentrated interest group).
See generally Gordon Tullock, Rents and Rent-Seeking, in The Political Economy of
Rent-Seeking 51 (Charles K. Rowley et al. eds., 1988).
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shirking.2- As a result, copyright producers have had and will likely
continue to have disproportionate resources available for any given
dollar amount at risk to press their case for broader copyright.26
The availability of disproportionate resources in political battles
over copyright's proper scope has often meant disproportionate in-
fluence. This disproportionate influence is not necessarily a
function of legislative bad faith, where legislators knowingly auc-
tion off the public interest for the campaign contributions and
other benefits the copyright industry can provide. While the influ-
ence of a special interest group can take plainly illegitimate forms,
such as bribery,2" even the most well-intentioned legislator can be
misled by the copyright industry's disproportionate resources. As a
practical matter, these resources translate into a constant clamor
where day after day, the legislator hears support for the measure,
backed by impressive (and expensive) expert opinions." At the
same time, the collective action difficulties facing consumers of
copyrighted works mean that legislators will hear relatively little
opposition from the other side.'6 Given the apparent support for
- Paul Pecorino notes that cooperation may break down and the free-rider problem
may prove more severe when there are "informational problems relating to the
unobservability of preferences. This would tend to create a difficult and well-known
problem of assigning contribution shares which each party would have to meet to
avoid triggering defection." Pecorino, supra note 160, at 132.
21' See Mancur Olson, The Rise and Decline of Nations 41 (1982) ("[S]mall groups
have a greater likelihood of being able to organize for collective action, and can
usually organize with less delay, than large groups. It follows that the small groups in
a society will usually have more lobbying ... power per capita.., than the large
groups.").
- E.g., Daniel H. Lowenstein, Political Bribery and the Intermediate Theory of
Politics, 32 UCLA L. Rev. 784, 848 (1985) ("It is a significant and politically relevant
fact that under our present system of campaign finance, politicians and interest groups
engage routinely.., in felonious bribery that goes unprosecuted primarily because
the crime is so pervasive.").
2, As an example of one such expert opinion, see Home Recording Hearings, supra
note 205 (memorandum of Laurence H. Tribe on constitutional law and copyright
compensation). The Motion Picture Association of America also retained Professor
Tribe to present its case personally to Senator Edward Kennedy. Lardner, supra note
31, at 225.
2m Procedural fairness, public hearings, and the like will not solve the problem.
Because of transaction costs and collective action advantages, the concentrated
interest group will be disproportionately represented at such meetings. Indeed, the
appearance of fairness such procedures create may itself enable the concentrated
group to swing the law even more in its favor than they could in the absence of such
procedural fairness. The apparent fairness of the procedure can, in effect, cloak a
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the measure and the apparent lack of opposition, enacting the
measure seems sensible not only to the bought-and-paid-for legis-
lator, but also to the legislator attempting to judge the merits of the
measure fairly and impartially. 9
Congress's increasing willingness to enact into law compromises
crafted between those who create, those who publish, and those
who provide the means to distribute works of authorship further
diminishes the political voice of copyright's consumers. 0 Ordinary
consumers seldom play any direct role in the extended (and often
private) negotiating sessions required to craft such compromises.
The consumer interest is represented only indirectly in these ses-
sions, when it happens to coincide with the interest of one of the
participants. Such coincidences are rare. As a general rule, all of
those involved in the creation, publication, and distribution of
copyrighted works share a common interest in maximizing their
joint revenue vis-A-vis consumers, whatever internecine fighting
may develop over how to apportion that revenue amongst them-
selves. As a result, industry-crafted compromises are unlikely to
reflect the interest of copyright consumers.
A mistaken view of copyright as a source of real economic
growth has exacerbated these agency cost problems. For example,
considerable degree of substantive unfairness in the result, making it possible for the
concentrated group to effect a statute that serves its interest to a greater extent than
would be possible in the absence of the procedures.
2 When Congress turns to governmental experts, such as the Register of
Copyrights, the commissioner of the Patent and Trademark Office, or other in-house
experts, looking for a neutral, objective evaluation, too often an overbroad copyright
bias prevails. There is not only the self-selection problem, with lawyers choosing to
specialize in copyright law because they believe more fervently in copyright's
desirability than the average citizen, but also the problem of the revolving door.
Government attorneys are well aware of whom, as between copyright producers and
copyright consumers, they are more likely to represent when they leave the
government's employ. See Pamela Samuelson, The U.S. Digital Agenda at WIPO, 37
Va. J. Int'l L. 369, 430 (1997) (noting that intellectual property professionals tend by
training to be "solicitious toward the interests of rights holders").
"i' See Jessica D. Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History, 72
Cornell L. Rev. 857 passim (1987) (discussing the use of such compromises in drafting
the 1976 General Revision of Copyright Law, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541). The
Senate Report accompanying the DMCA proudly boasts that "Chairman Hatch
initiated comprehensive negotiations within the Judiciary Committee among
copyright owners and Internet and online service providers to resolve the issue of
service provider liability." S. Rep. No. 105-190, at 7 (1998). How the negotiations
could be "comprehensive" when consumers were not represented is unclear.
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Senator Orrin Hatch, in arguing for passage of Senate Bill 2037
(the bill containing the DMCA), emphasized that in 1996 "the U.S.
creative industries accounted for 3.65% of the U.S. gross domestic
product" and that from 1977 through 1996, "the U.S. copyright in-
dustries' share of GDP grew more than twice as fast as the
remainder of the economy.""1 According to Senator Hatch, these
and other numbers regarding the economic significance of the
copyright industries leave "no doubt that copyright is of supreme
importance to the American economy. '
These numbers mask a key fact. Even if broadening copyright
generates no real economic growth, it increases the price American
consumers must pay for copyrighted works and transfers those ad-
ditional revenues to copyright producers. Broadening copyright
can thereby generate a real increase in revenue, and consequently
GDP share, for the copyright industries even if it generates no real
economic growth. A similar effect arises when the law allows copy-
right owners to claim a share of the value added to preexisting
works by improvements in distribution technology. By extending
protection to a work regardless of the form in which it is conveyed
or stored,2 copyright enables the owners of preexisting works to
exact a fee on the use of the new distribution technology and to ob-
tain thereby a transfer of wealth from those who use and those who
create the new distribution technology. When the new distribution
21 144 Cong. Rec. S4884 (daily ed. May 14, 1998) (statement of Sen. Hatch); see also
S. Rep. No. 105-190, at 10 (1998) ("The copyright industries are one of America's
largest and fastest growing economic assets.").
,7 144 Cong. Rec. S4884 (daily ed. May 14, 1998) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
".. Copies" is defined to include any form of the work (other than phonorecords).
17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994). As the Second Circuit explained in Matthew Bender & Co. v.
West Publishing Co., 158 F.3d 693,702-03 (2d Cir. 1998):
This definition [of "copies" in § 101] was intended to avoid the distinctions
"derived from cases such as White-Smith Publishing Co. v Apollo Co., 209 U.S.
1 [28 S. Ct. 319, 52 L.Ed. 655] (1908), under which statutory copyrightability in
certain cases [had] been made to depend upon the form or medium in which the
work is fixed." H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 52 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5665; see also S. Rep. No. 94-473, at 51 (1975).... Thus, the
definition of "copies" is intended to expand the "fixation" requirement to
include material objects that embody works capable of being perceived with the
aid of a machine, thereby ensuring that reproductions of copyrighted works
contained on media such as floppy disks, hard drives, and magnetic tapes would
meet the Copyright Act's "fixation" requirement.
Id. at 702-03 (footnote omitted).
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technology at issue was not foreseen or anticipated at the time the
preexisting work was created, it cannot plausibly be argued that
this fee and wealth transfer served to encourage the work's crea-
tion. 4 Instead, the transfer serves as a mere post hoc windfall." As
a result, automatically extending the protection of preexisting
works to new distribution technologies can increase the revenues
and apparent GDP share of the copyright industries, even though
the real source of the economic growth lies elsewhere.
In this light, the fact that Senator Hatch has chosen the 1977 to
1996 time period to explore revenue and GDP share growth for the
copyright industries is particularly troubling. With several substan-
tial expansions in copyright protection during this period, such as
the Copyright Act of 1976,'6 the Berne Convention Implementa-
tion Act of 1988,' and the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension
Act of 1998 8 much of the apparent growth Hatch proudly cites
may not reflect productive economic activity, but a mere redistri-
-' Cf. Michael H. Davis, Extending Copyright and the Constitution: "Have I Stayed
Too Long?," 52 Fla. L. Rev. 989, 992-94 (2000) (noting constitutional difficulties with
retroactive term extensions); Paul J. Heald & Suzanna Sherry, Implied Limits on the
Legislative Power: The Intellectual Property Clause as an Absolute Constraint on
Congress, 2000 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1119, 1169 (noting that retroactive term extensions
"cannot 'promote the Progress of Science' in the way intended by the framers of the
Constitution"); Merges & Reynolds, supra note 17, at 58-59 (noting constitutional
difficulties with retroactive expansions). Courts avoid this logical flaw by focusing
solely on whether licensing distribution through the new distribution technology
would increase copyright owners' revenue without addressing whether providing that
increase post hoc played any role in the work's creation. E.g., Basic Books v. Kinko's
Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522, 1534 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (noting that allowing
Kinko's to prepare course packages without paying a permission fee would reduce
revenue for copyright owners and stating that "[t]his impact is more powerfully felt by
authors and copyright owners of the out-of-print books, for whom permissions fees
constitute a significant source of income" without discussing whether expectation of
such permission fees played any role in encouraging the creation of the works at
issue).
"s See Lardner, supra note 31, at 291 ("Most of the video dealers thought that
Hollywood ought to be thanking them-and the electronics industry-for a new
source of revenue, not only on current movies but on 'a lot of movies that were lying
around in a vault somewhere."') (quoting Ira Gomberg, general counsel for Sony
Corporation of America).
6Act of Oct. 19,1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, Title 17, § 101, 90 Stat. 2541.
-Act of Oct. 31, 1988, Pub L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853 (codified as amended at
17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994)).
r'Act of Oct. 27. 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-298, Title 1, § 101, 112 Stat. 2827 (codified
as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994)).
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bution of wealth. In addition, distribution technology for copy-
righted works also radically advanced during this period, with the
advent of cable, the videocassette recorder, and digital storage and
transfer. Again, increasing revenue growth for the copyright indus-
tries during this period may reflect merely a monopolist's cut of the
value added to preexisting works by the diligent and creative ef-
forts of those responsible for these new distribution technologies,
rather than productive economic activity in the copyright industries
themselves.27
The hope, of course, is that by throwing money at copyright pro-
ducers, more and better works will result. As discussed earlier,
there is good reason to doubt that hypothesis, particularly given
copyright's increased emphasis on maximizing revenues for the
most popular works and the excess incentives that systematically
result. Whether the hypothesis is true, false, or something in be-
tween, however, focusing on copyright revenue and similar
economic measures enables the increasingly substantial redistribu-
tive component inherent in broader copyright to masquerade
successfully as productive economic activity.
Fearing the excesses that granting Congress unconstrained au-
thority over copyright would create, the drafters of the
Constitution entrusted courts with the final responsibility for en-
suring that copyright serves primarily the public and not a private
interest. Yet courts have largely abdicated that role. Although Jus-
tice Harlan Fiske Stone, in the famous Carolene Products footnote
four, recognized the need for heightened scrutiny where the Con-
stitution contains an express limitation on congressional power,'
courts have refused to impose a constitutional check on copyright's
continuing expansion. 1 Indeed, the judicial process has shown
"'Moreover, this analysis omits the unproductive and wasteful expenditure of
resources to ensure that such wealth transfers occur. See Merges & Reynolds, supra
note 17, at 55 ("From society's point of view, any expenditure on lobbying that might
instead have been invested in research and development is a loss.").
101 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (noting that
there is a "narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality"
where "legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the
Constitution, such as those of the first ten amendments").
,' See Eldred v. Reno, 74 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 1999) (upholding constitutionality
of Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998), aff'd, 239 F.3d 372 (D.C. Cir.
2001).
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symptoms that it too has been infected by the copyright industry's
disproportionate influence. Although the prospects of campaign
contributions or future employment are not likely to influence a
judiciary appointed for life, the status of copyright plaintiffs as re-
peat players has offered the copyright industry a tremendous
advantage in shaping the development of copyright doctrine.
As repeat players, copyright plaintiffs have the ability to decide
which defendants to sue, which cases to bring, and in which or-
der.' This allows copyright plaintiffs to bring the right test cases-
the ones in which they feel they have the best chance of winning. It
also allows copyright plaintiffs to forum shop and pick the Circuit
where they feel they have the best chance of winning. Moreover,
because they are as interested in the development of copyright
doctrine over time as the outcome in any given case, copyright
plaintiffs can arrange cases against a number of similarly situated
defendants in an order most likely to achieve a desired end result.
For example, when video rentals first became popular, a group of
movie studios set out to obtain a judicial ruling barring such rent-
als.' Recognizing that the first sale doctrine posed a substantial
obstacle to such a ruling, the studios began by suing a video rental
store that offered in-store viewing.' Furthermore, the video rental
store selected as the first defendant offered in-store viewing by
transmitting the work from a VCR located in the front of the store
through a cable to a viewing room in the back of the store. This in-
store transmittal differentiated the defendant's video rental opera-
Copyright defendants can bring their own test cases under the Declaratory
Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201,2202 (1994). See, e.g., On Command Video Corp. v.
Columbia Pictures Indus., 777 F. Supp. 787 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (finding copyright
infringement in response to plaintiffs declaratory judgment action seeking
declaration of non-infringement). Their ability to do so, however, is severely limited
by the "case or controversy" requirement of Article III. To bring a declaratory
judgment action, the would-be plaintiff must demonstrate that the copyright owner
"has either expressly or impliedly charged the plaintiff with infringement." Sherwood
Med. Indus. v. Deknatel, Inc., 512 F.2d 724, 727 (8th Cir. 1975) (describing
requirement in patent cases); see also Diagnostic Unit Inmate Council v. Films Inc.,
88 F.3d 651, 653 (8th Cir. 1996) (extending this rule to copyright cases).
The studios pursued their ultimately unsuccessful efforts to persuade courts that
ordinary video rentals constituted a public performance through a sequence of three
cases. Columbia Pictures Indus. v. Profl Real Estate Investors, 866 F.2d 278 (9th Cir.
1989); Columbia Pictures Indus. v. Aveco, Inc., 800 F.2d 59 (3d Cir. 1986); Columbia
Pictures Indus. v. Redd Home, Inc., 749 F.2d 154 (3d Cir. 1984).
Redd Home, 749 F.2d at 156-57.
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tion from an ordinary rental store, and enabled the Third Circuit to
find copyright infringement without directly confronting the first
sale doctrine." Building on this success, the movie studios then
sued a second video rental store that also offered in-store view-
ing.2  This video rental store did not, however, transmit the work.
Rather, it merely rented rooms containing a VCR and television to
its customers, and allowed its customers to perform the work for
themselves.' " Nevertheless, the Third Circuit, relying on its deci-
sion in the first case, found this to be an infringement as well.'
In doing so, the Third Circuit held that by offering the video-
tapes, equipment, and a room in which to view the copyrighted
work to the public, the video store had publicly performed the
work.' At its broadest, the opinion suggested that by enabling any
member of the public to perform a work, the video store violated
the copyright owner's exclusive right to perform the work publicly,
even if each individual performance of a work was private!' Such a
reading would readily extend to a more traditional video rental
store. 9' It too makes performances of the works possible for any
member of the public, even though each individual performance is
- Id. at 158-60 (finding a public performance and concluding on that basis that the
first sale doctrine did not apply).
Aveco, 800 F.2d at 61.
- Id.
- Id. at 63.
Id. ("Our opinion in Redd Home turned not on the precise whereabouts of the
video cassette players, but on the nature of Maxwell's stores. Maxwell's, like Aveco,
was willing to make a viewing room and video cassette available to any member of the
public with the inclination to avail himself of this service. It is this availability that
made Maxwell's stores public places, not the coincidence that the video cassette
players were situated in the lobby.").
Id. Aveco argued that "while [the] viewing rooms are available to anyone for
rent, they are private during each rental period, and therefore, not 'open to the
public.' The performance-the playing of the video cassette-thus occurs not in the
public lobby, but in the private viewing rooms." Id. By rejecting this argument as
irrelevant, the Third Circuit implicitly suggested that the ultimately private nature of
the individual performances that Aveco enabled through its rental operation was
irrelevant to the public performance issue. See id.
' Lardner, supra note 31, at 287-88 ("The people at Fox and Disney hoped the
rental issue would be less controversial than the royalty. The repeated rental of a
videocassette, it seemed to them, was no different in concept from a public showing of
a movie in a theater, and the law ought to treat the two activities the same way-as
commercial uses of a copyrighted work, to be allowed or disallowed at the copyright
owner's discretion.").
2001] 903
904 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 87:813
private. Fortunately for the public interest, the movie studios' ef-
forts to build these decisions into a prohibition on ordinary video
rentals died when they filed their third case in this progression in
the Ninth Circuit and lost.' Although ultimately unsuccessful, the
movie studios' ability to bring a progression of cases directed to-
wards a desired end represents an advantage available uniquely to
copyright plaintiffs.
As repeat players, copyright plaintiffs have also sought to shape
copyright doctrine and preserve favorable rulings by buying set-
tlements where necessary.' When a copyright plaintiff obtains an
initially favorable ruling from a district or appellate court on a new
issue, the copyright plaintiff can offer a license to the infringing de-
fendant at a token or below-market price.' By settling with the
defendant, the copyright plaintiff eliminates the risk that the ini-
tially favorable ruling will be overturned on appeal. Settling keeps
the favorable ruling on the books as binding or persuasive author-
ity that can become the basis for further expansions in copyright
protection. Moreover, the rules of joinder, as well as the concentra-
tion and cohesiveness of the copyright producers, permit copyright
producers to join together for test cases against any new, poten-
tially infringing activity.295 This allows copyright producers to share
-n Columbia Pictures Indus. v. Prof'l Real Estate Investors, 866 F.2d 278, 281-82
(9th Cir. 1989) (rejecting a reading of the Third Circuit's reasoning that would extend
the public performance doctrine to a hotel's rental of videodisks to its guests).
As Paul Goldstein recounts, this approach is not new; it originated with the
Stationers' Company. Goldstein, supra note 10, at 46-49 (following the Stationers'
Company's efforts to obtain a ruling establishing a perpetual common law copyright,
including the use of settlement following a favorable lower court ruling to avoid a
possible reversal on appeal).
"4 Even before litigation begins, a copyright owner can offer a license with a token
fee. After copyright consumers have accepted the token license fee, the copyright
owner can then begin to raise the fee or use the existing token fee licenses as proof
that a license market for the use exists. Id. at 219-23 (describing the use of such a
"carrot-and-stick strategy" by the Copyright Clearance Center).
Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a) ("All persons may join in one action as plaintiffs if they
assert any right to relief jointly, severally, or in the alternative in respect of or arising
out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences and if
any question of law or fact common to all these persons will arise in the action.").
Thus, the recent cases against Napster and MP3.com were brought by a group of
record companies. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001)
(including plaintiffs A&M Records, Geffen Records, Interscope Records, Sony
Music, MCA Records, Atlantic Recording, Island Records, Motown Records, and
Capitol Records); UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, 92 F. Supp. 2d 349 (S.D.N.Y.
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the expense and allows each producer to influence the direction of
the litigation. In contrast, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do
not allow the test case defendant the same leeway to join other
similarly situated parties for a joint defense.' 9 As a result, a token-
fee settlement offer is also disproportionately attractive to the tar-
get defendant. Rejecting the settlement will force the target
defendant to bear the cost of defense alone, even though the legal
result the defendant is striving for would benefit many other simi-
larly situated parties. Accepting the settlement, in contrast, gives
the particular defendant express permission to continue its opera-
tion while creating the appearance that such express permission is
required. Accepting the settlement thus not only enables the par-
ticular defendant to ensure its own continued existence, but also
increases the pressure on the defendant's would-be competitors to
obtain a similar license at a no longer token-fee price. For these
reasons, an individual defendant may accept a settlement offer that
a unified defense would have rejected."7
While these repeat player advantages in the judicial process are
not foolproof, they offer copyright plaintiffs a unique opportunity
to skew the judicial process towards broader protection. The net
result has been that courts, rather than serving as guardians of the
public interest that the Constitution enshrines, have been partici-
pants in copyright's capture.
These advantages in the domestic arena have only grown as the
question of copyright's proper scope has become increasingly in-
2000) (including plaintiffs UMG Recordings, Sony Music, Warner Bros. Records,
Arista Records, Atlantic Recordings, BMG Music, Capitol Records, Elektra
Entertainment, Interscope Records, and Sire Records).
Fed. R. Civ. P. 14(a) (allowing a defendant to bring in a third party only where
the third party "is or may be liable to the third party plaintiff for all or part of the
plaintiffs claim against the third-party plaintiff"); see also Rose v. Chi., Rock Island
& Pac. R.R., 308 F. Supp. 1357, 1361 (W.D. Okla. 1970) (noting that a defendant is
allowed to join a third party only if the third party is derivatively liable to the
defendant for the plaintiffs loss; a defendant may not otherwise join another,
alternative defendant).
' In recent years, important cases have been settled while a petition for certiorari
was pending before the Court. See, e.g., Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60
F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994) (finding that copying of scientific journal articles for Texaco
research scientists constituted unfair use), cert. dismissed, 516 U.S. 1005 (1995).
Others have been settled following the issuance of a preliminary injunction. See, e.g.,
West Publ'g Co. v. Mead Data Cent., 799 F.2d 1219 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 1070 (1987).
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ternational. As students of political systems have long known, par-
liamentary systems, because they lack an independently elected
chief executive and offer a viable role for third parties, are particu-
larly susceptible to special interest group influence.29 Moreover,
until recently under the aegis of the European Union, much of
Europe lacked a strong and coherent antitrust enforcement pol-
icy.' As a result, copyright owners' influence was relatively
stronger in Europe than in the United States, and the important
counterweight that deadweight losses and other monopoly conse-
quences of overbroad copyright could offer was diminished. Given
these two considerations, copyright in many European countries
has long provided more extensive protection than copyright in the
United States.' Negotiations with Europe concerning copyright's
proper scope have led almost inevitably to an increase in the scope
of protection that draws American copyright further from the pub-
lic interest that it is supposed to serve.' The fact that Congress has
empowered unelected officials to conduct these negotiations,'
with the results often presented to Congress as part of a larger
-SThe need for separation between the legislative and executive branches played a
prominent role in the Constitutional Convention and in the creation of the
constitutional provision for an infdependently elected chief executive. As James
Madison explained, quoting Montesquieu: "There can be no liberty where the
legislative and executive powers are united in the same person or body of
magistrates .... " The Federalist No. 47, at 270 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961). For further elaboration on the need for an executive independent of the
legislative branch, see The Federalist Nos. 48, 49, 51 (James Madison), Nos. 71, 73
(Alexander Hamilton).
Gabriele Dara, Antitrust Law in the European Community and the United
States: A Comparative Analysis, 47 La. L. Rev. 761,762 (1987) ("On the other side of
the Atlantic the statutory reaction to anti-competitive practices was much slower.
Apart from the Monopolies and Restrictive Practices (Inquiry and Control) Act of
1948, passed in the United Kingdbm, and the West German Gesetz gegen
Wettbewerbsbeschzakungen of 7.27.1957, none of the other European countries
developed any substantial antitrust legislation prior to the establishment of the
EEC."); Francis G. Jacobs, Civil Enforcement of EEC Antitrust Law, 82 Mich. L.
Rev. 1364 (1984).
Samuelson, supra note 269, at 394 ("Also noteworthy is the fact that the United
States has been a member of the Berne Union for less than a decade, whereas the
Europeans have been the dominant players in Berne Convention negotiations since
its inception. As welcome as the belated U.S. conversion to high protectionist norms
might be, many Europeans remember the errant nature of earlier U.S. ways.").
301 Id. at 430.
- Id. at 429-30.
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package deal, only compounds this quiet trampling of the public in-
terest.0
Taken together, the advantages available to copyright owners in
the political and legal battles over copyright's scope do not mean
that copyright owners will win every battle over copyright's expan-
sion. Even with their disadvantages, consumers may on occasion
rise up and defeat proposals for broader protection. Nevertheless,
these advantages mean that copyright owners will win more such
battles than they should. Whatever occasional defeats for broader
protection occur will likely prove only temporary setbacks,' and
the disproportionate influence of copyright owners should prove
decisive over the long run. A process biased in favor of overbroad
protection will lead, sooner or later, to a similarly biased result. For
that reason, traditional political avenues of opposition to copy-
right's evolution from public interest to private interest will likely
fail. If copyright has not yet been fully captured by the industry it is
supposed to regulate, it is only a matter of time.
Private copying, as a form of civil disobedience, can help counter
copyright's capture. Since its role in the founding of this nation,
civil disobedience has remained a vital force in our civic lives.305 In
the face of unjust laws, which copyright laws have increasingly be-
come, an individual has no choice but to withhold her consent and
, See id. at 409-15 (noting that the anti-circumvention provisions of the putative
DMCA closely track language that U.S. delegates proposed for the WIPO treaty on
anti-circumvention, but that was rejected by other delegations as too restrictive).
Although the MPAA and Columbia Pictures could not obtain a ruling barring
video rentals from either Congress or the courts, respectively, they managed to
persuade the U.S. trade representative to insert a provision barring video rentals
under certain circumstances into the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property. Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakech Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 1C, Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round vol. 31,
33 I.L.M. 81, § 1, art. 11, (1994) (requiring Members to "provide authors ... the right
to authorize or to prohibit the commercial rental to the public of originals or copies of
their copyright works," but excepting Members from this obligation for
cinematographic works where such rental has not "led to widespread copying").
Ronald Dworkin, A Matter of Principle 105 (1985) (noting that given its long
history in American politics, "civil disobedience has a legitimate if informal place in
the political culture of [the American] community"). See generally Civil Disobedience
in America: A Documentary History (David R. Weber ed., 1978) (collecting
American writings on civil disobedience from the seventeenth through the twentieth
centuries).
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force government to confront squarely the injustice it seeks to im-
pose. 6 Although private copying can serve as a form of civil
disobedience, it will prove effective only if copyright requires visi-
ble enforcement actions against ordinary citizens. Only such
actions will convince the ordinary Consumer that she too is affected
by overbroad copyright. A reading of the DMCA that severely re-
stricts access to decryption technology would likely confine the
ability to engage in private copying to an isolated technological
elite. Because copyright owners could more readily scapegoat such
an isolated elite as dangerous "hackers" or pernicious "pirates, ' a
strict reading of the DMCA would likely defeat the effectiveness of
private copying as a form of civil disobedience.
Such a result is undesirable. Think of copyright as a tax.' If
copyright owners.are allowed to enforce their rights through an ef-
fective technological lock, the full extent of the copyright tax
remains invisible to the typical consumer. Unaware of the tax they
are paying, consumers will fail to oppose it as vigorously as they
should, compounding the transaction cost and collective action dis-
- See Richard A. Vachon, The Relevance of St. Thomas More, 13 Cath. Law. 145,
147 (1967) (noting that one goal of civil disobedience is to call attention to an unjust
act of the government); Paul J. Weber, Toward a Theory of Civil Disobedience, 13
Cath. Law. 198, 202 (1967) (noting that civil disobedience is a form of protest against
injustice); see also Michael Walzer, Obligations: Essays on Disobedience, War, and
Citizenship, at xi-xii (1970) (arguing that a government is only just when the
governed have consented to the exercise of authority over themselves); Bruce
Ledewitz, Civil Disobedience, Injunctions, and the First Amendment, 19 Hofstra L.
Rev. 67, 90-91 (1990) (describing civil disobedience as a "conscientious protest" that
"encourage[s] citizens to keep faith with themselves").
See S. Rep. No. 105-190, at 8 (1998) (referring to need to provide copyright
owners with reassurance "that they will be protected against massive piracy" that the
Internet would otherwise create); H.R. Rep. No. 105-551, pt. 2, at 25 (1998) (asserting
that "digital technology enables pirates to reproduce and distribute perfect copies of
works-at virtually no cost at all to the pirate"); id. pt. 1, at 9 (1998) ("While such
rapid dissemination of perfect copies will benefit both U.S. owners and consumers, it
will unfortunately also facilitate pirates who aim to destroy the value of American
intellectual property.").
As Lord Macaulay long ago explained:
The principle of copyright is this. It is a tax on readers for the purpose of giving
a bounty to writers. The tax is an exceedingly bad one; it is a tax on one of the
most innocent and most salutary of human pleasures; and never let us forget,
that a tax on innocent pleasures is a premium on vicious pleasures.
Speech of Thomas Babington Macaulay on Copyright (Feb. 5, 1841), in 1 Thomas
Babington Macaulay, Miscellanies 235,243 (1900).
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advantages consumers already face.' But requiring copyright
owners to pursue infringement actions against ordinary consumers
directly increases the likelihood that consumers will become aware
of the full extent of the copyright tax they are paying, and improves
the chance that consumers will participate actively, either directly
or through civil disobedience, in the political debate over copy-
right's proper scope.
In a sense, the ability to engage in private copying empowers or-
dinary consumers to set the appropriate level of protection for
creative works. Such empowerment should not be taken as excuse
or license for consumers to copy without consideration of the con-
sequences. At the heart of civil disobedience is a willingness to
accept the official consequences of breaking an unjust law.1
Should consumers begin copying too freely, copyright owners re-
main free to bring the full weight of the law down on them, thus
provoking a political confrontation regarding copyright's just and
proper scope. Yet, requiring copyright owners to act directly
against ordinary citizens helps ensure that the resulting political
battle is more balanced. Rather than a disorganized and unaware
populace, copyright owners will confront a fully aroused and fully
aware citizenry. Even with their transaction costs and collective ac-
tion advantages, copyright owners should fear such a
confrontation.
Until copyright owners are prepared to place their privileges at
risk through such a confrontation, ordinary citizens should be free
to engage in private copying and to determine the proper level of
protection for themselves, rather than through their elected repre-
sentatives. Such an approach requires copyright owners to make
their case for broader protection to consumers directly. Because
these are the same consumers that will bear the full costs of
In addition, because government has authorized copyright owners to collect the
tax for themselves, revenues from the copyright tax never flow through the
government's coffers where their expenditure on works of authorship could be forced
to compete against other, more deserving programs.
"I See A.D. Woozley, Law and Obedience: The Arguments of Plato's Crito 141,
141-56 (1979) (presenting Socrates' view that an individual should accept even unjust
punishment for violating an unjust law); Martha Minow, Breaking the Law: Lawyers
and Clients in Struggles for Social Change, 52 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 723, 733 & n. 38 (1991)
(defining civil disobedience as "open acts violating the law accompanied by a
willingness to accept the official consequences"); Weber, supra note 306, at 202.
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broader protection, they are likely to prove a far more skeptical
audience than elected representatives who bear only a tiny fraction
of broader protection's costs. Setting protection levels through a
direct democratic process thus avoids the agency-cost problems as-
sociated with representative democracy.
Even if some free riding slips by, in the guise of civil disobedi-
ence or otherwise, the empirical evidence suggests that voluntary
compliance will likely prove sufficient to achieve a fair and effi-
cient level of effective protection.' As a result, private copying as
a form of direct democracy is likely to bring protection levels more
in line with the public welfare than is strong encryption-based pro-
tection.
IV. THE ALTERNATIVES REVISITED
Revisiting the alternative approaches for controlling the poten-
tial threat that private copying poses to the production of creative
works, this Article suggests that interpreting the DMCA to incor-
porate directly copyright's longstanding limitations on protection,
such as the fair use doctrine, would advance copyright's public
purpose. Federal law that enabled copyright owners to employ en-
cryption to protect their works as they see fit would likely prove
both undesirable and unconstitutional. Instead, copyright should
rely on some mixture of weak encryption and faith in American
consumers to ensure an adequate level of protection. If more pro-
tection proves necessary to ensure "the progress of Science," a
limited tax on copying technology and blank storage media would
likely prove far more consonant with the Constitution's public in-
terest requirement than a strong encryption-based regime.
Although it is initially tempting to reject an approach that incor-
porates a fair use defense into the DMCA's anti-circumvention
provisions directly, a closer look at private copying illustrates the
benefits of such an approach. The initial temptation arises because
incorporating a fair use defense into the DMCA, while ensuring
access to decryption technology for those with a fair or otherwise
non-infringing use for such technology, would also inevitably place
decryption technology in the hands of those intending an infringing
311 See supra text accompanying notes 158-77.
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use. As a result, incorporating the fair use defense into the DMCA
would not recapture the balance that copyright and the fair use
doctrine have established over the last two hundred years. It would
simply open the door to widespread private copying. Moreover,
such private copying would essentially be uncontrolled because the
technological lock would be broken and copyright's traditional in-
dividual lawsuit approach would prove prohibitively expensive.
This creates an all-or-nothing choice between having effective
technological protection and not having effective protection at all.
Given this choice, copyright's traditional incentives-based analysis
suggests that we choose effective technological protection even if
such protection bars otherwise fair or non-infringing uses. After all,
the traditional analysis seductively whispers, it is better to have the
works, albeit at a higher price, than risk not having them at all.
A closer look at private copying suggests that we can have our
works and lower prices too. Given the popularity networks inher-
ent in the marketing of creative works and given copyright's value-
based expansion over the last century, copyright protection has in-
creasingly awarded copyright producers exceedingly large returns
for the most popular works, while providing only slight encour-
agement to the marginal works that represent copyright's true
public purpose. To the extent that private copying increases with
the popularity of a work, private copying is not likely to reduce ma-
terially the incentives necessary to ensure the production of the
marginal works. Instead, private copying will simply enable con-
sumers to recapture the excess incentives otherwise given to more
popular works. In addition, by reducing excess incentives, private
copying will tend to remove the distortion and discouragement that
excess incentives will otherwise introduce into the authorship
process. Finally, private copying can enable consumers to set the
appropriate level of copyright protection directly, rather than
through their elected representatives. Private copying can thereby
reduce the agency-cost mistakes that a representative government
would otherwise introduce into the process of defining copyright's
proper scope and bring the protection available for creative works
more in line with the overarching public interest.
If further protection is warranted, neither a strong encryption-
based approach nor a levy-based approach is likely to balance per-
fectly the public and private interests at stake. As between them,
2001]
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however, a limited tax on copying technology and storage media is
likely to prove more desirable. This conclusion was personally sur-
prising, yet it appears inescapable. Although three difficulties arise
with a levy-based approach, comparable problems arise and are
likely to prove more substantial with strong encryption-based pro-
tection. Moreover, a levy-based approach offers two clear
advantages over strong encryption in tailoring protection to serve
the public interest: (1) directing incentives towards the marginal,
rather than the non-marginal, work; and (2) ensuring a more bal-
anced political battle over the proper level of protection.
The first difficulty that a levy-based approach presents is that a
uniform levy on copying technology and storage media artificially
inflates the price of such equipment and also requires those using
the technology for legitimate purposes to pay tribute to copyright
owners. Yet, a strong encryption-based approach entails a similar
cost by denying access to decryption technology to those intending
a fair or otherwise legitimate use of a copyrighted work. Thus, both
approaches, in attempting to address the risk of private copying,
treat legitimate users of the technology as if they were illegitimate
infringers. In that sense, the two approaches are equally inefficient
and equally unfair to those intending a legitimate use. As between
them, however, a levy-based approach is better able to allow for
legitimate uses, for example by exempting certain types of re-
cording equipment or by granting certain institutions exemptions
from the levies.'
The second difficulty is that a uniform levy discourages the crea-
tion and introduction of new and innovative distribution
technologies by forcing manufacturers to turn over a portion of the
rents associated with their innovation to copyright owners. But a
strong encryption-based approach has similar effects."' Because
3 See 17 U.S.C. § 1001(3) (1994) (excluding "professional model products" from
the general definition of a "digital audio recording device").
3"'From the mid-1970s through its expiration in March 1993, Congress gave the
President fast-track authority to negotatiate trade agreements. See Steve Charnovitz,
No Time for NEPA: Trade Agreements on a Fast Track, 3 Minn. J. Global Trade 195,
201-04 (1994). With the fast track procedure, Congress agreed in advance not to
amend trade agreements proposed by the President and also agreed to vote on such
agreements within sixty days of their proposal. Id. Although the fast track procedure
expired in March 1993, responsibility for negotiating international intellectual
property agreements still fell to unelected administration officials. See Samuelson,
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new distribution technologies and copyrighted works are comple-
ments, extending protection for preexisting copyrighted works to
new forms of distribution enables copyright owners to extract a full
monopolist's share of the value added by the new technology."4 It
thereby reduces the rents available for innovative distribution
technologies and increases the effective price of such technologies
to consumers.31 To the extent that encryption enables copyright
owners to price discriminate more effectively, it will allow copy-
right owners to capture that much more of the value added by the
new distribution technologies, leaving that much less to encourage
their innovation.
The third difficulty is that a uniform levy expressly authorizes
private copying and may therefore convert private copying from a
marginal to a mainstream activity. Although this difficulty is trou-
bling, a levy-based approach at least has the virtue of
acknowledging reality. Given that private copying is likely to con-
tinue, retaining a formal prohibition on private copying that is
supra note 269, at 430 (noting that Commissioner Lehman "alone would be in charge
of presenting the U.S. position" at the December 1996 WIPO meeting to discuss
proposed treaties for updating intellectual property protection to reflect digital
technologies).
11 See Ward S. Bowman, Jr., Patent and Antitrust Law 70-76 (1973) (using an
example from patent law); Richard A. Posner, Antitrust Law 173 (1976). The classic
example economists offer to explore the relationship between complements and
market power concerns shoes. Assume, for example, that consumers are uniformly
willing to pay $10 for a pair of shoes, and that a pair of shoes costs $5 to make. In a
perfectly competitive market, a pair of shoes will cost $5. If a single entity controls the
production of shoes generally, then it will raise prices to $10 and earn a monopoly
profit of $5 per pair. Yet, to earn such a monopoly profit, the entity need not have a
monopoly over the production of all shoes; it is sufficient if the entity has a monopoly
over the production of left shoes alone. If right shoes are produced in a perfectly
competitive market and sold at their cost of $2.50 per shoe, then our left shoe
monopolist can earn the same $5 monopoly profit per pair by selling left shoes at
$7.50 each. Although the problem becomes more complicated with more realistic cost
and demand functions, the shoe example establishes the basic principle that with
complements, sometimes a monopoly on one of the necessary products is as good,
from the monopolist's point of view, as a monopoly on both or all of the necessary
products. See Lunney, supra note 194, at 39-40.
" If both the manufacturer of the new distribution technology and the copyright
owners enjoy market power, the fact that the technology and copyrighted works are
complements may lead to a double monopoly mark-up on the price consumers must
pay for the combination of the two. See Bowman, supra note 314, at 72; Varian, supra
note 148, at 463-65. In such a case, as Professor Varian explains, "[t]he price is not
only too high from a social point of view, it is too high from the viewpoint of
maximizing total monopoly profits!" Id. at 465.
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routinely ignored has costs as well 1 6 A levy-based approach would
also avoid the Ninth Circuit's unseemly condemnation of Napster
users as copyright infringers both en masse and in abstentia.317 Al-
though the Ninth Circuit's ruling is not binding against Napster
users,318 any approach that requires a blanket finding of infringe-
ment against an unrepresented party (or a very large number of
unrepresented parties) raises the specter of judicial and govern-
mental over-reaching. Perhaps the Ninth Circuit would have
reached the same conclusion even if the millions of Napster users
had individually presented their cases to the court, although, as
Justice John Paul Stevens noted in his initial draft dissent in the
Sony Corp. case? "no interested party has ever seriously suggested
that a penalty, or any form of statutory liability, should be imposed
upon an individual for making a single copy of any copyrighted
work for his own private use.""3 9 Given that the individual Napster
users had no opportunity to be heard, the Ninth Circuit's conclu-
sions regarding the propriety of their actions are inherently
suspect. In addition, the harm that may result from formally ac-
knowledging private copying must be balanced against the harm
that will result from formally converting the protection of creative
works from copyright into guild monopoly. Unjust laws always
carry a price. The price of turning our system of protecting creative
316 For example, given that home audio-taping had been going on for years without
any legal action by the copyright owners, it is quite incongruous to read a statement
asserting that such behavior is, was, and always has been illegal. Compare Burt A.
Leete, Betamax and Sound Recordings: Is Copyright in Trouble?, 23 Am. Bus. L.J.
551, 557 (1986) ("Clearly, home audio recording of copyrighted material is illegal
under the current Act and may always have been."), with Lardner, supra note 31, at
215 ("Besides, [the MPAA] worried that the ability to record copyrighted music free
of charge had become so commonplace and so undisputed that it could no longer be
challenged; and they worried that the video royalty would become tainted by
association.").
3"7A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1014 (9th Cir. 2001)
("Napster users who upload file names to the search index for others to copy violate
plaintiffs' distribution rights. Napster users who download files containing
copyrighted music violate plaintiffs' reproduction rights.").
318 Under the rules of estoppel, a party not present cannot be bound by an earlier
decision. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322,327 n.7 (1979) ("It is a violation
of due process for a judgment to be binding on a litigant who was not a party or a
privy and therefore has never had an opportunity to be heard.").
319 Goldstein, supra note 10, at 152 (reprinting a portion of Justice Stevens' proposed
dissent).
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works over to the private interests of copyright producers will
prove high indeed.
Moreover, as compared to a strong encryption-based approach,
a levy-based approach offers two clear advantages. First, rather
than simply maximizing revenue for the most popular works, a
levy-based approach can be tailored to increase the revenue avail-
able to marginal works. In Europe, a number of countries
specifically require a certain percentage of the levy funds to be set
aside for specified social and cultural purposes.2 Some countries
allocate additional shares of the levies for certain types of works;
others allocate a specified percentage to new authors.21 Although
questions may arise over how these "discretionary" funds are allo-
cated, simple modifications to the formula for calculating shares
can redistribute revenue from the most popular works to the mar-
ginal works."- Through such manipulation, a levy-based approach
may encourage the production of marginal works and ensure a bet-
',o Deloitte & Touche, supra note 135, at 60 ("French legislation of 1985
strengthened the role of promotion of cultural life by obligating the SGCs [collective
rights organizations] to allocate 25% of the remunerations for private copying and
50% of the non-distributable sums arising from the public broadcasting of recordings
[to social and cultural purposes]."). Members of the collective rights organization are
typically entitled to control disbursement of the levy portion set aside for social and
cultural purposes. Id. ("Control of the use of the funds allocated for social and
cultural expenditure and of the non-distributable sums: the allocation of the sums in
question is generally part of the member control carried out by the members of the
SGC .... "),
'', See Gr6ndahl, supra note 142 ("Characteristically, France reserves 25 per cent of
the proceeds from hardware sales for a fund to promote young or avant-garde
artists.").
-'For example, take the Nielsen ratings for January 18 to January 24, 1999. Nielsen
Ratings, Jan. 18-24, 1999 (Jan. 27, 1999), at http.//nielsen-ratings.tripod.com/nielsen8.htm.
Allocating the private copying levies to each of the 125 identified prime-time shows
by the show's Nielsen rating as a fraction of the total Nielsen ratings, the most
popular show would receive 2.65% of the levies and the two least popular shows
would each receive 0.037% of the levies. The two least popular shows would therefore
receive levy revenue only 1.4% of that received by the most popular show. If,
however, we allocate each of the 125 shows one point to start with and then allocate
revenue by a fraction equal to (a show's Nielsen rating plus one) divided by (the total
Nielsen ratings plus 125), then the most popular show would receive 2.4% of the
levies and the two least popular shows would receive 0.14%. As a result, while the
two least popular shows would still receive less levy revenue, under this system, they
would each receive levy revenue equal to 5.8% of that received by the most popular
show-a more than four-fold increase of their relative shares.
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ter fit between our system of copyright protection and the public
interest in encouraging additional works.
Second, a government-set levy is likely to be more fair and effi-
cient than prices set by the copyright industry and enforced
through strong encryption-based protection. Although David Ladd
has denounced compulsory licenses as government meddling with
the market,.' the notion that prices for copyrighted works are in-
dependent of government meddling is facially absurd. Prices for
copyrighted works are a direct function of the level of copyright
protection the government has provided. The notion that the prices
resulting from any given level of government-provided protection
are somehow natural or efficient is simply mistaken. If the gov-
ernment provides too much protection, prices will be inefficiently
high (or perhaps, output will be too low). 24 Moreover, even if
copyright were perfectly tailored to the public interest and only
went so far as to correct the market failure associated with the
production of creative works, popularity networks and other natu-
ral monopoly characteristics of copyrighted works, as well as the
concentration of the copyright industries,' would likely ensure
that the resulting market prices were neither fair nor efficient.
Strong encryption-based protection is likely to worsen this Iroblem
by enabling the copyright industries to exploit their market power
more fully, further distorting the allocation of scarce resources
such as creativity.
-Ladd, supra note 199, at 431 ("Whatever one thinks of the comparative merits of
national economic planning and free markets, or of government as an instrument of
wealth distribution, our government should abstain as much as possible from
intervention in the copyright world, and willingly forebear from setting or affecting
the value or price of works of authorship.'). The sentiment is a curious one given that
Mr. Ladd's opinions on the issue were important primarily because of his position as
Register of Copyrights.
Prices and output usually work hand-in-hand. An individual can set a high price
only if she can reduce her output, and will reduce her output only if she can receive a
higher price in return. For authors, however, who do not enjoy their own market
power but are simply following the prices set by more popular authors, we might
think of price and output as separate (or at least separable) decisions.
2 See Hayes, supra note 221, at 9 (displaying chart that attributes 70.4% of the
domestic box office in 2000 to six movie studios); Rick Karr, Record Labels Begin to
Respond to Settlement Offer Napster Made Public Yesterday, All Things
Considered, Feb. 21, 2001, LEXIS, News Library, National Public Radio File (noting
that the five major record labels in the Napster case had a market share of roughly
75%).
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By challenging the copyright industries' unilateral power to set
prices, adoption of a government-set levy would ameliorate the in-
efficiency that a strong encryption-based regime and its associated
high prices would bring. By setting levies at a level below that re-
quired to equalize the market price of an authorized copy and the
cost of making a copy privately, the government can enable private
copying to become a source of competition that exerts downward
pressure on the authorized copy's market price. 26 To the extent
that the "market" price would otherwise reflect monopolistic ele-
ments or over-broad copyright protection, such competitive
pressure can bring market prices closer to the competitive ideal.' 7
Undoubtedly, the copyright industries will attempt to use their
transaction cost and collective action advantages to persuade gov-
ernment to set a levy sufficiently high so that private copying does
not pose a threat to their market power. Yet, with a levy-based ap-
proach, the tax is readily visible and therefore more likely to raise
consumers' ire. The political battle over the proper levy may not
therefore prove as lopsided as the battle over copyright's proper
scope. Moreover, levies on copying equipment threaten directly
the sales and profits of those who manufacture and distribute copy-
ing equipment. While an interest group with its own agenda cannot
always serve as an effective representative for consumers generally,
in the case of levies, the interest of equipment manufacturers are
likely to parallel closely the interests of consumers. Equipment
manufacturers are also better organized, more concentrated, and
more cohesive than consumers, and should therefore be more ef-
fective at opposing high levies. Indeed, equipment manufacturers
enjoy transaction costs and collective action advantages compara-
ble to those enjoyed by the copyright industries, making the two
well matched as political opponents on the levy issue. Rather than
seeing and hearing only one side of the story, legislators and gov-
126 If a CD in the store costs $14.95, and a private copy of the CD can be made for
$0.95, then the levy on the blank CD will determine the ultimate price of the private
copy. A high levy of $14 per blank CD will make the average consumer indifferent
between the private copy and the store-bought copy (assuming the two CDs are
otherwise identical and that all costs are fully incorporated in the $14.95 price). A levy
in excess of $14 will lead the average consumer to forego private copying. A levy
below $14 may lead some consumers to switch to private copying and place
competitive pressure on the copyright owner's $14.95 price.
127 Lunney, supra note 182, at 449.
2001] 917
918 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 87:813
eminent officials will see and hear both sides. In contrast to the de-
cidedly uneven battles between the copyright industries and
consumers over copyright's proper scope, this more balanced po-
litical battle between the copyright industries and equipment
manufacturers over levies would enable Congress to set levies at an
efficient and fair level.'
CONCLUSION: PREPARING COPYRIGHT FOR THE DIGITAL
MILLENNIUM
As we begin a new millennium, we face a choice both as to how,
and more importantly why, we protect creative works. As to the
how, Congress's premise in enacting the DMCA was sound: Digital
technology has fundamentally altered the landscape. In the face of
widespread private copying, copyright's traditional approach of di-
rect legal action against the individual copier, while sensible in the
last millennium, has become increasingly unworkable. When the
copiers number in the millions, it is simply impractical to attempt
to control their behavior through lawsuits directed at each individ-
ual. While copyright's traditional approach will remain important
for protecting non-digital works and for controlling traditional
forms of infringement, addressing widespread private copying will
require a different approach. For that reason, the methods of pro-
tection of creative works in a digital environment need to change.
Yet, digital technology justifies no similar change in the underlying
reasons to protect creative works. Even if digital technology has
rendered copyright's direct legal action paradigm anachronistic,
copyright's more fundamental message remains as timely today as
when first spoken in the Statute of Anne nearly three hundred
years ago: Protection of creative works should serve the public, and
not merely a private, interest.
In designing protection for the digital age, we must first deter-
mine whether the possibility of widespread private copying
31 Thus, in contrast to the steady expansion of copyright protection, opposition from
consumers and manufacturers has kept levy rates on private copying equipment at a
constant level in Germany since 1986. Kreile, supra note 136 ("As one of the
imminent next steps, the Minister of Justice subsequently announced an increase in
copyright royalties in the sector of private copying, since statutory remuneration,
having remained unchanged for fourteen years, has led to a 'wage freeze' for
authors.").
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threatens the public interest in ensuring an adequate supply and
distribution of creative work, or merely the private interest in
maximizing the copyright industries' revenue. Although the copy-
right industries have been quick to proclaim their doom should we
fail to address the risk of widespread private copying, their cries in
this regard are not new. During the hearings surrounding the Sony
Corp. decision, one of the law firms representing the Motion Pic-
ture Association of America boldly proclaimed: "Unless Congress
acts to compensate copyright owners for the home taping of their
intellectual property, the audiovisual marketplace will become a
barren wasteland of programming that does not edify, nor inspire
nor entertain."3 More than a decade and a half later, it is obvious
that the copyright industries were exactly wrong in predicting the
likely effects of home videotaping.
A closer look at private copying suggests that the copyright in-
dustries are equally wrong in their predictions with respect to
digital technology. Private copying may reduce the excessive incen-
tives currently given the most popular works, but is unlikely to
reduce revenues for less popular, marginal works. Whatever threat
private copying poses to the private interest of the copyright indus-
tries, it poses no threat to the public interest.
Although constitutionally constrained to serve the public inter-
est, Congress has nevertheless embraced a strong encryption-based
approach to preventing private copying and has thereby turned its
responsibility for defining the proper scope of protection for crea-
tive works over to the copyright industries. In doing so, Congress
has recreated an approach to protection that relies on technologi-
cal controls backed by legal prohibition-an approach last seen
during the reign of the Stationers' Company in England over three
hundred years ago. Once established, the Stationers' Company's
monopoly lasted 138 years. With history as a lesson, we can only
'- Lardner, supra note 31, at 229; see also Home Recording Hearings, supra note
205, at 142 ("Unless we do something to insure that the creators of the material are
not exploited by the electronics revolution, that same revolution which Will make it
possible for almost every household to have an audio and video recorder will surely
undermine, cripple, and eventually wash away the very industries on which it
feeds....") (statement of Howard Oliver, Executive Secretary, American Federation
of Television and Radio Artists).
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hope that the new guild monopoly created by the DMCA will not
hold sway so long.
